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Albert O. Hirschman

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Notes on the Post-Industrial Society (I)
Daniel Bell

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COMMENT

The Bureaucracy Problem

JAMES Q. WILSON

THE federal bureaucracy, whose growth and problems were once only the concern of the Right, has now become a major concern of the Left, the Center, and almost all points in between. Conservatives once feared that a powerful bureaucracy would work a social revolution. The Left now fears that this same bureaucracy is working a conservative reaction. And the Center fears that the bureaucracy isn't working at all.

Increasing federal power has always been seen by conservatives in terms of increasing *bureaucratic* power. If greater federal power merely meant, say, greater uniformity in government regulations — standardized trucking regulations, for example, or uniform professional licensing practices — a substantial segment of American businessmen would probably be pleased. But growing federal power means increased discretion vested in appointive officials whose behavior can neither be anticipated nor controlled. The behavior of state and local bureaucrats, by contrast, can often be anticipated *because* it can be controlled by businessmen and others.

Knowing this, liberals have always resolved most questions in favor of enhancing federal power. The "hacks" running local administrative agencies were too often, in liberal eyes, the agents of local political and economic forces — businessmen, party bosses, organized professions, and the like. A federal bureaucrat, because he was responsible to a national power center and to a single President elected by a nationwide constituency, could not so easily be bought off by local vested interests; in addition, he would take his policy guidance from a President elected by a process that gave heavy weight to the votes of urban, labor, and minority groups. The New Deal bureaucrats, especially those appointed to the new, "emergency" agencies, were expected by liberals to be free to chart a radically new program and to be competent to direct its implementation.

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It was an understandable illusion. It frequently appears in history in the hopes of otherwise intelligent and far-sighted men. Henry II thought his clerks and scribes would help him subdue England's feudal barons; how was he to know that in time they would become the agents of Parliamentary authority directed at stripping the king of his prerogatives? And how were Parliament and its Cabinet ministers, in turn, to know that eventually these permanent undersecretaries would become an almost self-governing class whose day-to-day behavior would become virtually immune to scrutiny or control? Marxists thought that Soviet bureaucrats would work for the people, despite the fact that Max Weber had pointed out why one could be almost certain they would work mostly for themselves. It is ironic that among today's members of the "New Left," the "Leninist problem" – i.e., the problem of over-organization and of self-perpetuating administrative power – should become a major preoccupation.

This apparent agreement among polemicists of the Right and Left that there is a bureaucracy problem accounts, one suspects, for the fact that non-bureaucratic solutions to contemporary problems seem to command support from both groups. The negative income tax as a strategy for dealing with poverty is endorsed by economists of such different persuasions as Milton Friedman and James Tobin, and has received favorable consideration among members of both the Goldwater brain trust and the Students for Democratic Society. Though the interests of the two groups are somewhat divergent, one common element is a desire to scuttle the social workers and the public welfare bureaucracy, who are usually portrayed as prying busybodies with pursed lips and steel-rimmed glasses ordering midnight bedchecks in public housing projects. (Police officers who complain that television makes them look like fools in the eyes of their children will know just what the social workers are going through.)

Now that everybody seems to agree that we ought to do something about the problem of bureaucracy, one might suppose that something would get done. Perhaps a grand reorganization, accompanied by lots of "systems analysis," "citizen participation," "creative federalism," and "interdepartmental co-ordination." Merely to state this prospect is to deny it.

There is not one bureaucracy problem, there are several, and the solution to each is in some degree incompatible with the solution to every other. First, there is the problem of accountability or control – getting the bureaucracy to serve agreed-on national goals. Second is the problem of equity – getting bureaucrats to treat like cases alike and on the basis of clear rules, known in advance. Third is the problem of efficiency – maximizing output for a given expenditure, or mini-

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mizing expenditures for a given output. Fourth is the problem of responsiveness – inducing bureaucrats to meet, with alacrity and compassion, those cases which can never be brought under a single national rule and which, by common human standards of justice or benevolence, seem to require that an exception be made or a rule stretched. Fifth is the problem of fiscal integrity – properly spending and accounting for public money.

Each of these problems mobilizes a somewhat different segment of the public. The problem of power is the unending preoccupation of the President and his staff, especially during the first years of an administration. Equity concerns the lawyers and the courts, though increasingly the Supreme Court seems to act as if it thinks its job is to help set national goals as a kind of auxiliary White House. Efficiency has traditionally been the concern of businessmen who thought, mistakenly, that an efficient government was one that didn't spend very much money. (Of late, efficiency has come to have a broader and more accurate meaning as an optimal relationship between objectives and resources. Robert McNamara has shown that an "efficient" Department of Defense costs a lot more money than an "inefficient" one; his disciples are now carrying the message to all parts of a skeptical federal establishment.) Responsiveness has been the concern of individual citizens and of their political representatives, usually out of wholly proper motives, but sometimes out of corrupt ones. Congress, especially, has tried to retain some power over the bureaucracy by intervening on behalf of tens of thousands of immigrants, widows, businessmen, and mothers-of-soldiers, hoping that the collective effect of many individual interventions would be a bureaucracy that, on large matters as well as small, would do Congress's will. (Since Congress only occasionally has a clear will, this strategy only works occasionally.) Finally, fiscal integrity – especially its absence – is the concern of the political "outs" who want to get in and thus it becomes the concern of "ins" who want to keep them out.

Obviously the more a bureaucracy is responsive to its clients – whether those clients are organized by radicals into Mothers for Adequate Welfare or represented by Congressmen anxious to please constituents – the less it can be accountable to presidential directives. Similarly, the more equity, the less responsiveness. And a preoccupation with fiscal integrity can make the kind of program budgeting required by enthusiasts of efficiency difficult, if not impossible.

Indeed, of all the groups interested in bureaucracy, those concerned with fiscal integrity usually play the winning hand. To be efficient, one must have clearly stated goals, but goals are often hard to state at all, much less clearly. To be responsive, one must be willing to run risks, and the career civil service is not ordinarly attractive to people with a taste for risk. Equity is an abstraction, of concern for

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the most part only to people who haven't been given any. Accountability is "politics," and the bureaucracy itself is the first to resist that (unless, of course, it is the kind of politics that produces pay raises and greater job security.) But an absence of fiscal integrity is welfare chiseling, sweetheart deals, windfall profits, conflict of interest, malfeasance in high places – in short, corruption. Everybody recognizes *that* when he sees it, and none but a few misguided academics have anything good to say about it. As a result, fiscal scandal typically becomes the standard by which a bureaucracy is judged (the FBI is good because it hasn't had any, the Internal Revenue Service is bad because it has) and thus the all-consuming fear of responsible executives.

If it is this hard to make up one's mind about how one wants the bureaucracy to behave, one might be forgiven if one threw up one's hands and let nature take its course. Though it may come to that in the end, it is possible – and important – to begin with a resolution to face the issue squarely and try to think through the choices. Facing the issue means admitting what, in our zeal for new programs, we usually ignore: *There are inherent limits to what can be accomplished by large hierarchical organizations.*

The opposite view is more often in vogue. If enough people don't like something, it becomes a problem; if the intellectuals agree with them, it becomes a crisis; any crisis must be solved; if it must be solved, then it can be solved – and creating a new organization is the way to do it. If the organization fails to solve the problem (and when the problem is a fundamental one, it will almost surely fail), then the reason is "politics," or "mismanagement," or "incompetent people," or "meddling," or "socialism," or "inertia."

Some problems cannot be solved and some government functions cannot, in principle, be done well. Notwithstanding, the effort must often be made. The rule of reason should be to try to do as few undoable things as possible. It is regrettable, for example, that any country must have a foreign office, since none can have a good one. The reason is simple: it is literally impossible to have a "policy" with respect to *all* relevant matters concerning *all* foreign countries, much less a consistent and reasonable policy. And the difficulty increases with the square of the number of countries, and probably with the cube of the speed of communications. The problem long ago became insoluble and any sensible Secretary of State will cease trying to solve it. He will divide his time instead between *ad hoc* responses to the crisis of the moment and appearances on Meet the Press.

The answer is not, it must be emphasized, one of simply finding good people, though it is at least that. Most professors don't think much of the State Department, but it is by no means clear that a

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department made up only of professors would be any better, and some reason to believe that it would be worse. One reason is that bringing in "good outsiders," especially good outsiders from universities, means bringing in men with little experience in dealing with the substantive problem but many large ideas about how to approach problems "in general." General ideas, no matter how soundly based in history or social science, rarely tell one what to do tomorrow about the visit from the foreign trade mission from Ruritania or the questions from the Congressional appropriations subcommittee.

Another reason is that good people are in very short supply, even assuming we knew how to recognize them. Some things literally cannot be done – or cannot be done well – because there is no one available to do them who knows how. *The supply of able, experienced executives is not increasing nearly as fast as the number of problems being addressed by public policy.* All the fellowships, internships, and "mid-career training programs" in the world aren't likely to increase that supply very much, simply because the essential qualities for an executive – judgment about men and events, a facility for making good guesses, a sensitivity to political realities, and an ability to motivate others – are things which, if they can be taught at all, cannot be taught systematically or to more than a handful of apprentices at one time.

This constraint deserves emphasis, for it is rarely recognized as a constraint at all. Anyone who opposed a bold new program on the grounds that there was nobody around able to run it would be accused of being a pettifogger at best and a reactionary do-nothing at worst. Everywhere except in government, it seems, the scarcity of talent is accepted as a fact of life. Nobody (or almost nobody) thinks seriously of setting up a great new university overnight, because anybody familiar with the university business knows that, for almost any professorship one would want to fill, there are rarely more than five (if that) really top-flight people in the country, and they are all quite happy – and certainly well-paid – right where they are. Lots of new business ideas don't become profit-making realities because good business executives are both hard to find and expensive to hire. The government – at least publicly – seems to act as if the supply of able political executives were infinitely elastic, though people setting up new agencies will often admit privately that they are so frustrated and appalled by the shortage of talent that the only wonder is why disaster is so long in coming. Much would be gained if this constraint were mentioned to Congress *before* the bill is passed and the hopes aroused, instead of being mentioned afterward as an excuse for failure or as a reason why higher pay scales for public servants are an urgent necessity. "Talent is Scarcer Than Money" should be the motto of the Budget Bureau.

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If administrative feasibility is such a critical issue, what can be done about it? Not a great deal. If the bureaucracy problem is a major reason why so many programs are in trouble, it is also a reason why the problem itself cannot be "solved." But it can be mitigated – though not usually through the kinds of expedients we are fond of trying: Hoover Commissions, management studies, expensive consultants, co-ordinating committees, "czars," and the like. The only point at which very much leverage can be gained on the problem *is when we decide what it is we are trying to accomplish.* When we define our goals, we are implictly deciding how much, or how little, of a bureaucracy problem we are going to have. A program with clear objectives, clearly stated, is a program with a fighting chance of coping with each of the many aspects of the bureaucracy problem. Controlling an agency is easier when you know what you want. Equity is more likely to be assured when over-all objectives can be stated, at least in part, in general rules to which people in and out of the agency are asked to conform. Efficiency is made possible when you know what you are buying with your money. Responsiveness is never easy or wholly desirable; if every person were treated in accordance with his special needs, there would be no program at all. (The only system that meets the responsiveness problem squarely is the free market.) But at least with clear objectives we would know what we are giving up in those cases when responsiveness seems necessary, and thus we would be able to decide how much we are willing to tolerate. And fiscal integrity is just as easy to insure in a system with clear objectives as in one with fuzzy ones; in the former case, moreover, we are less likely to judge success simply in terms of avoiding scandal. We might even be willing to accept a little looseness if we knew what we were getting for it.

The rejoinder to this argument is that there are many government functions which, by their nature, can never have clear objectives. I hope I have made it obvious by now that I am aware of that. We can't stop dealing with foreign nations just because we don't know what we want; after all, they may know what *they* want, and we had better find out. My argument is advanced, not as a panacea – there is no way to avoid the problem of administration – but as a guide to choice in those cases where choice is open to us, and as a criterion by which to evaluate proposals for coping with the bureaucracy problem.

Dealing with poverty – at least in part – by giving people money seems like an obvious strategy. Governments are very good at taking money from one person and giving it to another; the goals are not particularly difficult to state; measures are available to evaluate how well we are doing in achieving a predetermined income distribution. There may be many things wrong with this approach, but adminis-

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trative difficulty is not one of them. And yet, paradoxically, it is the last approach we will probably try. We will try everything else first – case work, counseling, remedial education, community action, federally-financed mass protests to end "alienation," etc. And whatever else might be said in their favor, the likelihood of smooth administration and ample talent can hardly be included.

Both the White House and the Congress seem eager to do something about the bureaucracy problem. All too often, however, the problem is described in terms of "digesting" the "glut" of new federal programs – as if solving administrative difficulties had something in common with treating heartburn. Perhaps those seriously concerned with this issue will put themselves on notice that they ought not to begin with the pain and reach for some administrative bicarbonate of soda; they ought instead to begin with what was swallowed and ask whether an emetic is necessary. *Coping with the bureaucracy problem is inseparable from rethinking the objectives of the programs in question.* Administrative reshuffling, budgetary cuts (or budgetary increases), and congressional investigation of lower-level boondoggling will not suffice and are likely, unless there are some happy accidents, to make matters worse. Thinking clearly about goals is a tough assignment for a political system that has been held together in great part by compromise, ambiguity, and contradiction. And if a choice must be made, any reasonable person would, I think, prefer the system to the clarity. But now that we have decided to intervene in such a wide range of human affairs, perhaps we ought to reassess that particular trade-off.

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The principle of the hiding hand

ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN

After two decades of intensive work by social scientists, the processes of economic, social, and political development of the so-called underdeveloped countries — in Latin America, Asia, and Africa — remain poorly understood. Theories that were attractive because of their simplicity and because they had clear-cut and hopeful policy implications have been badly battered by academic critics; worse, they have been faulted by events. Nevertheless, it is not true to say that we have learned nothing from the experience of the past twenty years. It's just that what we have learned is not quite what we expected to learn. . . .

I

The Karnaphuli pulp and paper mill is one of the earliest large-scale industrial enterprises to have been set up in Pakistan after partition and independence. Planned by the official Industrial Development Corporation to utilize the vast resources of the bamboo forests of the Chittagong Hill Tracts along the upper reaches of the Karnaphuli river in East Pakistan, the mill started to operate in 1953. It had perhaps more than its share of technical and managerial teething troubles, but considerable progress had been achieved in these respects by 1959 when management of the mill passed into private hands. Soon thereafter, a major upset endangered the very life of the mill: the bamboo began to flower, an event entirely unforeseen and

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probably unforeseeable in the present state of our knowledge, since it occurs only once every 50 to 70 years: given the resulting paucity of observations, the life cycle of the many varieties of bamboo is by no means fully known. In any event, the variety which supplied the Karnaphuli mill with some 85% of its raw material, flowered and then, poetically but quite uneconomically, died.

It was known that flowering of the bamboo results in death of the whole plant and in regeneration from the seeds, rather than, as normally, from the rhizomes; but it was *not* known that the bamboo that dies upon flowering would be unusable for pulping since it would disintegrate upon being transported and floated down the river. Another unpleasant surprise was the discovery that, once flowering was over, a number of years would have to pass before the new bamboo shoots would grow up to the normal size fit for commercial exploitation. In its seventh year of operation, the mill therefore faced the extraordinary task of having to find itself another raw material base.

In a temporary and costly way, the problem was solved by importing pulp, but other, more creative responses were not long in coming: an organization to collect bamboo in villages throughout East Pakistan was set up (the waterways crisscrossing the country make for cheap transportation of bulky cargo), sundry lumber was cut in the Tracts, and, most important, a research program got underway to identify other fast growing species which might to some extent replace the unreliable bamboo as the principal raw material base for the mill. Permission was obtained to plant an experimental area of six square miles with several of the more promising species and plans to cover eventually a much larger area are underway. Thus, the crisis of the flowering bamboo may in the end lead to a diversification of the raw material base for the mill.

Looking backward it may be said that the Karnaphuli mill was "lucky": its planners had badly overestimated the permanent availability of bamboo, but the mill escaped the possibly disastrous consequences of this error by an offsetting underestimate or, more correctly, by the unsuspected availability of alternative raw materials.

The question which I wish to explore is whether this really is a matter of pure luck or whether there are reasons to expect some systematic association of such providentially offsetting errors. A phenomenon very similar to the one just noted can be observed in successful irrigation and irrigation-hydroelectric projects: the river that is being tapped is frequently found not to have enough water for all the agricultural, industrial, and urban uses which had been planned or which are staking claims, but the resulting shortage can then often be remedied by drawing on other sources which had not been within the horizon of the planners: ground water can be lifted

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by tubewells, the river flow can be better regulated through upstream dams, or the water of more distant rivers can be diverted. At present such plans are afoot for the San Lorenzo irrigation scheme in Peru, and for the Damodor Valley in India.

It would obviously be silly to expect that any overestimate of the availability of a given material resource is always going to be offset by an underestimate of alternative or substitute resources; but if we generalize a little more, we obtain a statement which no longer sounds wholly absurd: on the contrary, it is quite plausible and almost trite to state that each project comes into the world accompanied by two sets of partially or wholly offsetting potential developments: (1) a set of possible and unsuspected threats to its profitability and existence, and (2) a set of unsuspected remedial actions which can be taken whenever any of these threats materializes.

We have much experience of development projects that fit this very broad proposition. For example, the San Lorenzo irrigation project in Northern Peru suffered serious and at times exasperating delays caused by political change and second thoughts on the kind of irrigation farming which the project should promote; but the economic losses implied by these delays were at least in part offset by the fact that, as a result of these second thoughts, San Lorenzo irrigation eventually became a pilot project for the subdivision of land into small but viable family farms, with credit and technical assistance being given to previously landless farmers; the project thus set an entirely new pattern for Peruvian agriculture and turned into a breeding ground for administrators who would be ready to apply elsewhere in Peru the lessons learnt in San Lorenzo.

A Uruguayan livestock and pasture improvement project also experienced extraordinary delays, first because of slowness in political and administrative decision-making and then because the key technical task of improving the natural grasslands by introduction of legumes into the soil turned out to be unexpectedly complex; yet the solutions that were gradually found, through scientific research and practical experimentation, and which were then applied over an expanding area, have now started to make this program into a particularly successful operation and have served to spread the spirit of innovation among a large group of Uruguay's farmers.

The common structure of the Pakistani, Peruvian, Uruguayan projects can now be recapitulated as follows:

1) If the project planners had known in advance all the difficulties and troubles that were lying in store for the project, they probably would never have touched it, because a gloomy view would have been taken of the country's ability to overcome these difficulties by calling into play political, administrative, or technical creativity.

2) In some, though not all, of these cases advance knowledge of

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these difficulties would therefore have been unfortunate, for the difficulties and the ensuing search for solutions set in motion a train of events which not only rescued the project, but often made it particularly valuable.

II

We may be dealing here with a general principle of action. *Creativity always comes as a surprise to us; therefore we can never count on it and we dare not believe in it until it has happened. In other words, we would not consciously engage upon tasks whose success clearly requires that creativity be forthcoming. Hence, the only way in which we can bring our creative resources fully into play is by misjudging the nature of the task, by presenting it to ourselves as more routine, simple, undemanding of genuine creativity than it will turn out to be.*

Or, put differently: since we necessarily underestimate our creativity it is desirable that we underestimate to a roughly similar extent the difficulties of the tasks we face, so as to be tricked by these two offsetting underestimates into undertaking tasks which we can, but otherwise would not dare, tackle. The principle is important enough to deserve a name: since we are apparently on the trail here of some sort of Invisible or Hidden Hand that beneficially hides difficulties from us, I propose "The Hiding Hand."

What this principle suggests is that, far from seeking out and taking up challenges, people are apt to take on and plunge into new tasks because of the erroneously presumed *absence* of a challenge – because the task looks easier and more manageable that it will turn out to be. As a result, the Hiding Hand can help accelerate the rate at which men engage successfully in problem-solving: they take up problems *they think* they can solve, find them more difficult than expected, but then, being stuck with them, attack willy-nilly the unsuspected difficulties – and sometimes even succeed. People who have stumbled through the experience just described will of course tend to retell it as though they had known the difficulties all along and have bravely gone to meet them – *fare bella figura* is a strong human propensity. While we are rather willing and even eager and relieved to agree with a historian's finding that we stumbled into the more shameful events of history, such as war, we are correspondingly unwilling to concede – in fact we find it intolerable to imagine – that our more lofty achievements, such as economic, social or political progress, could have come about by stumbling rather than through careful planning, rational behavior, and the successful response to a clearly perceived challenge. Language itself conspires toward this sort of asymmetry: we fall into error, but do not usually speak of falling into truth.

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III

While some presence of the Hiding Hand may be helpful or required in eliciting action under all latitudes, it is no doubt specially needed where the tradition of problem-solving is weak and where invention and innovation have not yet been institutionalized or routinized. In other words, in developed countries less hiding of the uncertainties and likely difficulties of a prospective task is required than in underdeveloped countries where confidence in one's creativity is lacking, and where new tasks harboring many unknowns must be presented as though they were all "cut and dried" in order to be undertaken.

The Hiding Hand principle is in effect a close relative, or perhaps a generalization, of an idea proposed several years ago by an economic historian, John Sawyer. Having looked at development projects that were undertaken in the first half of the 19th century in the United States, he noted that underestimates of cost resulting from "miscalculation or sheer ignorance" were, in a number of great and ultimately successful economic undertakings, "crucial to getting an enterprise launched at all." "Had the total investment required been accurately and objectively known at the beginning, the project would not have been begun." The eventual success of these ventures, in spite of the large initial miscalculation and the consequent financial trouble at various stages, derived from the fact that, once the necessary funds were secured and the project was brought to completion, "the error in estimating costs was at least offset by a corresponding error in the estimation of demand."[1]

This has a close resemblance to the Hiding Hand principle. The difference is that in Sawyer's model the underestimate of the benefit is unexplained and acts rather as a *deus ex machina* to save selected projects from becoming failures, once they turn out to cost so much more than expected. In our Hiding Hand principle, Sawyer's unexplained underestimate of benefits becomes the easily intelligible underestimate, on the part of the project planner, of his own problem-solving ability. The principle then simply goes on to state that, in view of this underestimate, a similar underestimate of the difficulties themselves is required so that projects which in the end turn out to be perfectly feasible and productive will actually be undertaken.

Which are the projects that are chosen because their difficulties tend to be underestimated? And which ones tend to be systematically neglected because their difficulties are too obvious? By asking these questions we realize that the Hiding Hand principle, while permitting an increase in the rate at which projects are taken up, also leads to

1. John E. Sawyer, "Entrepreneurial Error and Economic Growth," *Explorations in Entrepreneurial History*, Vol. 4 (May 1952), pp. 199, 200.

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a bias in project selection whose nature must now be briefly explored.

First of all, it becomes clear that projects derive a crucial advantage from being based on a technique that *looks* transferable even though it may not actually be nearly as transferable as it looks. This is perhaps a principal reason which gives industrial projects so large an edge over others. Time and again, industrial projects, particularly those that are not limited to administering "last touches" to a host of imported semi-finished products, run into very considerable technical and managerial difficulties when they are transplanted to a different environment. But factories *look* as though they could be picked up and dropped anywhere – whereas in other activities, such as agriculture and education, the need for adaptation and the concomitant problems are immediately obvious. Industry thus lends itself eminently to the operations of the Hiding Hand, whereas agricultural projects suffer in comparison from the sincerity with which they flaunt their prospective difficulties.

This conclusion is reinforced when the principle of the Hiding Hand is viewed in the perspective of time. For its mechanism to work, it is necessary that the operators be thoroughly "caught" by the time the unsuspected difficulties appear; caught in the sense that having spent considerable money, time, and energy and having committed their prestige, they will be anxious to generate all the problem-solving energy of which they are capable.

Just as the Hiding Hand principle states that the to-be-experienced difficulties should be hidden at the moment of the decision to go ahead with the project, so it *implies* that these difficulties should not appear *too early* after the execution of the project has started – for, within a certain range, the propensity to tackle the difficulties will be roughly proportional to the effort, financial and otherwise, already furnished. Therefore, a given level of difficulties may be wholly discouraging for the prosecution of the project if it turns up early, while it would be tackled with alacrity and perhaps solved if it arose at a later stage.

In spite of the somewhat paradoxical ring of this assertion – paradoxical only because medical science has thoroughly impregnated us with the notion that the sooner a malady is recognized and diagnosed the better – it appears to be confirmed by experience with development projects, and it again underlines the disadvantageous position of agricultural as compared with industrial and public-work projects. With the (important) exceptions of irrigation and of tree crop projects, agricultural projects have a short gestation period, and therefore production or marketing difficulties unfold rather soon after the projects have been started; hence, attempts to rescue them are often half-hearted and they are readily pronounced failures and abandoned.

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This is the story of many colonization projects in Latin America and Africa.

In the case of projects with longer gestation periods and more permanent structures, similar difficulties tend to appear much later and then lead to far more serious efforts to overcome them. This difference between projects with short and long gestation periods is well exemplified by the contrasting fates of the East African Groundnut Scheme and the Owen Falls Hydroelectric Station in Uganda. Undertaken at the same time, in the same region, by the same kind of colonial administrators wishing to turn over a new progressive leaf and harboring similar illusions about the nature of the development process, both schemes met with similar financial difficulties during their early years. After a very few years, the Groundnut scheme was abandoned and nothing remains of it; the Owen Falls Hydro station, on the other hand, has had many lean years, but it has endured and finally come into its own and will soon have to be supplemented by new generating capacity. For once it had become clear that the originally anticipated industrial boom in the Owen Falls area was not going to materialize, the Uganda Electricity Board made an effort to tap, through the building of transmission lines, new markets for its power to neighboring Kenya at first, and then to a host of smaller industries and towns of Uganda.

By itself, the mere ability of the Owen Falls Station to survive cannot of course be taken as a vindication of the original investment decision. While later administrators were right in considering as bygone the heavy costs which had been sunk into the project in its early years, the project as a whole may still have to be given a poor mark in any ex-post appraisal. It is well known that, with long-gestation projects, one runs the risk that good money will be thrown after bad. We are here pointing out that short-gestation projects are subject to the opposite risk: the failure to throw good money after what looks bad, but could be turned into good, if only the requisite rescue effort were forthcoming.

The foregoing remarks permit a policy conclusion: projects whose potential difficulties and disappointments are apt to manifest themselves at an early stage should be administered by agencies having a long-term commitment to the success of the projects; also such projects should be developed as much as possible in an experimental spirit, in the style of a pilot project gathering strength and experience gradually, for in that case they will be able to escape being classed and closed down as failures when they are still in their infancy. The Uruguayan livestock and pasture improvement project followed both these precepts and has thus been able to survive and to achieve maturity and success.

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IV

In general, entrepreneurs and promoters and developers must long have been dimly aware of the Hiding Hand principle, for they have been most adept at finding ways in which projects that would *normally be discriminated against, because they are too obviously* replete with difficulties and uncertainties, can be made to look more attractive to the decision maker.

One widely practiced method consists in pretending that a project is nothing but a straightforward application of a well-known technique that has already been used successfully elsewhere. For example, for a number of years in the post-World War II period, any river valley development scheme, whether it concerned the São Francisco River in Brazil, the Papaloapan River in Mexico, the Cauca River in Colombia, the Dez in Iran, or the Damodar River in Eastern India, was presented to a reassured public as a true copy, if possible certified expressly by David Lilienthal, of the TVA. Although obviously two river valley development schemes will differ vastly more from one another than two Coca Cola bottling plants, the impression was created, by the appeal to the "TVA model," that clear sailing lay ahead for the proposed schemes. To be acceptable, it seems, a project must often be billed as a pure replica of something that already exists as a successful venture in an advanced country.

It surely is a pity that ventures which are 90% indigenous initiative and execution and 10% imitation of a foreign model are regularly presented to the public as though the percentages were, in fact, reversed; but this seems to be the price that must sometimes be paid to "sell" projects which would otherwise look too forbidding.

This attempt at making a project's path look more smooth than it actually is may be termed the "pseudo-imitation" technique. When the novelty or difficulty of the task is too obvious for the use of this technique to be plausible, another method is often resorted to. It consists in dismissing previous efforts at solving the task as "piecemeal" and in pretending to more insight than is actually available by drawing up a "comprehensive program." We shall call it the "pseudo-comprehensive-program" technique.

An excellent example of this technique is supplied by the Uruguayan livestock and pasture improvement project. It started with the avowed aim to "implement" a joint World Bank-United Nations report issued in 1951 whose recommendations covered an extremely wide spectrum as will appear from the following incomplete list of topics: subdivision of pastures by fences, grazing trials, tree plantings on permanent grasslands, introduction of legumes, increased use of lime and phosphate, shrub eradication, works to control runoff water, establishment of fodder reserves through silage and hay, better stor-

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age facilities, changes in the cropping system to include legumes, establishment of diversified farming combining harvested crops and livestock, improvement in productivity by irrigation, tillage practices, weed and pest control, erosion control, control of animal disease, improvement in transportation, storage and marketing, organization of research and technical services, appropriate price and other economic policies, etc. . . .

Such a report tends to give the policy makers and project planners the illusion that the "experts" have already found all the answers to the problems, and that all that is needed is faithful "implementation" of these multifarious recommendations. In fact, Uruguayan agriculture had shown prolonged and stubborn resistance to many of the report's proposals, which were by no means new; the reason was that very considerable and difficult breakthroughs remained to be achieved in the technical, organizational, and other realms. But the comprehensive program technique underplays this need for imagination, insight, and for the application of creative energies; and the project planners are, as it were, tricked into undertaking a program with whose real difficulties they will only gradually become acquainted.

The comprehensive program, whose many components all are given the same emphasis and are pronounced to be interrelated, in effect covers up the ignorance of the experts about the real cure of the malady they have been summoned to examine; if they knew, they would be proposing a far more narrowly focused program! At the same time, the diffuse kind of program provides an excellent alibi to the experts in case anything goes wrong: since it is practically impossible to carry out all the proposed actions, any lack of success can always be blamed on the failure to follow the experts' instructions rather than on the shortcomings of their advice.

This is not to deny that there are real interdependencies, and that often a multi-pronged attack on a problem is necessary. But a comprehensive program that stems from real insight into the problem will be easy to tell from one that is a smoke screen for ignorance, for in the former the nature of the interdependencies will be clearly spelled out and an effort will have been made, in the interests of feasibility, to limit the number of activities that have to be undertaken concurrently. This approach was evident in a 1964 plan for the creation of an industrial pole in the Taranto-Bari-Brindisi area in Southern Italy. Here a deliberate effort was made to determine a strictly limited number of establishments producing intermediate goods and providing services, such as tool making, which would have to be available if a certain group of newly planned mechanical industries were to find it attractive to locate at the "pole."

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V

The two Hiding Hand techniques which have been reviewed at some length – the pseudo-imitation technique and the pseudo-comprehensive-program technique – are nicely complementary: the former makes projects appear less difficulty-ridden than they really are, whereas the latter gives the project planners the illusion that they are in possession of far more insight into the projects' difficulties than is as yet available. Both techniques act essentially as crutches for the decision-maker, permitting him to go forward at a stage when he has not yet acquired enough confidence in his problem-solving ability to make a more candid appraisal of a project's prospective difficulties and of the risks he is assuming. The experience of meeting with these difficulties and risks, and of being able to deal with them, should then enable him to discard these crutches and to achieve a more mature appraisal of new projects. The recourse to the Hiding Hand thus becomes less necessary as development proceeds, and one of the indirect benefits of projects is precisely that the willingness of the decision-maker to face uncertainty and difficulty is increased. The Hiding Hand is essentially a mechanism *which makes a risk-averter take risks* and turns him into less of a risk-averter in the process. In this manner, it opens an escape from one of those formidable "prerequisites" or "pre-conditions" to development: it permits the so-called prerequisite to come into existence *after* the thing to which it is supposed to be the prerequisite. In our model, risk-taking behavior is engaged in actively (though involuntarily) prior to the arrival on the stage of the "risk-taking, achievement-motivated personality"; instead, it is this personality which is fashioned by risk-taking behavior.

The Hiding Hand model is helpful in understanding the process of growth from yet another point of view. It has often been remarked that what is most needed at an early stage of development is that the ventures that are undertaken meet with unqualified success, so that the spirit of entrepreneurship may become strong and widely spread. The objection to this prescription is, of course, that it is singularly unhelpful, since in the early stages of any development effort numerous disappointments are inevitable and survival is a feat. How is development possible then? Perhaps because, among the ventures that do survive, there is a large number in which the Hiding Hand has been at work. In these ventures, the entrepreneurs' experience will have been *both worse* than expected (getting into unsuspected trouble) *and better* (getting unexpectedly out of it); and even though their financial success is not striking, the resulting infusion of confidence, and perhaps the discovery of a more exciting way of life, will strengthen the spirit of enterprise.

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What we are in effect saying is that in appraising the contribution to development of various ventures, we must take into account not only their – properly discounted – financial returns, but important side effects connected with what economists call the "time shape" of these returns; specifically, a venture which has gone through considerable teething trouble, presumably as a result of the intervention of the Hiding Hand, is likely to deserve a higher ranking than one with a similar return, but no such experience.

We have ended up here with an economic argument strikingly paralleling Christianity's oft expressed preference for the repentant sinner over the righteous man who never strays from the path. And essentially the same idea, even though formulated, as one might expect, in a vastly different spirit, is found in Nietzsche's famous maxim, "That which does not destroy me, makes me stronger." This sentence admirably epitomizes several of the histories of economic development projects in recent decades.

VI

Having achieved, in a roundabout way, a convergence of benefit-cost analysis with the teachings of philosophy and religion, I should probably stop right here. Unfortunately, however, this dramatic effect must be spoiled, for something now must be said about the failings and dangers of the Hiding Hand. As noted before, its principal usefulness is in inducing risk-averters to commit themselves to risk-taking behavior. This commitment permits an acceleration of economic growth; as a result of this experience, the decision-makers are likely to become readier to look newly emerging risk-laden situations straight in the face. The Hiding Hand is thus essentially a transition mechanism through which decision-makers learn to take risks; and *the shorter the transition and the faster the learning, the better.* For this mode of learning about risk is not without grave dangers. One has to be rather lucky to be lured by the Hiding Hand into ventures whose emergent problems and difficulties can be successfully tackled. As long as one needs this "crutch" in order to act, the probability of committing major errors and of undertaking projects which will turn into failures is obviously higher than when one is able to differentiate between acceptable and non-acceptable risk.

Moreover, those servants of the Hiding Hand, the pseudo-imitation and the pseudo-comprehensive-program technique, while they facilitate decision-making, can easily be habit-forming rather than self-liquidating. The camouflage which they use to disguise pioneering entrepreneurship may go undetected for a long time and may possibly still be used when there is no longer a real need for them. The pseudo-imitation technique will not permit the country using it to reap the full psychological benefit of the ventures successfully launched un-

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der its auspices, since there will remain a lingering feeling that any achievement is due to the imitation of a foreign model. As to the pseudo-comprehensive-program technique, a favorable outcome may even leave a sense of disappointment and frustration behind; for, if our description of the process by which insight into the problem is finally achieved is correct, then a number of originally enunciated measures and objectives which were important elements in the "comprehensive program" will no longer be actively pursued. As a result, public opinion will tend to lament the abandonment of originally much-touted programs, and the project, even though a success, will leave behind a vague sense of failure.

VII

Before concluding it may be of interest to place the phenomenon here described in a wider context. The Hiding Hand is essentially a way of inducing action through error, the error being an underestimate of the project's costs or difficulties. As Sawyer noted for his related theory of entrepreneurial error, the argument smacks uncomfortably of "praise of folly" – a praise which is sometimes deserved, but always needs to be narrowly circumscribed.

We could bestow limited praise on the Hiding Hand because, in causing an underestimate of costs and difficulties, it serves to offset another error which project planners are liable to commit through their propensity to underrate their inventiveness and problem-solving ability; when this propensity is present, the chances for correct project decisions to be taken will actually improve, up to a point, as the Hiding Hand does its handiwork. But suppose now that, *in the same situation,* it fails to do so and that prospective difficulties stand therefore clearly revealed: since, by assumption, the actors are afflicted by the same lack of self-confidence, the difficulties (i.e., costs) will now loom larger than they really are, and the only remaining way by which action on perfectly feasible projects can still be induced is through an *overestimate of the prospective benefits* – we need a magnifying glass for benefits to take the place of the Hand that hid the costs or difficulties. Thus, the same basic infirmity, namely lack of confidence in one's ability to overcome difficulties, requires correction either by understating the difficulties or by exaggerating expectations about the project's future accomplishments.

Exaggeration of prospective benefits is at least as common a device to elicit action as underestimation of costs. This error, especially when it is combined with an underestimation of costs, has of course often led to disaster – history abounds with examples, from bankruptcies and white elephants to lost or ruinously won wars. But occasionally the exaggeration of benefits can serve, just as the hiding

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of costs, to ward off another, less visible, but nonetheless real, disaster: missed opportunity.

This is the case when difficulties in the project's path tend to be overestimated *and are unhideable.* Take, for example, projects that clearly require from the start the making of politically difficult decisions, such as a change in existing administrative structures around which considerable vested interests have gathered. Extravagance in promising future benefits plays a useful role in such development projects – precisely because they do require difficult *initial* decisions, be it a change in existing institutions or a fiscal sacrifice demanded of some or all of the citizenry. Actually, the promise of some sort of Utopia is for this reason more characteristic of larger-scale social undertakings.

Recourse to the utopian vision as a stimulant to action has on occasion been advocated in a sweeping way. We considered a specific and, hopefully, temporary infirmity of *some* societies, i.e. inadequate acquaintance with man's ability to solve difficulties, as the reason for which the Hiding Hand or, in its absence, the exaggeration of benefits can play a useful role. A far more generalized pessimism about human nature as weak-willed, routine-ridden, and decadence-prone led Georges Sorel to the belief that humanity required "myths" – inspiring images of battle and triumph – for any substantial forward movement. He was so well aware of the disproportion between the promises of these myths and the ensuing reality that he simply vetoed what we call today project reappraisal. "We should be especially careful," he said, "not to make any comparison between accomplished fact and the picture people had formed for themselves before action."

A far more appealing and convincing defense of the occasional need for exaggeration of prospective benefits appears in an essay by Kolakowski, the Polish philosopher:

> The simplest improvements in social conditions require so huge an effort on the part of society that full awareness of this disproportion would be most discouraging and would thereby make any social progress impossible. The effort must be prodigally great if the result is to be at all visible. . . . It is not at all peculiar then that this terrible disproportion must be quite weakly reflected in human consciousness if society is to generate the energy required to effect changes in social and human relations. For this purpose, one exaggerates the prospective results into a myth so as to make them take on dimensions which correspond a bit more to the immediately felt effort . . . [The myth acts like] a Fata Morgana which makes beautiful lands arise before the eyes of the members of a caravan and thus increases their efforts to the point where, in spite of all their sufferings, they reach

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the next tiny waterhole. Had such tempting mirages not appeared, the exhausted caravan would inevitably have perished in the sandstorm, bereft of hope.

This fine passage permits two observations. First of all, in contrast to what must have been Sorel's assumption when he issued his injunction against looking back, the Kolakowski image definitely conveys the message that the effort of the caravan *was* worth the cost and the suffering, since it permitted survival. Secondly, the effort would not have been forthcoming had there not been the Fata Morgana, i.e. a rather serious overestimate of the benefits.

The similarity with our two points describing the mechanism of the Hiding Hand is striking. In Kolakowski's thought (which again is concerned of course with large-scale socio-political movements and action rather than with development projects), the reason for which the exaggeration of benefits is required is precisely the one we indicated earlier: the actors underestimate the strength that is left in them, therefore the to-be-furnished effort is felt as "impossible" until the required social energy is generated by the mirage.

The Fata Morgana image actually contains one other suggestion, rather different from the use Kolakowski makes of it: there may be special difficulties in visualizing in advance *intermediate* outcomes or *partial* successes such as the "tiny waterhole." In other words, the Utopian vision may not originate so much in a need to offset the inflated costs of the enterprise under consideration, as in an infirmity of our imagination which, even without costs appearing unduly high, is simply unable to conceive of the strictly limited, yet satisfactory, advances, replete with compromises and concessions to opposing forces, which are the very stuff of "incremental politics."

We have now identified two situations in which overestimates of benefits can play a positive role: 1) when, because of inexperience in problem-solving, the actors have an exaggerated idea of the costs and difficulties of action; and 2) when, because of inexperience with the actual processes of change, the actors are unable to visualize intermediate outcomes and limited advances. As in the case of the Hiding Hand with its underestimate of costs and difficulties, and pending the correction of these various inexperiences, the overestimate of benefits must therefore be recognized as a useful development mechanism for a transitional phase.

But, for the reasons already given in connection with the Hiding Hand, it is much to be desired that this transitional phase be short. A contribution to this end could be hoped for from the very description-exposé of these mechanisms of self-deception which has been attempted here. It may persuade project planners to dispense with these crutches as soon as it is possible for them to do so.

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Notes on the post-industrial society (I)

DANIEL BELL

Notes are often a difficult form for a reader – even, I suspect, a reader of *The Public Interest*. He naturally prefers a tidy exposition which makes its points in some linear fashion and which comes to a specific conclusion. In a sense, this is a peculiarly "American" demand. The presumption is usually made that every problem has a solution, and one can march towards it in a direct line. Indirection irritates. It suggests ambiguity or complexity which, in the American vernacular, becomes translated as evasiveness or hesitation.

Nevertheless, here are some "notes." I have chosen this form, not to irritate the reader (though this may be a consequence), but to suggest the incompleteness of my own thoughts and the tentativeness of my formulations. For the past four years, I have been engaged on a long work entitled *The Post-Industrial Society*. It is an effort to deal with underlying structural changes in American society. The purpose of the following "notes" is to suggest some of the directions that my inquiry has been taking.

• Speeding-up the time machine

It was once exceedingly rare to be able to observe the formation of institutions *de novo*. Social change was crescive and moved slowly.

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Adaptations were piecemeal and contradictory, the process of diffusion halting. In his reflections on history, thirty-five years ago, Paul Valéry, the quintessential French man of letters, remarked that:

> "There is nothing easier than to point out the absence, from history books, of major phenomena which were imperceptible owing to the slowness of their evolution. They escape the historian's notice because no document expressly mentions them. . . .
>
> "An event which takes shape over a century will not be found in any document or collection of memoirs. . . ."

Today, not only are we aware of, and trying to identify, processes of change, even when they cannot be "dated," but there has been a speeding-up of the "time-machine," so that the interval between the initial impetus to change and its realization has been radically reduced. A study by Frank Lynn of twenty major technological innovations that have had a substantial economic and/or social impact during the last sixty to seventy years indicates that every step in the process of technological development and diffusion has accelerated during this period. Specifically:

¶The average time span between the initial discovery of a new technological innovation and the recognition of its commercial potential decreased from 30 years (for technological innovations introduced during the early part of this century, 1880-1919) to 16 years (for innovations introduced during the post-World War I period) to 9 years (for the post-World War II period).

¶The time required to translate a basic technical discovery into a commercial product or process decreased from 7 to 5 years during the 60-70-year time period investigated.

¶The rate of diffusion (measured by economic growth) for technological innovations introduced during the post-World War II period was approximately *twice* the rate for post-World War I innovations and *four* times the rate for innovations introduced during the early part of this century.

Perhaps the most important social change of our time is the emergence of a process of direct and deliberate contrivance of change itself. Men now seek to anticipate change, measure the course of its direction and its impact, control it, and even shape it for predetermined ends.

• The prophet from the past

More than a hundred and fifty years ago, the wildly brilliant, almost monomaniacal technocrat, Claude-Henri de Rouvroy, le Comte de Saint-Simon ("the last gentleman and the first socialist" of France), popularized the word *industrialism* to designate the emergent society, wherein wealth would be created by mechanized production rather than be seized through plunder and war. Past society, said Saint-

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Simon, had been military society, in which the dominant figures were noblemen, soldiers, and priests, and the leading positions in the society were based either on control of the means of violence or on the manipulation of religious myth. In the new society, the "natural élite" that would organize society in a rational, "positive" fashion would be the industrialists (actually the engineers or technocrats), for the methods of industry were methods of order, precision, and certainty, rather than of metaphysical thought. In this society, ordered by function and capacity, "the real noblemen would be industrial chiefs and the real priests would be scientists."

The revolution which ended feudal society—the French Revolution—could have ushered in the industrial society, said Saint-Simon, but it did not do so because it had been captured by metaphysicians, lawyers, and sophists, men with a predilection for abstract slogans. What was needed, Saint-Simon added, was a breed of "new men" – engineers, builders, planners – who would provide the necessary leadership. And since such leaders require some inspiration, Saint-Simon, shortly before his death, commissioned Rouget de l'Isle, the composer of the "Marseillaise," to write a new "Industrial Marseillaise." This "Chant des Industriels," as it was called, was given its première in 1821 before Saint-Simon and his friend Ternaus, the textile manufacturer, at the opening of a new textile factory in Saint-Ouen.

The episode takes on a somewhat comic air, especially when we read that a number of the Count's followers established a new religious cult of Saint-Simonianism to canonize his teachings. (In the monastic castle to which the followers of Saint-Simon retreated, garments were buttoned down the back so that, in socialist fashion, each man would require the help of another in order to dress.) And yet many of these same followers of Saint-Simon were also the men who, in the middle of the 19th century, redrew the industrial map of Europe.*

We may at this point leave the story of Saint-Simon and his followers to the *curiosa* of the history of ideas. But if, with the spirit

*It is not too much to say, Professor F. H. Markham has written, "that the St. Simonians were the most important single force behind the great economic expansion of the second Empire, particularly in the development of banks and railways." Enfantin, the most bizarre of the St. Simonians, formed the society for planning the Suez Canal. The former St. Simonians constructed many of the European railways – in Austria, Russia, and Spain. The brothers Emile and Isaac Pereire, who promoted the first French railway from Paris to Saint-Germain, also founded the Crédit Mobilier, the first industrial investment bank in France, as well as the great shipping company, the Compagnie Générale Transatlantique which today sails the *Flandre* and the *France*, and which gave its first ships the names of St. Simonian followers, including the *Saint-Simon* (1,987 tons).

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rather than the method of Saint-Simon, one speculates on the shape of society forty or fifty years from now, it becomes clear that the "old" industrial order is passing and that a "new society" is indeed in the making. To speak rashly: if the dominant figures of the past hundred years have been the entrepreneur, the businessman, and the industrial executive, the "new men" are the scientists, the mathematicians, the economists, and the engineers of the new computer technology. And the dominant institutions of the new society – in the sense that they will provide the most creative challenges and enlist the richest talents – will be the intellectual institutions. The leadership of the new society will rest, not with businessmen or corporations as we know them (for a good deal of production will have been routinized), but with the research corporation, the industrial laboratories, the experimental stations, and the universities. In fact, the skeletal structure of the new society is already visible.

- **The transformation of society**

We are now, one might say, in the first stages of a post-industrial society. A post-industrial society can be characterized in several ways. We can begin with the fact that ours is no longer primarily a manufacturing economy. The service sector (comprising trade; finance, insurance and real estate; personal, professional, business, and repair services; and general government) now accounts for more than half of the total employment and more than half of the gross national product. We are now, as Victor Fuchs pointed out in *The Public Interest*, No. 2, a "service economy" – i.e., the first nation in the history of the world in which more than half of the employed population is not involved in the production of food, clothing, houses, automobiles, and other tangible goods.

Or one can look at a society, not in terms of where people work, but of what kind of work they do – the occupational divisions. In a paper read to the Cambridge Reform Club in 1873, Alfred Marshall, the great figure of neo-classical economics, posed a question that was implicit in the title of his paper, "The Future of the Working Classes." "The question," he said, "is not whether all men will ultimately be equal – that they certainly will not be – but whether progress may not go on steadily, if slowly, till, by occupation at least, every man is a gentleman." And he answered his question thus: "I hold that it may, and that it will."

Marshall's criterion of a gentleman – in a broad, not in the traditional genteel, sense – was that heavy, excessive, and soul-destroying labor would vanish, and the worker would then begin to value education and leisure. Apart from any qualitative assessment of contemporary culture, it is clear that Marshall's question is well on the way to achieving the answer he predicted.

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In one respect, 1956 may be taken as the symbolic turning point. For in that year – for the first time in American history, if not in the history of industrial civilization – the number of white-collar workers (professional, managerial, office and sales personnel) outnumbered the blue-collar workers (craftsmen, semi-skilled operatives, and laborers) in the occupational ranks of the American class structure. Since 1956 the ratio has been increasing: today white-collar workers outnumber the blue-collar workers by more than five to four.

Stated in these terms, the change is quite dramatic. Yet it is also somewhat deceptive, for until recently the overwhelming number of white-collar workers have been women, who held minor clerical or sales jobs; and in American society, as in most others, family status is still evaluated on the basis of the job that the man holds. But it is at this point, in the changing nature of the male labor force, that a status upheaval has been taking place. Where in 1900 only fifteen percent of American males wore white collars (and most of these were independent small businessmen), by 1940 the figure had risen to twenty-five percent, and by 1970, it is estimated, about forty percent of the male labor force, or about twenty million men, will be holding white-collar jobs. Out of this number, fourteen million will be in managerial, professional, or technical positions, and it is this group that forms the heart of the upper-middle-class in the United States.

What is most startling in these figures is the growth in professional and technical employment. In 1940, there were 3.9 million professional and technical persons in the society, making up 7.5% of the labor force; by 1962, the number had risen to 8 million, comprising 11.8% of the labor force; it is estimated that by 1975 there will be 12.4 million professional and technical persons, making up 14.2% of the labor force.

- **A new principle**

In identifying a new and emerging social system, however, it is not only in such portents as the move away from manufacturing (or the rise of "the new property" which Charles Reich has described) that one seeks to understand fundamental social change. It is in the defining characteristics that the nerves of a new system can be located. The ganglion of the post-industrial society is knowledge. But to put it this way is banal. Knowledge is at the basis of every society. But in the post-industrial society, what is crucial is not just a shift from property or political position to knowledge as the new base of power, but a change in the *character* of knowledge itself.

What has now become decisive for society is the new centrality of *theoretical* knowledge, the primacy of theory over empiricism, and the codification of knowledge into abstract systems of symbols that can be translated into many different and varied circumstances.

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Every society now lives by innovation and growth; and it is theoretical knowledge that has become the matrix of innovation.

One can see this, first, in the changing relations of science and technology, particularly in the matter of invention. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, the great inventions and the industries that derived from them – steel, electric light, telegraph, telephone, automobile – were the work of inspired and talented tinkerers, many of whom were indifferent to the fundamental laws which underlay their inventions. On the other hand, where principles and fundamental properties were discovered, the practical applications were made only decades later, largely by trial-and-error methods.

In one sense, chemistry is the first of the "modern" industries because its inventions – the chemically-created synthetics – were based on theoretical knowledge of the properties of macromolecules, which were "manipulated" to achieve the planned production of new materials. At the start of World War I, hardly any of the generals of the Western Allies anticipated a long war, for they assumed that the effective naval blockade of the Central powers, thus cutting off their supply of Chilean nitrates, would bring Germany to her knees. But under the pressure of isolation, Germany harnessed all her available scientific energy and resources to solving this problem. The result – the development of synthetic ammonia by Bosch and Haber – was a turning point, not only in Germany's capacity for waging war, but also in the connection of science to technology.*

In a less direct but equally important way, the changing association of theory and empiricism is reflected in the management of economies. The rise of macro-economics and of governmental intervention in economic matters is possible because new codifications in economic theory allow governments, by direct planning, monetary or fiscal policy, to seek economic growth, to redirect the allocation of resources, to maintain balances between different sectors, and even, as

*In *Modern Science and Modern Man*, James Bryant Conant, who, before becoming a distinguished educator, was a prominent chemist, tells the story that when the United States entered World War I, a representative of the American Chemical Society called on Newton D. Baker, then Secretary of War, and offered the services of the chemists to the government. He was thanked and asked to come back the next day – when he was told that the offer was unnecessary since the War Department already had a chemist! When President Wilson appointed a consulting board to assist the Navy, it was chaired by Thomas Edison, and this appointment was widely hailed for bringing the best brains of science to the solution of naval problems. The solitary physicist on the board owed his appointment to the fact that Edison, in choosing his fellow members, had said to President Wilson, "We might have one mathematical fellow in case we have to calculate something out." In fact, as R. T. Birge reports, during World War I there was no such classification as "physicist;" when the armed forces felt the need of one, which was only occasionally, he was hired as a chemist.

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in the case of Great Britain today, to effect a controlled recession, in an effort to shape the direction of the economy by conscious policy.

And, with the growing sophistication of computer-based simulation procedures — simulations of economic systems, of social behavior, of decision problems — we have the possibility, for the first time, of large-scale "controlled experiments" in the social sciences. These, in turn, will allow us to plot "alternative futures," thus greatly increasing the extent to which we can choose and control matters that affect our lives.

In all this, the university, which is the place where theoretical knowledge is sought, tested, and codified in a disinterested way, becomes the primary institution of the new society. Perhaps it is not too much to say that if the business firm was the key institution of the past hundred years, because of its role in organizing production for the mass creation of products, the university will become the central institution of the next hundred years because of its role as the new source of innovation and knowledge.

To say that the primary institutions of the new age will be intellectual is not to say that the majority of persons will be scientists, engineers, technicians, or intellectuals. The majority of individuals in contemporary society are not businessmen, yet one can say that this has been a "business civilization." The basic values of society have been focused on business institutions, the largest rewards have been found in business, and the strongest power has been held by the business community, although today that power is to some extent shared within the factory by the trade union, and regulated within the society by the political order. In the most general ways, however, the major decisions affecting the day-to-day life of the citizen — the kinds of work available, the location of plants, investment decisions on new products, the distribution of tax burdens, occupational mobility — have been made by business, and latterly by government, which gives major priority to the welfare of business.

To say that the major institutions of the new society will be intellectual is to say that production and business decisions will be subordinated to, or will derive from, other forces in society; that the crucial decisions regarding the growth of the economy and its balance will come from government, but they will be based on the government's sponsorship of research and development, of cost-effectiveness and cost-benefit analysis; that the making of decisions, because of the intricately linked nature of their consequences, will have an increasingly technical character. The husbanding of talent and the spread of educational and intellectual institutions will become a prime concern for the society; not only the best talents, but eventually the entire complex of social prestige and social status, will be rooted in the intellectual and scientific communities.

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• Things ride men

Saint-Simon, the "father" of technocracy, had a vision of the future society that made him a utopian in the eyes of Marx. Society would be a scientific-industrial association whose goal would be the highest productive effort to conquer nature and to achieve the greatest possible benefits for all. Men would become happy in their work, as producers, and would fill a place in accordance with their natural abilities. The ideal industrial society would by no means be classless, for individuals were unequal in ability and in capacity. But social divisions would follow actual abilities, as opposed to the artificial divisions of previous societies, and individuals would find happiness and liberty in working at the job to which they were best suited. With every man in his natural place, each would obey his superior spontaneously, as one obeyed one's doctor, for a superior was defined by a higher technical capacity. In the industrial society, there would be three major divisions of work, corresponding, in the naive yet almost persuasive psychology of Saint-Simon, to three major psychological types. The majority of men were of the motor-capacity type, and they would become the laborers of the industrial society; within this class, the best would become the production leaders and administrators of society. The second type was the rational one, and men of this capacity would become the scientists, discovering new knowledge and writing the laws that were to guide men. The third type was the sensory, and these men would be the artists and religious leaders. This last class, Saint-Simon believed, would bring a new religion of collective worship to the people that would overcome individual egoism. It was in work and in carnival that men would find satisfaction; and in this positivist utopia, society would move from the governing of men to the administration of things.

But in the evolution of technocratic thinking,* things began to ride men. For Frederick W. Taylor, who – as the founder of scientific management – was perhaps most responsible for the translation of technocratic modes into the actual practices of industry, any notion of ends other than production and efficiency of output was almost

*The word *technocracy* itself was first coined in 1919 by William Henry Smyth, an inventor and engineer in Berkeley, California, in three articles published in *Industrial Management* of February, March, and May in that year. These were reprinted in a pamphlet, and later included with nine more articles, written for the *Berkeley Gazette,* in a larger reprint. The word was taken over by Howard Scott, a one-time research director for the Industrial Workers of the World, and was popularized in 1933-34, when Technocracy flashed briefly as a social movement and a panacea for the depression. The word became associated with Scott, and through him with Thorstein Veblen, who, after writing *The Engineers and the Price System,* had been associated earlier with Scott in an educational venture at the New School for Social Research. Interestingly, when the word became nationally

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nonexistent. Taylor believed strongly that "status must be based upon superior knowledge rather than nepotism and superior financial power," and in his idea of functional foremanship he asserted that influence and leadership should be based on technical competence rather than on any other skills. But in his view of work, man disappeared, and all that remained was "hands" and "things" arranged, on the basis of minute scientific examination, along the lines of a detailed division of labor wherein the smallest unit of motion and the smallest unit of time became the measure of a man's contribution to work.

In the technocratic mode, the ends have become simply efficiency and output. The technocratic mode has become established because it is the mode of efficiency – of production, of program, of "getting things done." For these reasons, the technocratic mode has spread in our society. But whether the technocrats themselves will become a dominant class, and in what ways the technocratic mode might be challenged are different questions.

• Soldiers ride things

It was the root idea of Saint-Simon, August Comte, and Herbert Spencer, the 19th-century theorists of industrial society, that there was a radical opposition between the industrial and the military spirit. The one emphasized work, production, rationality; the other display, waste, and heroics. Out of technology, economizing, and investment would come productivity as the basis of an increasing wealth for all, rather than exploit and plunder as the means of seizing wealth from others. In ancient society, work was subordinated to war and the warrior ruled; in industrial society, the times would become pacific and the producer would rule.

The irony is that, while the economizing spirit – the deployment of limited resources to attain maximum results – has indeed spread throughout society, it has been war rather than peace that has been largely responsible for the acceptance of planning and technocratic modes in government.

Instead of peace, every industrial society has a *Wehrwirtschaft*, a "preparedness economy," or a mobilized society. A mobilized society is one in which the major resources of the country are concentrated on a relatively few specific objectives defined by the government. In these sectors, in effect, private needs are subordinated to social goals and the role of private decision is correspondingly re-

popular through Scott, it was repudiated by Smyth, who claimed that Scott's use of the word fused *technology and autocrat*, "rule by technicians responsible to no one;" whereas his original word implied "the rule of the people made effective through the agency of their servants, the scientists and technicians."

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duced. The Soviet Union is a mobilized society *par excellence*. Most of the "new states," in their quest for modernization, have become mobilized: the basic resources of the society – capital and trained manpower – are geared to planned economic change.

In recent years, America has taken on the features of a mobilized polity in that one of the crucial scarce resources, that of "research and development" – and more specifically, the work of most of the scientists and engineers in research and development – is tied to the requirements of the military and of war preparedness. The United States has not done this by outright commandeering of talents, or by restricting the right of nongovernmental units to engage in R & D. But since R & D is always a risk, in that no immediate payoffs or profits are assured, and the costs of R & D have become astronomical, few institutions other than the government can underwrite such expenditures. And the government has been compelled to do so because of the extraordinary revolutions in the art of war that have occurred since 1945.

In one sense, as Herman Kahn has pointed out, military technology has supplanted the "mode of production," in Marx's use of the term, as a major determinant of social structure. Since the end of World War II there have been almost three total revolutions in military technology, with complete and across-the-board replacement of equipment, as older weapons systems were phased out without being used. Neither World War I nor World War II represented such complete breaks in continuity.

The source of these accelerated revolutions – changes in the character of atomic weapons, from manned bombers to missiles, from fixed missiles to roving missiles and from medium-range to intercontinental missiles – has been concentrated research and development, concerted planning for new systems of weaponry. And the technology of "custom-crafted" missile construction, as against bombers, was a chief element in changing the "production-mix" of the aerospace industry labor force, so much so that the Budget Bureau Report on Defense Contracting (The David Bell Report of 1962) estimated that the ratio of engineers and scientists to production workers in the aerospace industry was roughly one-to-one.

In the Economic Report of the President, presented to Congress in January 1963, President Kennedy declared: "The defense, space and atomic energy activities of the country absorb about two-thirds of the trained people available for exploring our scientific and technical frontiers.... In the course of meeting scientific challenges so brilliantly, we have paid a price by sharply limiting the scarce scientific and engineering resources available to the civilian sectors of the American economy." By now, it is likely that President Kennedy's estimates are too low.

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• **Who holds power?**

Decisions are a matter of power, and the crucial questions in any society are: who holds power, and how is power held? Forty-five years ago, as we have noted, Thorstein Veblen foresaw a new society based on technical organization and industrial management, a "soviet of technicians," as he put it in the striking language he loved to employ in order to scare and mystify the academic world. In making this prediction, Veblen shared the illusion of Saint-Simon that the complexity of the industrial system and the indispensability of the technicians made military and political revolutions a thing of the past. "Revolutions in the 18th century," Veblen wrote, "were military and political; and the Elder Statesmen who now believe themselves to be making history still believe that revolutions can be made and unmade by the same ways and means in the 20th cenutry. But any substantial or effectual overturn in the 20th century will necessarily be an industrial overturn; and by the same token, any 20th-century revolution can be combatted or neutralized only by industrial ways and means."

This syndicalist idea that revolution in the 20th cenutry could only be an "industrial overturn" exemplifies the rationalist fallacy in so much of Veblen's thought. For, as we have learned, though technological and social processes are crescive, the crucial turning points in a society are political events. It is not the technocrat who ultimately holds power, but the politician.

The major changes which have reshaped American society over the past thirty years – the creation of a managed economy, a welfare society, and a mobilized polity – grew out of political responses: in the first instances to accommodate the demands of economically insecure and disadvantaged groups – the farmers, workers, Negroes, and the poor – for protection against the hazards of the market; and, later, as a consequence of the concentration of resources and political objectives following the mobilized postures of the Cold War and the space race.

The result of all this is to enlarge the arena of power, and at the same time to complicate the modes of decision-making. The domestic political process initiated by the New Deal, which continues in the same form in the domestic program of the Johnson administration, was in effect a broadening of the "brokerage" system – the system of political "deals" between constituencies. But there is also a new dimension in the political process which has given the technocrats a new role. Matters of foreign policy are not a reflex of internal political forces, but a judgment about the national interest, involving strategy decisions based on the calculations of an opponent's strength and intentions. Once the fundamental policy decision was made to oppose the Communist power, many technical decisions, based on military

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technology and strategic assessments, took on the highest importance in the shaping of subsequent policy. And even the reworking of the economic map of the United States followed as well, with Texas and California gaining great importance because of the importance of the electronics and aerospace industries. In these instances, technology and strategy laid down the requirements, and only then could business and local political groups seek to modify, or take advantage of, these decisions so as to protect their own economic interests.

In all this, the technologists are in a double position. To the extent that they have interests in research, and positions in the universities, they become a new constituency – just as the military is a distinct new constituency, since we have never had a permanent military establishment in this country before – seeking money and support for science, for research and development. Thus the technical intelligentsia becomes a claimant, like other groups, for public support (though its influence is felt in the bureaucratic and administrative labyrinth, rather than in the electoral system and through mass pressure). At the same time, the technologists provide an indispensable administrative mechanism for the political office-holder with his public following. As the technical and professional sectors of society expand, the interests of this stratum, of this constituency, exert a greater pressure – in the demands not only for objectives of immediate interest but in the wider social ethos which tends to be associated with the more highly educated: the demands for more amenities, for a more urbane quality of life in our cities, for a more differentiated and better educational system, and an improvement in the character of our culture.

But while the weights of the class system may shift, the nature of the political system, as the arena where interests become mediated, will not. In the next few decades, the political arena will become more decisive, if anything, for three fundamental reasons: we have become, for the first time, a *national society* (though there has always been the idea of the nation) in which crucial decisions, affecting all parts of the society simultaneously (from foreign affairs to fiscal policy) are made by the government, rather than through the market; in addition, we have become a *communal society*, in which many more groups now seek to establish their social rights – their claims on society – through the political order; and third, with our increasing "future orientation," government will necessarily have to do more and more planning. But since all of these involve policy decisions. it cannot be the technocrat alone, but the political figures who can make them. And necessarily, the two roles are distinct, even though they come into complicated interplay with each other.

[Part Two of these "Notes" will appear in the next issue of *The Public Interest*.]

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The underdeveloped profession

IRVING KRISTOL

It is becoming high fashion, in some circles, to sling an occasional shot at the New York *Times*. The temptation is both powerful and understandable. The *Times* is such a big, smug, solid target that any individual is bound to add a journalistic cubit to his stature by taking it on. Victory, moreover, is cheap: the writer demonstrates – usually quite convincingly – either (a) that he knows more about a particular corner of the world than the *Times*' correspondent there, or (b) that he writes far better than the average Timesman. The net effect of these incidents is to inflict a superficial wound upon the *Times*' self-esteem. Predictably enough, recovery is swift and complete.

Now, what is most unfortunate about this whole business is that there is indeed a very serious problem connected with "the matter of the *Times*," and the usual slings and arrows, for all their force and accuracy, do not penetrate to the heart of this matter. The problem is not that the *Times* has flaws. It is that these flaws flow naturally from the history and present condition of American journalism itself. We are not dealing merely with an imperfect newspaper; we are dealing with an entire profession, and an entire industry, that is in a critical state of decay – and which doesn't know it, doesn't even begin to comprehend it.

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I would put the matter this way: the *Times* is not only our best newspaper, it is a truly great newspaper. Why, then, is it not a truly good one?

I

Of the greatness of the *Times*, there can be no question. To begin with, its greatness is of a simple, material order: it is far bigger, far richer, and far more powerful than any other newspaper in the world. But its greatness is also of a spiritual kind. I do not think that there has ever been, in the history of journalism, a newspaper so selflessly dedicated to the public interest, so uncompromisingly committed to what it conceives to be the highest journalistic standards. It is no secret that, though the *Times* operates at a tidy profit, most of this profit comes from its ancillary activities (timberlands, pulp and paper factories, etc.) and that the newspaper itself is run as if it were, to all intents and purposes, a non-profit enterprise. One can be reasonably certain that, where there is a conflict between an opportunity to make (or save) money and an opportunity to fulfill its self-imposed journalistic obligations, the *Times* will resolve this conflict in favor of the latter – and it won't even deliberate overly long before doing so. There are not many institutions on this planet of which the same can be said, with such assurance.

Nevertheless, after conceding the *Times*' greatness, one is left dissatisfied with its goodness. Between what one learns from reading its pages, and what is really happening in the world, there is too great a gap, which, I repeat, has to do with American journalism as a whole, rather than incidentally with the *Times*. A detailed indictment along these lines could too easily serve as a distraction from the main point at issue. But lest I be thought cavalier in my judgment, I shall give a few examples of what I have in mind. I shall skirt, in these illustrations, the wilder shores of egregious incompetence or folly – shipwreck here can always be attributed to bad luck or mere human fallibility. Instead, I shall try to select ordinary instances in which the *Times* itself presumably thought it had adequately performed its journalistic duty.

1) On September 29th, the *Times* printed a front-page story whose headline read: "Vietcong Invites a Peace Coalition in South Viet Nam." Had this been a fact it would have been news indeed. But the very first sentence shattered the illusion: "North Vietnam broadcast today an invitation to members of former South Vietnamese governments to join the Communist-led National Liberation Front." Note that the invitation was, not to South Vietnamese leaders, but to former leaders; and not to join a "coalition" but to join the existing Communist political organization. Since it stands to reason that the Viet Cong would like to recruit important people in South Vietnam,

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the broadcast told us nothing of significance. Nothing had happened – except in the *Times*. Nevertheless, the *Times* followed up this front-page story with another, from Washington, which began: "Officials here are studying with interest, but with some divergence of interpretation, the Hanoi broadcast. . . . There was no conclusion here whether the broadcast represented a concrete peace move. There was a tendency to doubt it, but the substance and the timing of the broadcast aroused strong interest among a minority of officials and prompted the view that a significant shift, though not probable, was not definitely excluded." And the next paragraph continued: "Both Secretary of State Dean Rusk and the White House press secretary, Bill D. Moyers, issued cautious statements saying that no conclusions had been reached about the broadcast. Compared with the pessimism shown by officials over other recent reports of a possible softening by Hanoi, this reaction signaled a definite if noncommittal interest."

Were it not for the fact that one knew the *Times* to be incapable of it, one would suspect that someone "up there" had decided, on a particularly dull day, to out-parody Art Buchwald. But, alas, this was unquestionably a straight-faced story. To some extent, it can be explained by the editorial bias of the *Times*, which feels the Administration to be insufficiently interested in peace negotiations over Viet Nam. But mainly, I think, a story such as this, in which a non-event becomes "news," is simply the natural consequence of a peculiar mindlessness that pervades the *Times* as a whole, and which itself derives from the structure and spirit of American journalism. What an Important Source – be it Senator McCarthy or Radio Hanoi – says is automatically "spot news," and a little inflation of its significance ensures that one is not "scooped" by some other paper. More about this, later on.

2) On the same day, September 29th, another front-page story from Washington, by Benjamin Welles, began as follows: "Chinese Communist military chieftains [*sic*] under Defense Minister Lin Piao appear to be consolidating their ascendancy over 'hard-core' civilian party rivals led by China's chief of State, Liu Shao-chi, *in the view of specialists on China.*" The italics are mine. (So, of course, is the *sic.*) It takes but a moment's reflection to reveal what an odd – even absurd – way this is to discuss such a matter. If the *Times* wants to interpret events in China, it could (a) employ a full-time China expert to do so – but it has none on its staff; (b) invite an outside expert to write a commentary for that day's newspaper – but the daily *Times* is out of bounds to non-staff personnel; (c) or have a reporter interview, by telephone if necessary, a fair sample of such experts, whose opinions would then be quoted and/or summarized – but this has the disadvantage of candidly suggesting what is indeed the case:

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that the *Times* itself has no special knowledge, or special access to knowledge, about what is happening in China. Instead of exercising any of these options, the *Times* had Mr. Welles ring up someone – perhaps a China expert in the State Department, perhaps someone who had recently spoken to a China expert in the State Department – and concoct a "view of specialists on China." In offering this spurious authoritative opinion – whether it guessed right or wrong is beside the point – the *Times* had no intent to deceive or mislead its readers; it was merely doing what comes naturally to anyone who practices journalism according to the reigning conventions. And that is what makes the case particularly interesting.

3) There has been a great deal of fuss and agitation – in Washington, in Mississippi, in civil rights circles, among all those involved with the war on poverty – about something called The Child Development Group in Jackson, Mississippi. This is an "anti-poverty" organization which the Federal Government had tried to abandon in favor of something called Mississippi Action for Progress. There are no secrets about the whats, the hows, and the whys of it; the story just happens to be extremely complicated. I defy anyone who has had to rely solely on the *Times* for his information about this issue to make sense of it. The *Times* gave it a fair amount of space, to be sure. But the space was filled with reports such as the following, on October 9th:

"Some 3,000 Negroes backing a controversial Head Start group that has been cut off from Federal funds charged in a mass meeting here Saturday that state leaders of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People had 'sold them out' to the white political structure in backing a new biracial group to take over the program."

And so on, for twelve more paragraphs – nearly a full column – all devoted to quoting and summarizing the charges made by speakers at this rally. No context, no perspective, no explanation – not even any apparent curiosity as to why the NAACP should have acted as it did. Nothing about the fact that the Child Development Group was operating as a Black Nationalist organization; that it was using anti-poverty funds for Black Nationalist political activities; that the "schools" it operated were not exactly the kinds of educational institutions Operation Head Start had in mind when it asked Congress for money, etc. Obviously, a bias in favor of Black Power would explain such a story; but the *Times* is known to have a bias in quite the opposite direction. What, then, does explain it? The answer, I believe, has something to do with that same previously-mentioned peculiar mindlessness which pervades the practice of journalism in the United States today, and which easily infiltrates even the most formidable and vigilant of journalistic institutions.

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4) On October 18th, a front-page dispatch from Nan Robertson, in Washington, opened as follows:

"Four and half million American children need psychiatric treatment ranging from counselling to intensive therapy, a Senate study reported today.

"A report released by a Senate subcommittee on juvenile delinquency headed by Senator Thomas J. Dodd asserted that one American child out of 10 in the 5-to-17 age group showed signs of odd behavior warranting treatment."

The story proceeds in this vein, piling solemn absurdity upon solemn absurdity. No indication is given as to how the Senate subcommittee reached this startling sociological conclusion. The fact is, of course, that the subcommittee didn't "reach" this conclusion: it merely propounded it. It had conducted no research of its own. What it did was to take the opinions of a few social scientists – opinions of many years' standing, which had been extensively discussed within the social science community, and which are generally regarded with considerable skepticism – and incorporate them into a "report." This report has no more authority than the average article in the *American Sociological Review*. If the *Times* had taken the occasion to point out that most such reports by Senate subcommittees are not worth the paper they are printed on, it would have performed a distinct journalistic service. But apparently, for the *Times*, such a report itself is "spot news," while its worthlessness is not news at all.

There are other deficiencies in the *Times*' "news" reports, most especially an incorrigible sloppiness of prose (e.g., Negro youths have a constant tendency to age instantly into "youthful Negroes"), an irritating mealy-mouthedness, and a bewildering determination to mention the salaries of public officials on every possible occasion. One could have fun – many have had fun – picking at these flaws. It is not hard to fault the *Times*, if one sets out to do it. It is a staple of conversation among those who have ever been involved in a public activity that, when they read the *Times* the next morning, they will discover that it has almost never got the story quite right and has only too frequently got it quite wrong.* What is hard, however, is to explain to one's own satisfaction why these flaws are so sovereignly entrenched in America's most powerful journalistic establishment.

II

Some clues toward the solution of this mystery are contained in a recently published book, *The Working Press* (edited by Ruth Adler,

*If the editors of the *Times* should think this an exaggeration, I would suggest they poll the several dozen expert witnesses before the Ribicoff-Kennedy-Javits subcommittee on urban affairs to ascertain if these people thought the *Times*' coverage of their testimony was competent.

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published by Putnam's). This book consists of an anthology from the house organ of the *Times,* "Times Talk" – a publication whose circulation is limited to members of the *Times'* staff, and which provides that journalistic community with the "story behind the story." That phrase, used by Mrs. Adler, will mislead those romantics (or should one say paranoiacs?) who persist in believing that within every published report there is some kind of sensational "inside story" struggling to be born. "The story behind the story" refers merely to the reporters' experiences in covering, composing, and communicating their news stories. The accounts of these experiences are frequently entertaining. They are also often quite unintentionally instructive.

If such a thing as truly adult journalism could be imagined, then "Times Talk" would stand to it rather as the Rover boys stand to adult literature. One's overwhelming impression from reading these internal communiqués is that the American press suffers from a bad case of chronic juvenility. "Times Talk" recounts, with an excitement that sometimes verges on awe, how a particular reporter ingeniously got to a phone booth eight minutes before some other reporter, from another newspaper, got there. There is a highly dramatic account of how the *Times,* by superhuman exertion and dedication, managed to get out an "extra," late one morning, reporting Malenkov's resignation. (In passing, we learn that the news had already been on radio and television for several hours.) One learns that, at the Democratic convention of 1952, "News Editor von Hartz went through the customary wringer, worked ungodly hours, gagged on convention hall fodder, swigged countless bottles of coke, gulped endless gallons of lukewarm coffee . . . etc.," while trying to cope with twenty-eight *Times* reporters turning out 25,000 words a day. It is taken for granted that 25,000 words, hastily composed under circumstances not allowing for a moment's thought, constitute journalism appropriate to a "big event." And in a contribution called "Deadline on the Potomac," we are privileged to witness the fierce pressure and driving tempo of the Washington Bureau on a particular day: "The State Department types – Max Frankel, Rick Smith, and [Tad] Szulc – are dividing up the world. 'Who's doing China?' Shuster calls from the front desk, waving some agency copy. 'I'm doing Vietnam,' Rick yells back, 'Max has got China today. . . .'" The reader may be pardoned for wondering – though he is evidently not supposed to – whether this is exactly the right way to cope with China and Vietnam.

Not that the powers-that-be on the *Times* are unaware of the dangers of superficiality. The editor of *The Working Press* introduces a report from J. Anthony Lukas as follows:

"Though spot news is always a newspaper's first concern, the *Times* also sends its men after 'depth' stories, the kind that tell us what is taking place in towns and villages far from the seat of govern-

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ment. To gather material for a piece on Congo village life, Anthony Lukas left the capital city of Leopoldville and went deep into the bush. He lived for a while in the village of Kibweta, the first white man the natives had seen in more than a year."

Mr. Lukas' report of his two-week politico-anthropological sojourn reads like an extract from the late Evelyn Waugh's notebooks for *Black Mischief*. Only, one has the awful certainty that Mr. Lukas didn't mean to be funny.

III

At the risk of seeming presumptuous, I would insist that the facts of *Times* life, as revealed in *The Working Press,* constitute one hell of a way to run a modern serious newspaper. But the facts of life on the *Times* are only a reflection of its state of mind — they are not accidental facts but hang together. One might even say that there is a kind of philsophy of journalism which receives its most perfect — because most abundant — incarnation in the *Times.* And this philosophy is summed up, in passing, in a single sentence in *The Working Press.* That sentence opens a report, in 1952, from a Timesman in Hong Kong:

"Whether in the case of a one-alarm fire or a 12-alarm revolution, any conscientious reporter is concerned with two basics: 'Get it right' and 'Tell it straight.'"

Behind this statement there obviously stands, firm as a rock, a primordial assumption: *all news is of one substance — only the magnitude differs.* And this assumption has an equally firm corollary: *There is such a thing as journalistic expertise that renders superfluous any true expert knowledge.* Upon these twin rocks American journalism lies impaled, like a floundering whale.

The tyranny exercised by these assumptions is to be observed in the very organization of that holy of holies: the newsroom. The *Times* receives daily, from its correspondents and the various news services, one and a half million words. To cope with this fantastic deluge, there are six news desks — foreign, national, metropolitan, sports, financial, business, and culture — each headed by an editor, with each editor having over a dozen assistants. Of these hundred people, how many know very much about the fields they are "editing"? How many are competent judges of the reporter's work? The answer to these questions is: not more than a dozen, surely — and perhaps less. So the bulk of this busy, faceless crowd is, inevitably, "dysfunctional" and "counterproductive." Whatever the quality of the input, this arrangement guarantees that the quality of output will be inferior to it. Why, then, should there be such an arrangement? Because of that overriding belief that "news is news" and any "experienced newsman," proceeding according to the simple principle enunciated above, can cope with it.

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This situation would be a scandal, and reporters would be complaining loudly about it, were it not for the fact that, in truth, the quality of the input is not —and, in the nature of the case, cannot be — much different from what comes out. The reporter himself subscribes to the thesis that "news is news" and that any "experienced newsman" can cope with it. More than that: he is recruited, trained, conditioned, and shaped to a point where this thesis is blindly accepted as an ineluctable law of nature.

The *Times,* of course, has its pick of the most promising young men — but its personnel policies do not essentially differ from those that prevail throughout American journalism as a whole. It hires bright college graduates who have been involved with student journalism. (It rarely hires anyone with a graduate degree in anything but journalism, and it *never* hires a professor — he is assumed to be beyond the reach of proper conditioning.) Sometimes, it waits until this young graduate has had a couple of boring years' experience on a small newspaper — just to be certain of the seriousness of his commitment to journalism. The *Times* then takes this young man and slowly squeezes him through the eye of all its needles — police reporter, Brooklyn Borough Hall reporter, etc., etc. — until he is eventually regarded as worthy of more weighty assignments. By then, he is a proper "newsman." He is also then certainly more stupefied and less literate than when he began.

Clearly, any young man of genuine intellectual distinction and/or literary ability would be out of his mind to go to work for the *Times,* or to contemplate a journalistic career in general. He'd be better advised to go on to graduate school and a university or government career. And the *Times* doesn't really want such young men, for they are bound to be "troublesome" — they will wish to write about subjects they are interested in and know something about, they will resist being assigned here and there, for this and that. The *Times* wants potential "newsmen," who can cover either one-alarm fires or twelve-alarm revolutions, at a moment's notice. And what the *Times* wants, it gets. This explains a phenomenon that could never have come about by mere chance: the extraordinary mediocrity of the *Times'* vast staff.

I must tread softly here. I have some friends and acquaintances on the *Times* and I do not want to suggest that there is anything necessarily mediocre about them. What I am trying to say is something institutional, not personal: whatever the intrinsic merits and talents of some individuals on the *Times,* these have been dissipated within the impersonal proceedings of that huge organization, so that only rarely is a trace of them to be discerned. I don't expect that this disclaimer on my part will win much favor from them: Timesmen are the most loyal employees in the world. Still, the disclaimer is no

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less sincere than my positive statement that, whatever the innate abilities of individual members of the *Times*' staff, it is mediocrity that is the outstanding operational characteristic of that staff, taken as a whole.

I would put that statement to the following test: the *Times*' Washington bureau has over 25 reporters, each a supposed, if temporary, "specialist" – two covering the White House, three the State Department, four the Congress, and so on. Now, let us say that someone wanted to edit a book of ten essays, to be used by the college student of American government and politics, covering such Washington institutions as the Pentagon, the Supreme Court, Congress, the administrative agencies, etc. Would one think instinctively of asking the New York *Times* man to contribute? Would one even know his name? These questions pretty much answer themselves.

Now this really is odd, I submit. A great newspaper should be able to make a better showing than this. Has it never occurred to the management of the *Times* that such a state of affairs bears looking into? Apparently not. And it is interesting to speculate why.

IV

If I were asked to sum up, in one word, the most notable surface characteristic of American journalism – and of its finest representative, the *Times* – I would reply: amateurism. One of the reasons a group of journalists usually makes such excellent company is, precisely, their youthful enthusiasm for their work, their delight in anecdotal gossip about the high and mighty, the high spirits with which they toss about the technical jargon of their trade ("overnights," "sidebars," "takeouts," etc.), their innocent certainty that they can cope with whatever challenge the world will offer them. When journalists assemble, the least problematic of atmospheres is immediately created – it is assumed that everyone knows what he is talking about, and that what he doesn't know he could, with time and diligence, find out. The preferred mode of finding out, and the one to which every journalist accords prompt recognition, is "leg work" – here again, the accent is on youth, and on youth's energy, persistence, and fortitude. Whenever a senior editor or commentator wants to get back into journalistic shape, he leaves his desk to do some "leg work." Everyone understands, and approves.

Whether or not a journalist reads books, or is interested in ideas, is of little importance in the eyes of his colleagues. In fact, even the élite of American journalism, the Washington press corps, reads little and reflects less. This is not – at least not usually – a kind of anti-intellectualism; it is, rather, a naïve and blithe non-intellectualism. The major difference between an older journalist and a younger one is that the older one will have more and better "contacts" and

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"sources." He may or may not *know* more: no one much cares. The foreign correspondent who knows the language of the country he is stationed in is still the exception to the general rule. How little this matters is evidenced by the casual way in which journalists are shuffled around, from country to country, from subject to subject. The "good newspaperman" has the world as his oyster, and from the practice of his profession he draws constant reinvigoration.

With the journalists blandly defining their work, and setting appropriate standards, in this fashion, the result is inevitable. American journalism is rapidly becoming an underdeveloped profession — its methods anachronistic, its habits injurious, its sloth impenetrable. *Every year, the American journalist becomes relatively more ignorant — relative to the complexity of his subject matter, relative to the accumulated knowledge about this subject matter, and relative to the increasing number of his readers who have a genuine, professional connection with this subject matter.*

V

If there are any two propositions which are at the heart of the modern conception of knowledge — whether it be in the physical sciences, the social sciences, or the humanities — they are: (1) one doesn't know what one has seen unless one knows what one is looking for, and (2) when one is dealing with complicated and continuous events, it is impossible to report "what happened" unless one is previously equipped with a context of meaning and significance. In other words, the motion that a "twelve-alarm revolution" is not essentially different from, but only twelve times larger than, a "one-alarm fire," is the most naïve of epistemological fallacies, and the most callow of simplifications. One can go even further and say that, in the modern world, authentic one-alarm fires are becoming exceedingly rare events: even what seems to promise to be a nice, simple "story" will usually have enough complication to cause the unknowing and unwary reporter to come a cropper. Thus, anyone who has even a casual interest in economics and finance is constantly being jarred by what he reads in the *Times*. If a company is expected by Wall Street to report a 50 percent increase in earnings, and in fact reports a 20 percent increase in earnings, it is utterly misleading to report, as the *Times* frequently does, that "Shmolox declined 3 points *despite* a reported increase in earnings." Here, as everywhere, the context is everything. And even the news story that is merely handed out to the waiting reporter can give rise to confusion. On October 26th, the *Times* had a front-page headline that read: "Food-Price Rises Laid to Retailers and Processors." On that same day, the *Wall Street Journal* gave its story this headline: "FTC Finds No Culprit, Some Justification, in Recent Sharp Milk, Bread Price Boosts." The *Times*' headline

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was inaccurate; the *Wall Street Journal's* headline was perhaps unduly tendentious, but it was certainly closer to the truth. To be sure, the FTC, juggling a political hot potato, did not exactly go out of its way to avoid all ambiguities in its report. But that's the way things are in this wicked world, and a reporter ought to be able to cope with them. Presumably, if the *Times* had a professional economist on its news staff — someone who saw instantly the difference between "profits" and "profit margins" — this sort of thing could be avoided. But the *Times* does not have a professional economist on its staff.*

It is really rather sad that an ordinary police reporter these days has to be so frightfully knowledgeable about such subjects as race relations, drug addiction, juvenile delinquency, and the sociology of ethnic groups. It robs journalism of much of its glamour, of its fresh-air easiness and amiable bustle, and puts a novel emphasis on professional experience and sallow-cheeked bookishness. Still, we all have to grow up sooner or later to face the facts of life, and American journalism's unwillingness to do so, while understandable, is hardly excusable.

VI

I have said the most notable *surface* characteristic of American journalism is its amateur airs and graces. Beneath this surface, however, there is a deep historic impulse at work — one that shaped American journalism into its present form and that continues to be its prime mover. This is what one can fairly call, with apologies for oversimplification taken for granted, *the populist-progressive idea.*

By these terms, "populist" and "progressive," I have in mind *both* certain attitudes and intellectual traits that have characterized the American democracy since the days of Andrew Jackson *and* the complex of ideas associated with the populist and progressive movements in the period 1880-1914. It was in this latter period that American journalism received the particular self-conscious definition of its mission which still prevails — though the elements that eventually constituted this definition unquestionably go much further back.

For instance, what we now call "muckraking" is a journalistic phenomenon that is indigenous to a democracy, with its instinctive suspicion and distrust of all authority in general, and of concentrated political and economic power especially. But "muckraking" as a

*In all fairness, I must quickly add that the *Times* does have two excellent economic journalists — Edwin Dale on the news staff, Murray Rossant on the editorial. Their own writings are knowledgeable and sophisticated; but these represent only a small portion of the total, and neither gentleman seems to have much influence over the *Times'* general coverage of economic developments. It is not too much to say that if the entire financial section were to vanish tomorrow, no one in Wall Street would particularly notice the event.

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supreme journalistic obligation and the most challenging of journalistic opportunities received its establishment during the "Progressive era," when the word itself was coined. Of the public service rendered by "muckraking," everyone is well aware: the exposure of fraud and criminality is something that one is always grateful for. But the dominance of the "muckraking" syndrome in journalism has its injurious side, which we are not so well aware of. Only recently, Roger Starr, Executive Director of New York City's Housing and Planning Council, was moved to complain:

> "Nothing could serve American City government better than putting the works of Lincoln Steffens on specially restricted shelves in the journalism schools of the nation. *The Shame of the Cities* continues to haunt the city rooms of the country's major newspapers."

What Mr. Starr had in mind is the passionate attention that newspapermen pay to the slightest hint of corrupt collusion between businessman and public officials. (Thus, a recent article in the press section of a national news magazine begins matter-of-factly: "Nothing delights a newspaper reporter more than the chance to snoop out a conflict-of-interest scandal.") There would be nothing wrong with this – were it not for the fact that it leaves the newspapermen with so little time, energy, and curiousity to devote to larger, and more serious, questions of, say, urban renewal. The journalist who exposes the fact that a city official steered a profitable urban renewal contract toward a friend, a relative, or a former business associate is sure to receive the appropriate honors and applause due "a good reporter." That this same journalist has never had anything intelligent to say about the urban renewal plan itself – that, indeed, he really understands almost nothing about this incredibly complicated subject – is deemed to be of little consequence. Yet the corruption probably involved the waste of tens of thousands of dollars of public funds, while the plan itself certainly involved the possible waste – innocent and uncorrupted waste – of tens of millions. Doesn't this suggest that American journalism lacks a proper sense of proportion, a reasonable perspective, about its work? Not to American journalists, it doesn't. The newspaperman who authored the exposé is automatically a candidate for a better job – he has "shown his stuff." Meanwhile, the expert who has written a good book or paper on this urban renewal project remains unheard of in the journalistic universe.

VII

Though the *Times* is thought to be – and, in a way, is – the "Establishment" newspaper, the populist impulse throbs through its editorial arteries as if nature itself had put it there. To show how

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powerful this impulse is, I would point not to its news stories — that would be too easy — but to two of its most dignified departments:

1) Letters-to-the-Editor: One would expect that this department would be, all by itself, a significant journalistic institution (as is indeed the case with the London *Times*). It is the natural outlet for people in authority who wish to comment on a *Times'* story, to quarrel with it, to supplement it. It is also the natural place where such people could most easily and conveniently put their opinions "on the record." Yet both of these possibilities for the department have been effectively nullified by the *Times'* editorial management. Insufficient space is allocated for the first possibility to be realized — any letter of more than 250 words, though by an important person on an important topic, is discouraged; and even many shorter letters, of this order, simply never get published.

When one makes inquiries, as I have occasionally done, as to why the Letters-to-the-Editor department is so deliberately stunted, one receives nothing resembling an articulate or cogent reason. But a faithful reading of this department, over the years, does enable one to make a pretty good guess as to why this situation prevails. Two guesses, actually. First, it is fairly clear that the *Times* does not like to see letters published which suggest that its original stories were incomplete and often ill-informed. The average reader of the *Times* would be astonished to learn of the number of such letters that are received — letters by people of some standing, who speak with some authority — which are resolutely not published. Second, it is equally clear that the *Times* regards this department as above all an outlet for the *vox populi:* it is a department, not for the use of officials, or scholars, or experts, or even for the subjects of the stories themselves, but for the *Times'* own version of the man-in-the-street. This explains why so many of the letters that do get published are so insignificant at best, so inane at worst. It is not an accident; it is a fair reflection of the *Times'* instinctive distrust of intellectual authority, and of its obstinate suspicion of uncommon opinion — above all, of un-journalistic opinion.

2) The Editorials: The *Times'* editorial board — which is responsible only for the editorial page — consists of approximately a dozen men. They are all experienced journalists, and a few of them have achieved real distinction in their special fields of interest. Why is it, then, that this mountain should daily give birth to so many mice?

Let me be as precise as I can. I am not saying that the *Times'* editorials are not influential: they frequently and inevitably are. Nor am I complaining, as others have, that these editorials are excessively temperate in tone and too often vague in substance. This accusation is largely true, but it is also trivial: one can usually infer, with only a

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modest effort, where the *Times* stands on any particular issue. I am not saying that the *Times*' editorials should be better than they are; I am saying that they should be different from what they are.

What is wrong with the *Times*' editorials is the near complete absence of analytical reason — of a real intellectual effort to prove a point, to make an argument, to persuade an intelligent reader. They are mostly expressions of opinions, with only the most casual references to the grounds of these opinions. What the *Times* says editorially, counts — because it is the *Times* that says it. A *Times* editorial never counts on its own merits. One may refer to a *Times* editorial; one never *quotes* it. All of which is to say that the *Times*' editorial page, though it has considerable impact, has no real influence. It is capable of intimidating, never of educating. One is always curious to know what the *Times*' "position" is on this or that; one rarely is moved to take the trouble to look up and read the editorial itself.

There is no mystery why the *Times*' editorials are this way. That's the way editorials in American newspapers, with only a few honorable and notable exceptions, always have been. Traditionally, the editorial has been little more than the expression of the publisher's or editor's opinion. The premise on which this tradition rests is that matters of state, and issues in public life, are all relatively simple; that such knowledge about these issues as is easily available is sufficient unto the occasion; and that one needs nothing but firmness of character, and the moral courage to "make up one's mind," in order to express a decent editorial opinion. The American editorial page, like the entire corpus of American journalism, is a creature of the myth that, because the common man is ultimately sovereign in a democracy, common opinion is inherently adequate to all the tasks of self-government. A banal editorial page passes without notice in the journalistic fraternity; a "professorial" or "highbrow" editorial page would immediately be the target for mocking and derogatory comment on the part of this same fraternity.

VIII

At the end of his second term in office, Harry Truman wrote to a friend:

> "I really look with commiseration over the great body of my fellow citizens, who, reading newspapers, live and die in the belief that they have known something of what has been passing in the world in their time."

This is clearly an exaggeration of American journalism's deficiencies. Equally exaggerated, no doubt, is Walter Lippmann's conception of American journalism's responsibilities, as stated in 1920:

> "The news of the day as it reaches the newspaper office is an incredible medley of fact, propaganda, rumor, suspicion,

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> clues, hopes, and fears, and the task of selecting and ordering that news is one of the truly sacred and priestly offices in a democracy. . . . The power to determine each day what shall seem important and what shall be neglected is a power unlike any that has been exercised since the Pope lost his hold on the secular mind."

Nevertheless, these exaggerations between them define a large area of truth — an area which American journalism has only begun to explore.

Once upon a time — let's say fifty years ago — no ambitious American household was without its "home encyclopedia." These compendious volumes were usually written by hacks — sometimes by a single hack — who accumulated their information hastily and conveyed it carelessly. Nowadays, encyclopedias are much better than they used to be. It is taken for granted that true knowledge is not so easily come by, or so easily communicated. Experts need to be consulted, even invited to contribute. And the written copy has to be supervised by editors who themselves have some claim to competence. There is still much room for improvement in our encyclopedias; but no one can deny that progress has been made.

The American press has made much less progress. To be sure, newsmen are better educated than they used to be — but, then, *everyone* is better educated than used to be the case. And it is probably true that today's publishers, editors, and reporters *wish* to be more responsible than their forbears. But it is not clear that they know how, for they are the prisoners of antiquated journalistic conventions. They are sensitive to the structure of "a good news story," in the sense that they can admire a neatly executed "pyramid lead" (who, what, why, and when, all in the first paragraph), but they are far less sensitive to the higher standards of knowledgeability that are demanded both by the complexities of modern society and by the academic-professional contributions to the "information explosion" that threatens to overwhelm us all. They worry about a reporter smuggling his personal opinions into a news story and remain oblivious to the need for good judgment if the story is to have any value at all. But, then, *the unwillingness to distinguish between opinion and judgment is itself one of the outstanding traits of the populist mentality.*

Judgment, unlike prejudice, is not something that a journalist can be *assumed* to possess. When you trust a man's judgment, you acknowledge that his opinions are informed; that they carry some special weight and authority; that they are based on knowledge and understanding which you — as a reader or editor — cannot usually pretend to have. But the only justification for allowing a reporter to exercise his judgment is that he, in fact, has it. In contrast, the com-

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mitment to so-called "objective" and impersonal reporting of "spot news" is, in practice, a rationalization for "safe" and mindless reporting. To keep a reporter's prejudices out of a story is commendable; to keep his judgment out of a story is to guarantee that truth will be emasculated.*

One can already hear the retort: "For God's sake, we're running a newspaper, not a university." True enough; but I find it revealing that this antithesis should spring so automatically to mind. After all, the Post Office does classify newspapers as "educational" publications (thereby making available to them the second-class mailing rate); and while this classification may have been casually made, in response to specific political pressures, it is also true that the press in America has always been regarded as participating, *in its own way*, in a kind of permanent process of adult education. It has *always* been understood that, democracy being the rule of public opinion, it was crucial that this public opinion be grounded in a full and reasonable assessment of the circumstances in which government must proceed. And in the course of educating the citizenry, the press also educates its leaders. As Max Ways has perceptively pointed out: "Top political leaders cannot hear themselves, cannot develop either confidence or self-criticism except as they apprehend what effect their words and deeds have upon the public. A policy maker does not know what he has said at a press conference until he reads the next morning's papers."

One need not be a professor to be an educator, and I am not suggesting that American journalists should all become academics. I *am* suggesting that many more of them should become *academically-trained* specialists – that they should have, if not theoretical knowl-

*In an essay on the reporting of murder trials, Eric Ambler had this to say:

"There is a tradition in American newspaper reporting which forbids the reporter to 'editorialise.' He may only write the received facts. This is not to say, however, that he only reports the truth. He may, indeed must, report what someone has said, even if he knows it to be a lie; but he may not say he knows that it is a lie; that is editorialising. The 'fact' which he is reporting is the fact that the statement was made. The theory behind all this is that it is not the reporter's business to tell the reader which facts are really facts, but only to report what has been said and done. It is up to the free and independent reader to decide for himself what he believes. The reporter who writes the 'truth as he sees it' is hell-bent for corruption.

"The principle is admirable; its practice has drawbacks. One of the reasons why the late Senator McCarthy was able so rapidly and so easily to lie his way to power was that everything he said was always faithfully reported. The New York *Times* once acknowledged the problem, but also shrugged it off: 'It is difficult, if not impossible, to ignore charges by Senator McCarthy just because they are usually proved false. The remedy lies with the reader.' As Richard Rovere has pointed out, 'to many people, this was rather like saying that if a restaurant serves poisoned food, it is up to the diner to refuse it.' "

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edge, then at least *contextual* knowledge – that they should be better equipped to *make sense* of their subject-matter. As Charles E. Silberman has recently written, "journalism and scholarship, far from being antagonistic, require each other. . . . One cannot deal satisfactorily with the larger and more insistent problems of the present except through some merger of the two disciplines."

If the American newspaper is comparable to the encyclopedia of yesteryear, the American press as an institution is comparable to the medical schools of fifty years ago. They had been sufficient unto their time – but were obviously becoming inadequate to the tasks their developing professions were proposing to them. A great reform ensued, which met with tenacious opposition, and which took decades to achieve success. Ultimately, however, the modern medical school emerged – a school composed not merely of "medical men" but also of micriobiologists, biochemists, histologists – a school that proposes to encompass all the pertinent expertises that make up the modern science of medicine. When the underdeveloped profession we now call journalism awakens to its defects, its opportunities, its obligations, then the ramshackle institution we call the American press will be transformed and modernized. Recently, the *Times* has shown some flickerings of awareness of what needs to be done. In its Metropolitan news and its Sunday edition there is far less mindless fanaticism about "spot news," noticeably more interest in making more sense of the news. A few favored journalists – e.g., Max Frankel and Anthony Lewis – seem to have been given (or have usurped) the authority to infuse a news story with intelligence and judgment. The *Times* now even has a lawyer to write about legal news – a precedent-shattering innovation! These may be signs of better things to come. Still, it would be nice to receive a clear and unambiguous signal that the process of modernization has begun.

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The future of teaching

WILLIAM ARROWSMITH

During the Roman Saturnalia even slaves were permitted to speak freely, even about slavery. I am here in this American carnival city* to speak, I suppose, for the classroom teacher, and I claim, *o decani praesidesque*, the ancient privilege of immunity for saying almost exactly what I think. I expect to be discounted as either innocent or impertinent, but that hardly matters. "So long as a man is trying to tell the truth," wrote John Jay Chapman, "his remarks will contain a margin which others will regard as mystifying and irritating exaggeration. It is this very margin of controversy that does the work. No explosion follows a lie."

Let me say immediately that I am concerned here with only one kind of teaching, and I am eager to talk about it because it is the kind of teaching with which this meeting is apparently least concerned. I mean the ancient, crucial, high art of teaching, the kind of teaching which alone can claim to be called educational, an essential element in all noble human culture, and hence a task of infinitely more importance than research scholarship. With the teacher as transmitter or conductor of knowledge, as servant or partner of research, I have no concern. He is useful and necessary and, because he does the bulk of university teaching, it is important that his job be effectively performed and intelligently evaluated. But so long as the teacher is viewed as merely a diffuser of knowledge or a higher popularizer, his

*This paper is the text of Mr. Arrowsmith's keynote address to the American Council on Education in New Orleans, last October.

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position will necessarily be a modest and even menial one. And precisely this, I think, is the prevalent view of the teacher's function, the view overwhelmingly assumed even among those who want to redress the balance in favor of the teacher. Is it any wonder, then, that the teacher enjoys no honor? For if the teacher stands to the scholar as the pianist to the composer, there can be no question of parity; teaching of this kind is necessary but secondary. So, too, is the comparatively subtler and more difficult kind of teaching that is concerned with scholarly methodology and the crucial "skeletal" skills of creative research. Only when large demands are made of the teacher, when we ask him to assume a primary role as educator in his own right, will it be possible to restore dignity to teaching. Teaching, I repeat, is not honored among us either because its function is grossly misconceived or its cultural value not understood. The reason is the overwhelming positivism of our technocratic society and the arrogance of scholarship. Behind the disregard for the teacher lies the transparent sickness of the humanities in the university and in American life generally. Indeed, nothing more vividly illustrates the myopia of academic humanism than its failure to realize that the fate of any true culture is revealed in the value it sets upon the teacher and the way it defines him. "*The advancement of learning at the expense of man,*" writes Nietzsche, "is the most pernicious thing in the world. The stunted man is a backward step for humanity; he casts his *shadow* over all time to come. It debases conviction, the natural purpose of the particular field of learning; learning itself is finally destroyed. It is advanced, true, but its effect on life is nil or immoral."

What matters, then, is the kind of context that we can create for teaching and the largeness of the demands made upon the teacher. Certainly he will have no function or honor worthy of the name until we are prepared to make the purpose of education what it always was—the molding of men rather than the production of knowledge. It is my hope that education in this sense will not be driven from the university by the knowledge-technicians. But this higher form of teaching does not die merely because the university will not practice it. Its future is always assured, since human beings and human culture cannot do without it. And if the university does not educate, others will. Education will pass, as it is passing now, to the artist, to the intellectual, to the gurus of the mass media, the charismatic charlatans and sages, and the whole immense range of secular and religious street-corner fakes and saints. The context counts. Socrates took to the streets, but so does every demagogue or fraud. By virtue of its traditions and pretensions the university is, I believe, a not inappropriate place for education to occur. But we will not transform the university milieu nor create teachers by the meretricious device of offering prizes or bribes or "teaching sabbaticals" or building a favor-

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able "image". At present the universities are as uncongenial to teaching as the Mojave Desert to a clutch of Druid priests. If you want to restore a Druid priesthood, you cannot do it by offering prizes for Druid-of-the-year. If you want Druids, you must grow forests. There is no other way of setting about it.

The disqualification of the scholar

I am suggesting what will doubtless seem paradox or treason—that there is no *necessary* link between scholarship and education, nor between research and culture, and that in actual practice scholarship is no longer a significant educational force. Scholars, to be sure, are unprecedentedly powerful, but their power is professional and technocratic; as educators they have been eagerly disqualifying themselves for more than a century, and their disqualification is now nearly total. The scholar has disowned the student—that is, the student who is not a potential scholar—and the student has reasonably retaliated by abandoning the scholar. This, I believe, is the only natural reading of what I take to be a momentous event—the secession of the student from the institutions of higher learning on the grounds that they no longer educate and are, therefore, in his word, *irrelevant.* By making education the slave of scholarship, the university has renounced its responsibility to human culture and its old, proud claim to possess, as educator and molder of men, an *ecumenical* function. It has disowned, in short, what teaching has always meant: a care and concern for the future of man, a Platonic love of the species, not for what it is, but what it might be. It is a momentous refusal. I do not exaggerate. When the President of Cornell seriously proposes that the university should abandon liberal education so that specialization can begin with matriculation—and when he advocates this in order to *reconcile* the conflicting claims of research and teaching![3]—it should be obvious even to the skeptical that education is being strangled in its citadel, and strangled furthermore on behalf of the crassest technocracy. I find it very difficult to imagine the rationalization of these salaried wardens of a great, ecumenical tradition, who apparently view themselves and the institutions they administer as mere servants of national and professional interests. A hundred years ago Nietzsche denounced the subservience of German universities to an inhuman scholarly technology and the interest of the Reich: "The entire system of higher education has lost what matters most: the end as well as the means to the end. That education, that *Bildung* is itself an end—and not the state—this has been forgotten. Educators are needed who have themselves been educated, not the learned louts whom the universities today offer our youth. Educators are lacking . . . hence the

[3] James A. Perkins, *The University in Transition,* pp. 43-45.

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decline of German culture." And what has happened in Germany is now an American story.

We, too, lack educators – by which I mean Socratic *teachers*, visible embodiments of the *realized* humanity of our aspirations, intelligence, skill, scholarship; men ripened or ripening into realization, as Socrates at the close of the *Symposium* comes to be, and therefore personally guarantees, his own definition of love. Our universities and our society need this compelling embodiment, this exemplification of what we are all presumably at, as they have never needed it before. It is *men* we need, not programs. It is possible for a student to go from kindergarten to graduate school without ever encountering a *man* – a man who might for the first time give him the only profound motivation for learning, the hope of becoming a better man. Learning matters, of course; but it is the *means*, not the *end*, and the end must always be either radiantly visible, or profoundly implied, in the means. It is only in the teacher that the end is apparent; he can humanize because he possesses the human skills which give him the power to humanize others. If that power is not felt, nothing of any educational value can occur. The humanities stand or fall according to the human worth of the man who professes them. If undergraduates ever met teachers of this kind, then the inhuman professionalism of the graduate schools might have some plausibility; there would be an educational base. But nothing can be expected of a system in which men who have not themselves been educated presume to educate others. Our entire educational enterprise is in fact founded upon the wholly false premise that *at some prior stage* the essential educational work has been done. The whole structure is built on rotten foundations, and the routines of education have begun to threaten and destroy what they were intended to save. There is a very real sense, for instance, in which scholarship has become pernicious to literature; the humanities as presently taught are destructive of the past and therefore of the present.

The human mediator

I repeat: the teacher is both the end and the sanction of the education he gives. This is why it is completely reasonable that a student should expect a classicist to live classically. The man who teaches Shakespeare or Homer runs the supreme risk. This is surely as it should be. Charisma in a teacher is not a mystery or nimbus of personality, but radiant *exemplification* to which the student contributes a correspondingly radiant hunger for becoming. What is classic and past instructs us in our *potential size*, offers the greatest human scale against which to measure ourselves. The teacher, like his text, is thus the mediator between past and present, present and future, and he matters because there is no *human* mediator but him. He is

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the student's only evidence outside the text that a great humanity exists: upon his *impersonation* both his text and his student's human fate depend. For student and teacher alike, ripeness is all. The age of the student does not matter.

Men, not programs; *galvanizers*, not conductors. When students say that their education is irrelevant, they mean above all the absence of this man. Without him the whole enterprise is ashes, sheer phoniness. This is why students are so quick, and so right, to suspect a fatal hypocrisy in the teacher who lives without the slighest relation to what he knows, whose texts are wholly divorced from his life, from human life. What students want is not necessarily what they need; but in this case it is the students who are right and the universities which are wrong. The irony of the situation is enough to make strong men weep. Here, unmistakably, we have students concerned to ask the crucial questions – identity, meaning, right and wrong, the good life – and they get in response not bread but a stone. Here we have a generation blessedly capable of moral outrage, and it is the bitterest of anomalies that the humanities should be dying among students capable of moral outrage in a morally outrageous world. Almost without exception the response of the universities to this profound hunger for education, for compelling examples of human courage and compassionate intelligence, has been mean, parochial, uncomprehending, or cold. Above all, *cold.* The waste in sheer human incentive, in disappointment in matters where disappointment is destructive and fatal, is appalling. But what fills one with rage is the callousness of scholars, the incredible lack of human concern among humanists, the monumental indifference of the learned to human misery and need. Why, you ask, is teaching held in contempt? Because it has become contemptible by indifference. Teaching has been fatally trivialized by scholarship which has become trivial. What, I find myself wondering, would education be like if humanists and teachers had the courage of their traditions and dared to face their students as men in whom their studies and texts found worthy, or at least attempted, embodiment?

Such embodiment may be personal, rational, and contemplative, or activist and public. What matters is the integration of significant life and knowledge, of compassionate study and informed conduct. The teacher in this sense goes where the action is, where his example is most needed. Moreover, it is by going there that he can hope to recover the great, complex power of the text whose custodian he is. The point is important. We must at any cost find room in our universities for those who are capable of *living or acting upon a pure text.* Lacking such men, the student distrusts the teacher and the culture he represents; the culture is defeated in the teacher's failure. I am not suggesting that teachers must be heroes or great men, but

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they must understand greatness and desire it for themselves and others. Only so can they speak to the student's hunger for the same greatness. It is important, however, that our sense of human greatness find *varied* incarnation. One thing a student needs to know is how men cope with the vast, impersonal chaos of modern existence. For most of us this is a matter of daily improvisation. We no longer have the ability to cope together, with a collective style based upon a common set of values, pagan, say, or Christain – it is rather an individualistic *sauve qui peut*, requiring educated hunchwork, luck, imagination, skill, and the habit of hope. This present generation has experienced drastic change, and it therefore has a drastic need for significant styles of coping, present and past and as varied as possible. What is wanted is a repertory of convincing, visible, and powerful life-styles. And this the university should, as *alma mater*, be able and happy to provide. It takes all kinds of men to make a *university* – not scholars only.

For the scholar's example is no longer adequate to educate, though at its best it may belong among the higher styles. His comparative security, his cosy enclave of learning with its narrow departmental limits, and his murderous preference for a single mode of the mind—the discursive or methodological, do not call it "rational"—with its neat problems and solutions, his stunted humanity – all this strikes the student as irrelevant and even repugnant. What he wants is models of committed integrity, as whole as they can be in a time of fragmented men. Admittedly such models are hard to find, and integrated men are not to be expected. Hence it is essential that a student be confronted with as many *different*, vivid modes as we can muster; from these he may be able to infer the great, crucial idea of all true education – the single, many-sided transformation of himself, the *man* he wants to be. These men are hard to find because nobody is concerned to find them. And meanwhile our universities are making them rarer.

Between syllabus and curriculum

One point should be made. When I say that scholarship no longer educates, I am not thereby joining what Daniel Bell calls the "apocalyptic" faction against the exponents of order and reason. But I also believe that the true stature of reason is no longer visible in technical scholarship, and that the academic sense of order is inadequate because it is not related to the real chaos of existence. Finally, it is order and not instinctual anarchy that we want, and when I speak of a style of life, I mean by style *controlled* passion, not the free play of instinct. It is because reason and order have been so diminished in the university that we require a repertory of models before we set about constructing a curriculum. The days of the syllabus are gone

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forever; we are not yet ready for a viable curriculum. General education has failed, not because of its curricular inadequacy (though it *is* inadequate), but because men of general intelligence are not available to teach it. It has ended up, therefore, in the hands of specialists who always betrayed it in practice. If I had a campus to play with, my first step would be to plant there, at any price, the six or seven charismatic teachers of my acquaintance; their collective *virtù* would, I am convinced, create a curriculum that would truly, explosively, educate. But it is these men we must have, regardless of their academic pedigrees – prophets, poets, apocalyptics, scientists, scholars, intellectuals, men who sprawl across departmental boundaries, who will not toe the line, individuals as large as life, irrepressible, troublesome and – exemplary. Either we must make scholarship whole and ripe and human again, or we must import into the university every conceivable variety of active, shaping, seminal humanity we can find.

At present the latter course is probably the more practicable. By usurping the whole job of education and by claiming to represent the whole mind or the only part of the mind that matters, scholarship has had the effect of destroying what education, generously defined, might provide—the basis of a common culture. We have provided men with skills they cannot meaningfully use, and by so doing we have *alienated* the laymen of any coherent future culture. R. P. Blackmur comes pat to my point: "What we have, with respect to the old forms of our culture, is the disappearance of the man who, by his education, his tradition, and his own responsive life, was the layman to all the forms of his society. The mind no longer feels omniform or that it knows its own interest. We have a society of priests or experts who are strangely alien to the great mass movements which they presumably express or control." In the profession of the teacher lies one of the few correctives to the alienation which technical scholarship has conferred upon us, since, like the artist, the teacher offers cultural skills in living and loving use.

But teaching will not easily recover its great, lost function. The forces arrayed – I will not say *against* teaching, but *for* research – are formidable indeed, composing a gigantic scholarly cartel. At its base is the department, the matrix of university power, protected from above by the graduate deans and administrators, who are more and more drawn from the research professoriat and therefore share its aims and ambitions. National structure is provided by the great foundations and the learned societies which form the American Council of Learned Societies. And now there is the new National Endowment for the Humanities, whose depressingly conventional initial programs (*inter alia* a grant for papyrological studies and historical bibliography) look as though they might have been designed

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by an unprogrammed computer in collaboration with a retired professor of Coptic. Even the Woodrow Wilson Foundation, designed "to attract men and women to the profession of college teaching," now seems to be tailoring its standards more and more to the pinched professionalism of the graduate schools. There is also the Cartter report of the American Council on Education; intended to assess the quality of graduate programs on the basis of *informed* opinion, it will almost inevitably have the effect of stifling innovation, if only because informed scholarly opinion is unadventurous and tyrannous as well as profoundly snobbish. My argument is this: at every level the forces making for scholarly conformity are immense, and the rewards of conformity high. If these forces are not directly hostile to teaching, they are certainly profoundly indifferent.

My point is not merely negative. If there is to be reform within the existing institutional framework, it must be radical. Teaching will not be restored by tinkering with the curriculum, by minor structural changes, or modest innovations in graduate degree programs. I offer the following observations as instances only; to my mind they represent the kind of profound structural reform that must precede real change. I believe they are practicable, but I offer them nonetheless with considerable pessimism, in the doubt that there is presently enough energy and leadership in the American university for it to be reformed from within.

Administration and Innovation:

Innovation, experiment, reform – these are crucial, and the pity is that, apart from a few noteworthy experiments, there is so little real innovation. Wherever one looks, there is the same vacuum of leadership, the same failure of nerve. For this I believe administrators must shoulder the blame, or most of it. It is idle to expect anything from the faculties, who are caught both in the hideous jungle of academic bureaucracy and their own professional lethargy. Nor can one look to the providential intervention of the foundations; they can perhaps fund imagination and courage, but they cannot, apparently, provide it. It is above all to local institutions – the colleges, the universities – that one must turn. They are funded by communities – states, alumni, student fees – and they therefore have a responsibility to the community that supports them, but above all to that general culture that I have identified with the ideal role of the teacher. But if community and faculty support is to be enlisted (and community tyranny to be avoided), there must be something more than mere management by administrators; there must be leadership, which means a sense of the whole endeavor. Chairman of departments and deans have constituencies to represent; only the presidents and provosts can speak on behalf of the whole enterprise.

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I believe that administrators fail to make anything like full, or imaginative, use of their power. As an ex-chairman I understand that administrators are not omnipotent, that hypocrisy and evasion go with the job. But I am not prepared to believe that presidents are powerless; too many instances of abuse of power convince me to the contrary. It is the margin of freedom that matters, and it is only with the failure of administrators to use this margin that I find fault. What is stunning is the universal torpor, the apparent dedication to the principle of *laisser aller*. If presidents are too harrassed to provide leadership, what has happened to the provosts? Why are the deans so subservient to the departments, so supinely deferential to the research professoriat? Why don't administrators take the stump on behalf of their policies? There is, I suspect, only one answer, and it is not powerlessness, but lack of policies and ideas, and a long habit of prostration before success. A man cannot stump for programs he doesn't have, and this is why so many administrators talk such dreary rubbish. They have, quite literally, nothing to say. Alternatively, they are the prisoners of their origins, the professoriat from which they emerge and whose assumptions and aims they share. Hence they conceive of their task as the encouragment of the *status quo* and, when confronted with the crisis of education, claim, like Clark Kerr, that chaos is positively good for us, or, like President Perkins, that we can reconcile teaching and scholarship by the simple device of abandoning liberal education.

The Colleges:

I can think of no more conspicious failure of leadership than in the liberal arts colleges. With a few notable exceptions, the record of the college is one of failure, at least if judged by its own claims. Whatever else it may be, Socratic it is not, neither in faculty nor style nor results. This I take to be a matter of fact. Certainly it is hard to imagine a more damningly documented indictment of the liberal-arts college than that of the Jacob study,[1] with its bleak conclusion that, apart from three or four colleges, the effect of college teaching on student values is simply nil, zero, and that what small change occurs comes from the student subculture. The conclusion is the more devastating because it is precisely on the claim to *teach* that the American college stakes its case. Here – in low student-teacher ratios, in college plans, tutorials, etc. – it has spent its money and ingenuity, and it is here that its failure has been spectacular. Why?

In my opinion, the colleges have failed as teaching institutions because they have been subverted from within. They have recruited their faculties heavily from the major graduate institutions, and these

[1] Philip E. Jacob, *Changing Values in College, An Exploratory Study of the Impact of College Teaching*. New York, 1957.

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recruits have inevitably altered the tone and finally the function of the colleges. There has doubtless been pressure from the graduate schools, but for the most part the colleges have consented to the process. And they are now in the ludicrous position of proudly claiming on the one hand that seventy-odd per cent of their graduates go on to graduate or professional schools, and on the other of complaining that they are being turned into prep-schools for graduate study. Gentility and snobbery have played a large part in this subversion, as well as the hunger for academic respectability which is now firmly linked to the business of research. Instead of cleaving to their Socratic pretentions and traditions, the colleges have tended instead to become petty universities, differing from the universities only in a slightly higher regard for the teacher and a corresponding tolerance of the student. If the wealthier colleges have managed to recruit able faculty, the poor colleges have fared badly, recruiting second and third-rate Ph.D's, who for their part regard the college as an academic boondocks and lust for the day when they can return to the urban Edens of research. In the meantime they teach the only thing they know – technical expertise – and thereby both corrupt their students and refuse their Socratic opportunities. The colleges, in short, have yoked themselves to Pharaoh's chariot and, if they regret their loss of function, they have only themselves to blame. A handful of small colleges have dared to break the bond of snobbery and respectability that binds the college to the university, and they have done so simply by daring to profess the values they assert and finding teachers who profess them too.

Organizational energy and intelligence are crucial if the liberal arts college is to escape subordination to graduate education. I am of course in violent disagreement with those who believe that "the selective liberal arts colleges of the future . . . must become first-rate preparatory colleges for graduate education."[2] If we believe that the liberal traditions of the colleges are viable and that the college may have a higher function than feeding professional schools, then we must set about saving it. If I am right, the trouble with the colleges is that they recruit their faculties from uncongenial sources; the well is poisoned. By imitating the universities, the colleges have everything to lose and nothing to gain; neither their funds nor their human resources are adequate to the competition. My solution is dramatically simple. Let the college go into business on their own, *against* the graduate universities; let them form their own league, as it were, and train the kind of man they cannot expect to recruit from the universities. I am aware that such federations are in the air, and perhaps already exist; but I am emphatically *not* suggesting federation on the

[2] Allan M. Cartter, "University Teaching and Excellence," *Educational Record* (Spring, 1966), p. 297.

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principle of beating the graduate schools at their own game. It should be a *different game altogether*, designed to produce men who did not think it beneath their dignity to educate others; men in whom the general civilized intelligence survives; humanists with a concern for men; scholars convinced that the world needs humane knowledge as never before. Ideally, I think, it would seek to *involve* its students in the real world, and it would surely seek real association with the vocations and professions. But its primary purpose would be to produce truly educated graduates as well as teachers to whom it could reasonably entrust the crucial task of providing models for those who wanted to become civilized men instead of scholars. I also believe that a formidable but generous enterprise helps to summon large behavior into being, and that the immense task of building institutions worthy of his love and learning might do much to create the kind of man who is missing. Enterprises which require humanity are the first pre-requisite for a greater humanity. Men must *use* themselves significantly in order to grow. That is the law of all education, all growth. Why not apply it *to education*? We need new or renewed institutions; in the act of renewing them we may renew ourselves.

Such institutions would surely not lack for students. Those who desire further study but have no wish to be processed as professors are, I am convinced, far more numerous than is commonly suspected. The country is rich; leisure is available; educational expectations are rising. Far too many graduates of our colleges and universities feel, moreover, that they never got an education, and it is these who go on to graduate school in the hope of getting what they failed to get as undergraduates. It is graduate *education* they want, not graduate *training*. This is why dissatisfaction with the graduate schools is so keen. There is simply *no option* available on the graduate level; everything is geared to professional training. And among those disenchanted with graduate school are precisely those from whom the colleges should in fact be recruiting their faculties – those students who are not averse to learning but who demand that it be given relevance and embodiment. It seems a cruel shame that such talent should go to waste or find no meaningful fulfillment at a time when it is so terribly needed. We are not so rich in the *higher* human resources that this source can be so tragically wasted.

Are there enough men to staff more than three or four such experimental "graduate" centers in the liberal arts? Probably not. But what matters is that there should be at least a handful of colleges in this country which dare to resist the conformity imposed by the research cartel and to distinguish themselves by putting the teacher – and therefore the humanities – squarely at the center of the curriculum. Two or three such places would, I am convinced, reinvigorate, perhaps even revolutionize, American education simply by providing

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convincing examples of the daring and diversity we need. The logical place for them to be established is either upon the existing base of the better liberal arts colleges, or as a new "higher college" created by a group of colleges acting in concert. Only by some such device, by striking at the source of the trouble, can the traditional role of the college be protected and expanded. It would be a staggering loss if the only institution of higher education still committed to liberal education — that is, to the creation of civilized men, the indispensable and large-minded amateur who is the layman to any coherent or general culture — should be subverted by the demand for professionals and technicians.

The Universities:

Teaching is notoriously worse off in the universities than in the colleges. Not only is the university traditionally more committed to pure research, but it is particularly vulnerable to the pressures that have eroded the teacher's status. Vast numbers of students, huge classes, intense competition for federal funds and therefore for distinguished research professors, political and professional pressures — all these have operated to downgrade and even discredit teaching. But even in the university it is the creative use of the margin of freedom that matters. Something has been done, for instance, to give the multiversity a human scale — through honors programs, emphasis on individual work, residential colleges, and so on. But helpful as these reforms are, they have not succeeded in changing the imbalance. And this, I believe, is because none of the reforms really touches the nub of the problem. And that is the structure of the university itself, the way in which its physical organization determines its policies and precludes change and reform. Certainly no real change in the status of teaching can possibly occur without a radical change in the present power-structure of the university.

Perhaps this is impossible, but I am not convinced that this is so. At present the heart of university power is the department. It is this departmental power that now so vehemently promotes research and is hostile or indifferent to teaching. It is at the departmental level that teaching-evaluation is subverted, since chairmen apparently equate research and teaching; it is there that publish-or-perish policies are really promulgated; that the pressure for reduced teaching-loads derives; from there that graduate deans are recruited; that the demand for early specialization arises, as well as the jealous specialism that fragments the curriculum into warring factions. Put a mild and gentle man of broad learning into a department chairmanship, and within two years he will either be murdered by his colleagues or become an agressive and vindictive *mafioso* of the crassest specialism. The process can no more be resisted than the ravages of time.

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It is inexorable and destructive; and it is the remorseless tragedy of university politics.

This is why it is so imperative that some rival to it, some countervailing, anti-departmental force be created. Research is dominant now because teaching has no effective representation, no normalized political place or power, within the structure of the university. The departments are theoretically composed of teachers, or teacher-scholars, but actually they have been wholly captured by the research professoriat. The research scholar has *everything* – the departments, the powerful committees, the learned societies, the federal funds, the deanships, and the presidencies – and if he chooses to say that he finds teaching distasteful and unworthy of his abilities, who will say him Nay? Who speaks for teaching here? Clearly nobody, except perhaps the students. If teaching is to survive within the modern university on terms of something like parity with research, it must somehow acquire institutional power. The teacher, like the scholar, must have a base, a position, a budget, students, an honored and normalized function. He cannot meaningfully exist in any other way. This, I am convinced, is simple political realism.

The obvious vehicle for such a countervailing force would be the so-called "university professorship." For though this professorship is still an uncertain novelty, occupying a still undefined institutional position, it has usually come into existence because enterprising administrators felt the need for countering the effects of extreme departmental specialism. Thus, while the university professor may retain a departmental base, his appointment is a "university" one insofar as it cuts across departmental and even college lines. This "horizontal" professor has of course aroused the jealousies of departments, and they have frequently responded by cutting off the new professor's access to students. What is now needed, I believe, is a deliberate effort to expand and consolidate the university professorship with the hope of eventually creating a new professoriat of such power that it can challenge the supremacy of the research departments. I have no illusion that this will be an easy task, but the precedent exists and the principle has been established. It would seem folly not to follow it up. Clearly the problems of defining the relations of two such professoriats to each other and to the administration and students would be of exceptional and maddening difficulty, but I doubt they are insoluble. So far as function is concerned, it would seem natural to assign to the university professorship all those tasks at which the departments have proven themselves incompetent – the courses in general education, humanities, inter-disciplinary programs, supervision of the teacher-oriented degree-programs, etc. – perhaps even the formal responsibility for evaluating teaching throughout the university. But its overall concern would be with teaching, and with the training of

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teachers. It would, therefore, I hope, display that broad spectrum of high and varied human skills that can significantly claim to be called *educational*, every conceivable great style of human existence and mode of mind side by side – the prophetic, the rational, the political, the scientific, the apocalyptic, the artistic. There would, of course, be an honored place in it for scholars, too, but only for scholars whose scholarship *educates*. I suspect this proposal will strike most of my audience as fantastic, but so, when you think about it, is the present state of affairs – a vast educational enterprise built entirely upon a caste of learned men whose learning has no relevance to the young and even seems to alienate the young from both education and culture. It is a vision of madness accomplished.

Pluralism:

My argument would not be complete without a word about pluralism. Educators never tire of saying that ours is a pluralistic system and that pluralism is good since it accords with the nature of American society. I share this view, but my fear is that, where higher education is concerned, we are rapidly junking pluralism for monolithic uniformity. One can understand why this is happening, but it seems to me the process must now be resolutely opposed. If education is to become, as perhaps it must in part, an "instrument of national policy," then we must have also institutions that still perform an *ecumenical* function, that speak for man rather than for the state or the nation. Professional training at the graduate level is now corrupting all higher education by ruthlessly expelling from the curriculum everything that does not conform to professional utility. By so doing it is forcing the student – who may want to be more than merely a professor – into the streets and out of the culture. The student becomes marginal simply out of opposition to the élite which has expelled him. Alternatively, he responds by violent and often unintelligent assertions of those very values, especially freedom, which the university seems to have abandoned. His attempts at heroism thus become merely anarchic; he loses the skills of educated heroism, even while claiming to assert them. What we must have, unless we are prepared to abandon our fates to parochial technicians, is precisely the pluralism to which we are committed. We need *options*, *choices*, *alternatives*; we need to honor the diversity of human skills and needs. We simply cannot afford, except at the cost of everything, to permit the range of realization to be narrowed to one small mode of the mind, and that a mode which seems to be incapable of compassion for any other mode, which seems, in fact, to have lost respect for humanity.

One final point. I expect to be told that I am actually meeting

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the problem of research and teaching not by reconciling them but by divorcing them altogether. That is my intention, and one which I am prepared to risk, since the only likely alternative is to make teaching the lackey of scholarship. I think we have reached the point at which slogans like "scholar-teacher" merely darken counsel; there may have been a time when that was a viable ideal, and doubtless some exceptionally gifted men still incarnate it. But by and large its vogue passes on to the professor the two functions which the university has inherited and which it cannot meaningfully reconcile. The realities of educational practice make it starkly apparent that no reconciliation can now occur except at the expense of teaching. And I am not prepared to incur that expense if I can humanly help it. This is why I urge you to consider freshly the wisdom of separating teaching and research, with the thought that significant teaching and fresh energy in academic institutions may eventually make scholarship human again, and that an invigorated scholarship may once again accept the burden of teaching as the source of its vigor and the test of its wisdom.

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REVIEW ESSAY

Two Cultures: Adversary and/or Responsible

RICHARD HOFSTADTER

MARTIN Green's book* is a pleasure to read and to take issue with, and it seems a sad comment on the state of our literary culture that a book of this interest and consequence should have had so little attention from the reviewing media. As one might expect, "the problem of Boston" (by Boston, Mr. Green usually means Boston-Cambridge-Concord) touches upon the larger problems of American culture in the 19th century; indeed, as Mr. Green deals with it, the problem of Boston involves the problems of culture in their largest sense. In effect, Boston stands here as a brilliant exception. The newness and rawness, the materialism and indifference (or hostility) to ideas and letters that we find in so much of 19th-century America was not found in Boston. Green argues, rightly I think, that this does not entitle us to disregard Boston as a part of American history, as though it were wholly unAmerican simply because it is atypical – simply because it is representative not of the usual but of *the optimal* American situation for a literary culture during the 19th century.

The problem of Boston, as he sees it, lies in this: 19th-century Boston, with its established wealth, its philanthropy, its strong cultural institutions, and its seriousness of mind, provided an auspicious environment – exceptionally auspicious in this country – for literary work of the first order. It was dedicated to high literary standards; it respected and honored its writers; it even provided them with a good literary market. As Thomas Bailey Aldrich put it in 1866, comparing Boston with his own New York: "There is a finer literary atmosphere here than in our city.... The people of Boston are full-blooded *readers,* appreciative, trained. The humble man of letters has a position here which he doesn't have in New York. To be known as an able writer is to have the choicest society open to you." But with all its social and cultural apparatus – its libraries, its university, its sym-

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phonies, its trained readers, its serious periodicals, its philanthropic institutions – Boston literary culture produced in the main secondary, or if you will tertiary, literary works. It produced the fireside or schoolroom poets – the culture of Longfellow, Lowell, Holmes, Whittier, and Howells. What went wrong? "Why was the literary product of this society so undistinguished?", Mr. Green asks.

His answer, to put it shortly and with all deference to the difficulties involved in saying that any set of writers *could* have produced works considerably more brilliant than those they did, that the Boston tradition, for all its externally favorable circumstances, in fact suppressed or deformed the talents of its writers. It created a literary society that did not encourage the writer to take the necessary risks, specifically the risks that come with the commitment to ruthless self-examination and self-affirmation. This risk was then associated with what we call the Romantic movement; and except for the Transcendentalists, no Boston writer was a Romantic. Only Emerson and Thoreau, and perhaps even they only incompletely (if I read the author correctly), were able to combine their obligations to self and to society. In Britain, this combination was less exceptional.

> "It was Carlyle's great achievement, which made him so important on both sides of the Atlantic, to show how one could return from, and indeed through, the dangerous personalism and anti-social feeling of the Romantics to affirmations of the basic decencies on which the whole structure of society is built. Duty to God and duty to one's fellow-man were rediscovered in despite of Byronism, and somehow through Byronism; and turned out to be, formulated this way, full of a new power which transcended the mere worldly conformities of the eighteenth century. Society, the time-old idea of living together with one's fellow-men, could be believed in again, though one continued to hate 'society.' Sensitive people continued to hate 'the world' in the eighteenth-century sense, but they began to employ their rational and moral faculties in analysis of exactly what was wrong with it, and in prescription of exactly what would cure it. . . . It was a major inspiration of the tradition of culture-prophets, from Burke and Cobbett on, to discover some more real community to affirm, which one could put in opposition to the more actual community one denied: 'culture' and 'civilization,' as Coleridge and Arnold use the terms."

Green is much concerned, then, not only with having the benefits of romantic sensibility and romantic personal radicalism but also with finding a way of making the forces of romanticism socially useful, "to give them free acknowledgment and expression of a kind that would also amount to creative social participation." This was not characteristically done in France, where romanticism tended to keep its "pure" anti-social form, but it was superbly done in England. In a certain sense, then, his problem may be translated into an effort to find why Boston failed to develop a literary tradition serviceable to "the responsible society" in the manner of such British cultural critics as

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Coleridge, Carlyle, and Matthew Arnold. Why was the culture of the Bostonians so light, so chatty, so cozily humorous, so genial, so sunny, so pompous at times, so damnably superficial? These qualities Mr. Green takes to be manifestations of the more important fact that Boston "excluded from its literature the telling of deeply personal truths; those truths which reveal the non-social self, or the non-social aspects of relationships and states of being, aspects so painful or so obscure as to be useless, even detrimental, to consider in the conduct of one's social (which here includes much of 'moral') life." It was the attempt to find and cope with such truths that made the great British, French, Russian, and German writers of fiction. And it is the absence of efforts to come to terms with such truths which explains why we have no New England cultural critic to set alongside Ruskin, Mill, Newman, Arnold, Carlyle, no writer of fiction to set alongside George Eliot or Dickens.

In an eloquent conclusion whose debt to F. R. Leavis and Raymond Williams is explicit, Green argues that we can see the nub of Boston's failure in "the refusal to take part in the explorations of the crucial experiences of the era and in the development of the crucial new modes and forms, the refusal to learn from those who had taken part." Given this refusal, none of the favorable attitudes, or the favorable circumstances, of Boston availed. What he discerns, in the end, is an "act of cowardice . . . on the part of a whole community." It is a harshly phrased judgment, when put in these moral terms, but what the author offers us is a social and moral account of a literary failure that has generally been judged quite harshly by others. The problem is there, and no answer is likely to be very flattering.

One can hardly expect in a work of 200 pages a full-scale elaboration of the matter. What Green has brought to his question is a very sensitive eye for those textual qualities which quietly and implicitly, but firmly, give substance to his argument. However, he is not always dependent upon such delicate modes of revelation; there are painful moments when his subjects seem to be making his case for him in the baldest terms. Thus Henry Lee Higginson wrote to Isabella Stewart Gardner: "Jack, you, and I have held the same view of life and its duties, and in doing so may have forgotten the painful subject – one's self. It was the natural result." Higginson, of course, was not a writer but a banker, and his significance for Boston culture lay in his unstinting generosity to the symphony orchestra and to Harvard. But here, as in other passages quoted by the author, he lays bare the essentials of the Boston problem. Still closer to the mark is the devastating line of Lowell's: "It is better to be a good fellow than a good poet. . . ." and Lowell himself may have seen the relevance of

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this when he made another remark quoted by Green: "I feel that my life has been mainly wasted, that I have thrown away more than most men ever had."

The characteristic Boston concern for good fellowship, for the amenities, is echoed by Howells when he makes an invidious comparison between British and American authors, a comparison which favors the latter. The British writers were often unsociable, fiercely isolated, and independent, said Howells, whereas "our gentler and honester celebrities did not forbid approach." See also Charles Eliot Norton, about whom Green writes so interestingly, in a letter of 1887 to Leslie Stephen: "I wonder whether you would agree with me that the set of men of letters, and their kindred, whom we have known, is a good deal the best that the world has seen; not the greatest, perhaps, but the pleasantest to live with, the best intentioned and honestest." Pleasantest to live with! Norton goes on to underscore the implications of this when he boasts: "There are no such liars as Pope, or cynics as Swift, or vulgarians as Gay, or sycophants as Young, or mockers as Sterne, — indeed you and I find it uncommonly difficult to pick our own friends to pieces." Norton's friends were, in fact, nice men — and there are not many nice men in the annals of great literature.

Mr. Green develops his ambitious argument with a great deal of economy. His main device is to pick out certain figures as exemplary in some respect, and to explore the Boston world from their angle of vision. For the first half of the 19th century his central figure is George Ticknor; for the Gilded Age it is Charles Eliot Norton. These men, and others who are drawn on less frequently, are chosen, not because they represent Boston's highest literary achievement, but because they were, as he puts it, emblematic of its culture. They represented so much of its best standards, were privileged to see so much of it at work, so often commented on it acutely, and beyond doubt had such a deep influence upon it.

Green can, of course, be criticized for resting so much of his case on two such men as Ticknor and Norton. His attention is highly selective. Hawthorne, whom he has written about elsewhere and in any case sees as commonly overrated, he barely discusses. A figure of major achievement like Parkman does not concern him very much — indeed the historians and philosophers (New England was strong here) figure only as a part of the social milieu. William James (I take it that his New York birth does not rule him out) is slighted; C. S. Peirce only mentioned. But these omissions do not detract from the basic interest of Green's argument. *The Problem of Boston* is not a massive history or a monograph. Men like Ticknor and Norton are not intended to "prove" Green's case: they illustrate it, and that is enough.

As a further development of his argument, Green distinguishes a set of writers (they were hardly close enough to be called a group)

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whom he characterizes as the Boston aesthetes – Henry Adams, Henry James, Santayana, Berenson – who all represent, Berenson most simply, a shift from the full range of the traditional Boston concerns to predominantly aesthetic values, which in Green's terms means a withdrawal from the ideal of the responsible society toward a kind of self-centered individualism. "The world," as Berenson had it, "consists of one's personal friends, one's thoughts and one's dreams, and one can manage to live anywhere with these three." The aesthetes open a new dialectic with the Boston tradition. In them Green marks a stylistic disposition which he calls "the hypertrophy of form," and a devouring interest in art of all kinds. With them, too, the Boston tradition leaves its native grounds, moves to Rome, Settignano, London, Paris, and in the course of its deracination becomes "etherialized," loses contact with "all its more mundane functions like social service," becomes in its expressions of amoralism and world-weariness even something close to the logical opposite of the Boston tradition.

Although Green is ready to concede that in the aesthetes the Boston tradition "achieved probably its most brilliant successes," he considers that they did so only through a kind of suicide that marked the end of the tradition itself, an end signalized by their common exile. His disapproval here, which may have some overtones of the Leavisite war with Bloomsbury, is tinctured with a certain harshness, perhaps a touch of puritanism. He is not attracted by the disillusionment of the aesthetes, their sophistication, their habit of irony, everything involved in what Adams, writing sternly about himself, called their "faded begonia" quality– everything that cost them so much in intelligence, vigor, and receptivity. It was this quality that Justice Holmes noticed in Adams: "When I happened to fall in with him on the street he could be delightful, but when I called at his house and he was posing to himself as the old cardinal, he would turn everything to dust and ashes. After a tiresome day's work one didn't care to have one's powers of resistance taxed by discourse of that sort, so I called rarely." If the aesthetes marked a break with certain of the Boston limitations, Green is quick to note that they conformed to its main failure: their taste in contemporary art stopped short of the modern. "Berenson was very philistine about Picasso and Joyce. James preferred Hugh Walpole's fiction (and Oliver Onions' and Compton Mackenzie's) to D. H. Lawrence's. They all disliked the reckless experimentation and self revelation of modern art."

PROBABLY the main question to be raised about *The Problem of Boston* is not Green's account of Boston itself but his theory of culture. Has he, in fact, a theory of the terms and conditions under which, in modern society, writers of major gifts will arise who will

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make the romantic affirmations he calls for, who will make the trip into the romantic realm of self-exploration and self-affirmation, at whatever costs in anti-social consequences, but who will also make the return trip to the responsible society, enlarged, enlightened, more humane, more largely human, and in the end more useful because of the wisdom they have acquired on their way? I would not quarrel with this ideal; nor is it possible to deny that one can cite, as the author does, good examples of writers, especially in the British literary tradition, who have in fact lived up to its complex demands. What is missing here is a theory of the social and historical conditions that make either the outward voyage or the return trip more probable. The whole history of modernism in literature and the arts argues that the case of Boston does not prefigure our problem: plenty of writers are ready to launch upon the romantic trip and to take its risks, as the Bostonians were not – but we find that the return journey is made less and less frequently. We have laid the basis for a quite massive and self-contained *adversary culture,* in Lionel Trilling's term, but not for the *responsible culture* Green demands.

I am uncertain whether or not Green is trying to tell us that there is some cultural policy, or at least some social policy, that can facilitate both the romantic voyage and the return trip. In this respect we are left uncertain as to what lessons we may be expected to draw from the example of Boston. Significant here is a quarrel Green has in one of his Appendices with Stanley Elkins's remarkable book on slavery. Elkins, discussing the role of the Northern intellectuals in the slavery controversy, criticized the New Englanders, not least the Transcendentalists, for having viewed the slavery issue as too exclusively moral, for not having given due regard to the social and institutional setting in which the moral problem existed, and for not making any effort to explore the institutional means by which it might be resolved. Since it is the Transcendentalists who are the one strand in the Boston tradition that approaches Green's standards, this view of the matter poses a major challenge to Green's argument. It is impossible here to enter in detail into this argument, and at the risk of seeming dogmatic in order to be brief, I must confess that I am not wholly persuaded by his vindication of the Transcendentalists against Elkins. It was Elkins's argument that the United States lacked the responsible *national* institutions to moderate the ills of slavery, or to abolish the institution at anything less than massive costs. Accordingly, the nation failed to develop an intellectual class that could translate the moral imperatives that were so readily – but also so easily – acceptable in Boston into workable social solutions. In effect, Elkins is saying, in Green's terms, that the Transcendentalists too failed to make the return journey to the responsible society, and he thus draws an even more comprehensive indictment than Green of

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Boston's failure – an indictment so comprehensive that it undercuts Green's discriminations between the partial romantic merits of the Transcendentalists and the demerits of the mainstream of Boston literary culture.

But all this suggests certain doubts, not so much as to Green's account of Boston culture itself, but as to the more general propositions by which he proposes, so to speak, retroactively to set standards for it. Modernist literature is full of the romantic affirmation which he finds wanting in Boston, but it is hardly full of evidences of the development of that responsible ethos he also requires. This may be a clue not just to our failure, or to the failure of 19th-century Boston, but to a certain tragic division in culture itself. Perhaps Green thinks that romantic affirmations and the demands of the responsible society are more easily or more generally reconcilable than in fact they are. Perhaps we are really confronted with two cultures (not Snow's), whose spheres are increasingly independent and more likely to be conflicting than to be benignly convergent: a massive adversary culture on one side, and the realm of socially responsible criticism on the other.

Is it not quite possible that the responsible society will get little or no nourishment from modern literature, but will have to draw mainly on history, journalism, economics, sociological commentary? Art, as it more ruthlessly affirms the self, as it more candidly probes the human abyss, may in fact have less and less to tell us about the conditions of a responsible society. We may have to concede the possibilities that there is no very certain way for society to underwrite the return trip, without emasculating the work of our central modernist writers; that in contemporary society we cannot hope to reproduce the rather special historical conditions that gave life to the English literary tradition Green holds up to Boston – a tradition that even in the 19th century, and even to a kindred and responsive center like Boston, proved unexportable; that we must take it as a clue to the character of modernist literature that the relatively non-responsible writers of France, Germany, and Russia created a literature still more powerful than that of the English writers; and that what modern society offers modern writers, still more essential to them as romantic modernists than good readers or a sound literary market, is provocation and outrage.

But where does this leave us in our attempt to resolve the problem of Boston?

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Facts and fancies about drug addiction

NORMAN E. ZINBERG

Diluit helleborum, certo compescere puncto
Nescio examen. — Persius

"He infuses a dangerous drug, without skill to know the proper point between its good and ill effects."

Misunderstanding of the problems of drug abuse in this country is the greatest current obstacle to attempts at their solution. It is my purpose in this essay to sort out what is actually known from what passes as fact; to show something of how these misconceptions have come to be accepted as truths; to point out what we do not know but urgently need to; and, finally, to indicate what lines of investigation seem at the moment to promise the most fruitful results.

How, first, is the problem of drug addiction commonly conceived? In most people's minds, drug addicts are a group of reprobate criminals who "mainline" heroin. This concept is not confined to the general lay public, but pervades even relatively sophisticated discussions of the drug problem. Unhappily, it also dominates professional attitudes toward legislation, law enforcement, and clinical treatment. But in its crudity it simply does not correspond with the true picture, even in so far as it is known; and, worse, it subtly undermines attempts to learn more. Given this distortion, the drug problem is rarely looked at for what it is — an endemic disease about which we need more information and less ideology. As a matter of fact, the very notion of the drug problem is wildly misleading. There is more than one drug problem, just as there is more than one kind of drug taker and more than one kind of pernicious drug.

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Two varieties of drug experience

At least two separate types of drug abusers can be clearly distinguished even in our present state of limited knowledge. They differ in terms of their places in our society, the kinds of drugs they use, and what they hope to get out of drugs. The first group comes mainly from the lower socio-economic strata of the population; they use drugs to escape from lives that seem unbearable and hopeless. Whatever their individual psychological problems, the general profile of members of this group reflects a direct relationship between social deprivation and specific personality types. I call them *the oblivion-seekers.*

Most public discussion of narcotics "addicts" recognizes only this first group. But there is a second, much larger, group who come from the middle and upper socio-economic strata. They use drugs not to get away from life but to embrace it. Drugs give them a sense of liberation from convention, a feeling that a level of genuine experience which is closed to them by their culture is opened for them by the drug. If they are thought of as presenting a social problem, it is their rebellion, not their addiction, which is viewed with alarm. Because of their class origins and their youth, they are commonly identified not as addicts but simply as participants in the rebellion our culture has come to expect from every rising generation. I call them *the experience-seekers.*

Members of these two groups typically use different drugs – the oblivion-seekers use heroin, the experience-seekers a considerable variety of other drugs. This difference is important, because heroin is illegal in this country for any purpose, medicinal or otherwise, and is reputed among the knowing to have both a greater kick and a greater pull toward dependency than any other drug. Before the typical heroin-taker became addicted, therefore, he probably knew he was committing himself to constant law-breaking and to drug dependency. Experience-seekers, who try other dependency-inducing drugs, rarely think of themselves in this way. Indeed, many of them – though they know the drug they are using does often induce dependency – think they are exceptions, and insist that they are not "hooked" long after this is manifestly untrue.

It would not be unreasonable to expect these differences to have been noticed long ago. Yet the situation as it stands now is so muddled that even so elementary a distinction as that which divides the oblivion-seekers from the experience-seekers has not been made by the medical profession. Lacking this or any other meaningful sort of distinction, and in the absence of any accepted clinical procedure, doctors respond to their drug patients emotionally, each according to his own bent. They fill in what they do not know with unexamined

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notions and feelings. The sentimentalists, the "soft" school, tend to see a curiously attractive innocence in the drug takers. The punishers, the "hard" school, refuse to see drug abuse as a physical and social disease, but insist it is rooted in moral turpitude.

Romantic illusions

The "soft" school looks upon the oblivion-seekers as new incarnations of the noble savage. For it, members of the lower classes have a special "earthy" knowledge about Life.

The moral support given to the drug taker by sentimentalists is sufficiently pernicious and persistent to warrant a closer look. In a recent *New Yorker* article, Dr. Marie Nyswander, well-known for her work with drug addicts, discussed her sad, tortured charges with a reporter. After describing a young, confirmed opiate dependent who *wanted* to be committed to a state hospital for three years, she was reported as having said: "Man may be able to experience freedom in a degree we can't yet imagine. . . . That's why drug addicts . . . strike me as being among the few comparatively free people I've met. . . . The addict's relationships, except when he's scrounging for drugs, are honest and direct. Deceit is not a basic part of his personality."

Here is a clear instance of the sentimental mystique at work. The nature of the drug addict is assimilated to the supposedly unspoiled nature of the child – he is someone who rejects our hard, competitive adult world and returns to the simple world of children, where truth and beauty are self-evident. He experiences life freely, he is untouched by fraud, oppression, pettiness, and despair. What matter if his arms are somewhat scarred?

In an odd way, it is true that the absence of responsibility for one's self or for the welfare of others does permit an engaging directness and lack of guile. Many oblivion-seekers lie and cheat to get drugs, but they can do so with disarming openness, because, like children, they want nothing but the immediate satisfaction of specific, pleasurable desires. The indirection and ambiguity necessary to manage adult responsibilities, the need to slight one wish or responsibility in order to give fuller expression to another, militate against simplicity. Many of those who admire drug users seem unaware that the charm which enchants is nothing more than simple single-mindedness – the conviction that few things other than drugs are worth the complexity and strain of striving for.

An earlier member of the sentimental school, Mabel Dodge Luhan, once decried the dismal accretion of cars, stoves, and sinks in white American homes, and proclaimed the superiority of the American Indian because he did not want this paraphernalia of progress. Indeed, as D. H. Lawrence said of Mrs. Luhan, "She hates the white world and loves the Indian out of hate." And, like Mrs. Luhan,

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many of those who sentimentalize the drug taker are dissatisfied with their lives and are moved by a hatred of their own worlds. But what it is more important to note is that Lawrence's statement applies even more accurately to the drug user. To view the drug taker as an adventurer into brave new worlds of experience in contrast to whom the ordinary member of society is a conformist or a coward, is seriously to miss the point. Our society has ills in plenty, but to regard the frightened runner into oblivion or the equally panicky fleer from inner emptiness as in some way superior to this society is perverse in the extreme.

"Hard-headed" illusions

The hard school, on the other hand, the punishers who see drug abuse almost entirely as crime, find their rationale in the legal history of the drug problem in this country. After many false starts, the medical profession in 1902 did accept as a serious medical problem Dr. Charles Towns' now classical description of the dependency triad – the compulsive need for the drug, the development of tolerance, and the emergence of a withdrawal syndrome if the drug is withheld. But it was already too late; the lawmakers had taken over. At the turn of the century, before the Flexner Report, there was good reason to mistrust the calibre of doctors produced by our medical schools. Partly for this reason, the 1904 Boylan New York State Law – and the 1914 Harrison Federal Narcotic Act which was patterned on it – gave no discretion to physicians in dispensing drugs to addicts. The Harrison Act, a Federal taxing law, was passed in the same atmosphere which a bit later resulted in the prohibition of alcoholic beverages being written into law. The right of the physician to prescribe narcotics in the course of his professional practice became an issue of law enforcement, and it was on this battleground that the "hard" school was able to win a decisive victory for their punitive point of view. Beginning in 1919, in a series of highly moralistic rulings ("a physician who prescribed narcotics" was stigmatized as intending "to cater to the appetite or satisfy the craving of one addicted to the use of the drug"), the Supreme Court decided that physicians could not prescribe narcotics to habitual users to keep them comfortable even if they were en route to a hospital. In this state of the law, drug abuse could only be seen as a criminal matter. Led by the American Medical Association, the medical profession simply abandoned the field. After the formation of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics in 1930, public discussion of drug abuse was confined to a discussion of criminality. Harry Anslinger, who was head of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics from its inception until four years ago, fabricated reports for public dissemination out of adroit compounds of fact and fiction. As a result, an automatic association between narcotics and criminal

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activity has been set up in both the public's and the professional's minds. Until recently, this atmosphere made research and experimentation virtually impossible.

Probably no more moralistic government agency than the Federal Bureau of Narcotics has ever existed. Reflecting as it does the 19th-century attitude of the temperance societies (i.e., one drink makes a confirmed drunkard) or of the 19th-century public attitude toward sex (i.e., one illicit experience makes a prostitute), the Federal Bureau of Narcotics has pointed out over and over again that, after even one single dose of any of the drugs on their list, dreadful moral deterioration sets in. For example, Mr. Anslinger, writing about "a few of many cases which illustrate the homicidal tendencies and the generally debasing effects arising from the use of marihuana," cites the case of a cotton-picker, 25 years old, who smoked a "reefer," picked up a 17-month-old baby girl who had been left in her family car, violated and suffocated her. Ignoring the complexity of the motives in so heinous a crime, Anslinger concludes that "the real criminal in this case is marihuana."

The young people who try drugs probably don't read these publications, but their pronouncements do effectively help shape the general public view. By first enormously oversimplifying, and then overstating, their case, government authorities have thus provided young people, who always like to puncture balloons of pompous self-righteousness, with a gratuitous sense of purpose in drug taking.

The punitive rigidity of law enforcement officials changed not at all until the 1962 White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse; since, they have changed their attitude only minimally. In spite of the enlightened proceedings of this Conference, the old simplistic thinking persists. Recently, when a Justice Department official was asked off the record about his views on the drug problem, he said it was very simple. "Now, about $5,000,000 a year is spent enforcing the Harrison Act; to keep an addict comfortable costs about $25,000 per year, most of which comes from crime. If only 50,000 addicts are involved, by simple arithmetic you arrive at a figure of $125,000,000 yearly that the public, in a sense, pays for the narcotics habit. Put that much money in the hands of the proper [enforcement] agency and we will eliminate the drug traffic." Both his thinking and his arithmetic fail to take into account such obviously germane facts as previous criminality among drug users, the lesson of prohibition, the constantly increasing difficulty any one country has in sealing its borders and acting unilaterally. Most importantly, however, he fails entirely to consider the drug problem as it is related to the experience-seekers.

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Drugs and psychosis

Nor is this punitive point of view confined to law enforcement agents. Evidence that even professionals working directly with addicts are affected by it crops up in surprising places. Two well-known studies of schizophrenia among drug takers, one by Donald L. Gerard and Conan Kornetsky and the other by Isadore Chein, contend that approximately 20 percent of adolescent drug takers suffer from schizophrenia or some form of thought disorder. Even the government clinic at Lexington reports that among the bizarre symptoms manifested during withdrawal are occasional acute psychotic breaks. If these studies are correct, at least 10 to 20 percent of drug takers could be expected to end up as psychotics. As it turns out, however, only a small number of drug takers develop psychoses. In a study which followed those cited above, George Vaillant showed that, after a search of the remarkably complete files of the New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, "not one addict was currently hospitalized [in a mental hospital] in New York and only eight had ever been hospitalized for mental disorder. . . . Only one addict appeared to fulfill the diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia." (There are other surveys which support Vaillant's findings and place the incidence of schizophrenia among addicts at less than one percent.) Further, Vaillant states that even when addiction is experimentally induced in chronic schizophrenics, if the drug is suddenly withheld, these patients do not ask for it.

Vaillant's convincing study thus concludes that the rate of overt psychosis in drug addicts is very low. How, then, can the other studies be explained? The point here is that those diagnoses which confuse addiction with schizophrenia tell us something further about the attitudes of many who are professionally concerned with drug takers. The emotional reactions of many professionals to drug takers' curiously anti-social personalities skew their diagnoses in a way that may be the converse of the sentimentalization we discussed earlier. The addict's obvious disdain for social conventions, his willingness to abuse his body, and his underlying fury at any effort to intervene, no matter how helpfully it is meant – all this offends the professional observer. Where the sentimentally-inclined doctor tends to see the addict's responses as a measure of his closeness to the deepest wellsprings of life, the doctor who is offended by the addict's scorn for society, and for society's doctors, sees him as bizarre, sick, outside reality, and therefore psychotic.

Facts and queries

These, then, are the sort of errors the ideologies of both the "hard" and the "soft" schools have led to. To show how fundamentally the substitution of fiction for fact has impeded research, let us look

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at what seems at first to be a relatively simple question. How many heroin users are there in the United States? Surprisingly, estimates differ widely. If the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' figure of 60,000 is correct, then the number of hard-core drug abusers in this country has hardly changed at all in the last four decades. (Indeed, relative to the rise in population, it has declined.) But the World Health Organization estimates the number of drug dependents as closer to one million!

How can we explain this fantastic disparity? Does the second figure actually include not only heroin users, but other kinds of drug addicts? Does it include persons who have been drug abusers only temporarily? How many times are chronic recidivists counted? The correct figure seems to be difficult to come at, but clearly this is the sort of question that cannot be answered meaningfully without the sort of typological distinctions we have been making.

To ask an even more fundamental question: are we sure that the oblivion-seekers present as dangerous a social problem as they have long been held to do – or is it rather the experience-seekers, hitherto hardly recognized as a problem at all, who present the real threat?

In 1965, John O'Donnell presented a careful analysis of figures about relapse rates. He states that, after a time, many heroin users dose themselves less frequently rather than more; and, further, he suggests that all heroin addiction may be time-limited, since his data point to a precipitous drop-off of drug abuse after the age of 35. This study supports an earlier one by Charles Winick, who concluded from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' files that "addiction may be a self-limiting process for perhaps two-thirds of the addicts." If this is true, then despite the important social, economic, legal, and criminal problems which the oblivion-seekers present, they may not in fact be the fundamental problem they are thought to be. In the present state of our knowledge, however, we do not know enough, even about the much-studied oblivion-seekers, to answer this question.

Some things about the oblivion-seekers are, of course, well-known. Their personal histories have been shown to follow a distinct pattern: cigarettes at age 6 or 7, liquor and sex by 13, marihuana soon after. Promiscuity and petty thievery merge almost automatically, in late adolescence, into prostitution and organized crime. Drug abusers of this type show a definitely ascending use of drugs, typically moving toward the one with the big kick, H. But other things we know about this type are puzzling – in particular, the ways in which their pattern differs from that of the non-addicted delinquent. To begin with, Billy E. Jones finds that the Lexington drug users are surprisingly intelligent: their average verbal IQ is 105. Contrast this with the Gluecks' study of penitentiary prisoners; there, 67 percent have a verbal IQ of less than 90. Nor are the family histories of crimi-

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nals and addicts identical. Fifty-two percent of addicts come from homes broken by death before age 16. (Indeed, 28 percent of these occurred before age 6.) These figures do not refer simply to the loss of fathers, so common to the lower socio-economic class strata; more than 20 percent lost their mothers very early. But non-addicted delinquents are even more deprived of a stable family situation, with 71 percent of homes broken by all means and 28 percent having lost their mothers by age 6. So while broken families seem to have something to do with addiction, it is not clear how much they have to do with it.

It also turns out that the drug takers are only or youngest children to a statistically significant degree. Yet birth order has never been proven to be a significant factor among delinquents, alcoholics, or the mentally ill.

But the most striking single correlation to have been established between parental history and drug dependency was parent-child cultural disparity. Among Negroes, for example, Northern-born drug takers had Southern-born parents twice as often as would be expected from the census figures. This statistical incidence is shown to the same degree by children of immigrant parents. By contrast, the incidence of drug dependency in a Northern urban sample who were themselves immigrants or Southern-born Negroes was only 12 percent, which is less than half of the percentage an average projection from census figures would lead one to expect.

Most surprising of all, however, is the fact that 72 percent of the patients studied by Vaillant still lived with their mothers at age 22; indeed, after age 30, 47 percent continued to live with a female relative. Approximately 70 percent were either married or maintained a relatively stable, common-law relationship. These marriages tended to continue in spite of hospitalization. This is holding on to people to a striking extent – an extent markedly greater than similar studies show for alcoholics or other delinquent groups. Glueck's study of criminal delinquents, for instance, shows only 22 percent continuing to live with their family of origin after 30, while about the same proportion maintained some form of married life.

An incidental finding of the same study supports the contention that the drug taker strives for closeness with a maternal figure. When hospitalized or imprisoned, drug takers, like other institutionalized persons, frequently engage in homosexual activity. But in only 3 percent of the cases studied by Vaillant do the patients report that homosexual activity is a source of significant gratification to them in their outside adult life. This is a surprisingly low figure, particularly in view of the popular notion that drug addiction and homosexuality go together.

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Drugs and crime

One of the most damning arguments used by the punitive school is the relationship of drug-taking to crime. They quote statistics showing that drug takers commit a high percentage of the crimes in the United States and strongly imply that crime results from drug taking. Now, it is true that oblivion-seekers get a lot of the money they need to buy drugs from criminal acts; but, nevertheless, drugs do not make criminals. It is the other way around: criminals take drugs. Hill, Gerard and Kornetsky, among others, indicate that over 70 percent of known drug abusers had criminal records *before* turning to drugs.

What seems to happen is that once a criminal is caught up in drug taking, a vicious circle commences. Drugs are illegal and expensive, large sums of money are needed to maintain a habit, and it takes a lot of time to make sure a connection is available. Moreover, once a habit is established, despite growing tolerance, drugs are debilitating in a way that makes regular work almost impossible. These conditions reinforce previous criminal activities.

This undeniable link between drugs and crime does not, however, invalidate the distinction between the oblivion-seekers and other types of delinquents. The oblivion-seekers' pattern – an intensity of attachment to family of origin and later to a significant female, the preponderance of youngest children, the low rate of psychotic illness, the high rate of intelligence – meaningfully marks addicts off from the others. Certainly, with their high intelligence, the oblivion-seekers know that the drug dependency they court demands antisocial activity of them, and it is inevitably asked how significantly aggression against society is involved as a motive for drug taking. From what we know now, such aggression is not very important. The oblivion-seeker seems, rather, to be a surprisingly dependent person. His drug dependency is a measure of his childishness, immaturity, and inability to cope with adult responsibility. The incidence of schizophrenia, as Vaillant shows, is low; rather, the oblivion-seekers have a high suicide rate. The search for oblivion is above all a flight from the pain of rejection and the fear of loneliness.

This proposition is reinforced by the fact that solitary drug users are an infinitesimal minority. Drug addicts depend on each other; drug taking is a group activity. Drug use spreads by contagion, that is, one drug user encourages, teaches, and recruits so that he can share his activity with others. Once the epidemiology of drug abuse is understood in the context of the character of the oblivion-seekers, the punishers will no longer be able to justify treating the drug abusers as simple moral delinquents. Some steps have already been taken in this direction. For example, the 1962 White House Conference on Narcotic and Drug Abuse specifically labeled as false the

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widely-held notion that drug abuse in the young was primarily initiated by narcotic salesmen hanging around public schools, coaxing juveniles into trying free shots, and thus working up an insatiable market for their trade.

From all that we know, the basic truth seems to be that drug abuse is simply another way to express fear, deprivation, and aimlessness. For the oblivion-seekers, drug taking in the end is self-defeating; for, in time, drugs reproduce the very situations from which users had hoped to escape. Even at this dead end, however, drug-taking is hard to stop. The impulse to escape survives the failure to escape.

The other kind of addict

To turn now to the experience-seekers, the one trait that characterizes them as a group is a terrible fear of lifelessness, of missing something important, of not really living. Beyond this, no such pattern as typifies the oblivion-seekers has as yet been discerned. Here, more than with the oblivion-seekers, the question of what part physiology plays in their drug dependency, and what part psychology,* confuses every attempt to analyze experience-seeking addiction. The drugs of choice are often varied; there is no such clear pattern as the oblivion-seekers' relentless preoccupation with heroin. The one characteristic common to them all, one which they share with the oblivion-seekers, is the need for others to share drug-taking with them. Indeed, they outdo the heroin takers in their proselytizing efforts.

Because the effects of most of the drugs used by this group vary

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*We know that all of the pernicious drugs mentioned produce dependency in varying degrees. In no case do we know the degree to which this dependency is physiological or psychological. We can set up a rough continuum of physiological response, putting heroin, which produces maximum physiological response to withdrawal, at one end, and perhaps marihuana or nicotine at the other. However, we find that these reactions are not nearly as clearcut as had been thought. Many users of narcotic drugs seem not to develop a direct physiological dependency. Some people continue on unvaried doses of morphine or heroin without demanding more, and show a minimum withdrawal reaction when taken off the drug (cf. Norman E. Zinberg, M.D., and David C. Lewis, M.D., "Narcotic Usage. I. A Spectrum of a Difficult Medical Problem," *New England Journal of Medicine*, 270:989-993, May 7, 1964). In fact, they may periodically remove themselves from any source of supply so as to maintain their semi-independence. On the other hand, many smokers, when they quit, suffer from the twitching, automatic movements of a hand used to a cigarette, a feeling of restlessness and increased appetite which chewing gum does not satisfy, a change in pulse rate, a decidedly unpleasant skin sensation, and a dryness of the mouth. Which of these symptoms are secondary to the psychological trauma of no smoking, and which are primarily physiological?

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so widely, all that we know about what individual drug users experience comes from the subjective responses they themselves report. Controlled experiments are simply not feasible; drug users insist that in a clinical setting – such as a hospital or a laboratory – the effect, probably the group effect, is largely cut off, the drug does not convey the real kick. It is hard not to conclude that, at least some of the time, the experience-seekers want so desperately to have drug-induced experiences that they have them psychologically even if not physiologically. What is more, like the Emperor in his new clothes, they want to be sure everyone around them has the same experience, sees the same cloth of gold. If others who have been persuaded to join the group testify that they, too, have had an experience and, more to the point, an "exciting" or "beautiful" experience, the original members of the group feel their drug-taking takes on enhanced validity. They can put aside their doubts and fears about drugs at least for a little while. From the point of view of contagion, the desire of the experience-seekers to proselytize presents a real and present danger to our society.

Marihuana

Most experience-seekers begin by smoking "pot"; these are the youngsters who stage demonstrations against the classification of marihuana as a narcotic by Federal Drug legislation. They contend that marihuana is probably less and certainly no more harmful than alcohol; they deny that the Federal Bureau of Narcotics' claims that people under the influence of "pot" are socially destructive. Above all, they insist that the notion that "pot" leads inevitably down the road to H is nonsense. The delight they take in exploding these official misconceptions, their sense of pursuing an idealistic cause, certainly stimulate their age-specific, culturally-expected rebellion and help to attract adherents.

Although the experience-seekers are probably right in their contention that the above-mentioned ideas about "pot" are silly, they are not as right as they think. Each of the conventional ideas they poohpooh deserves more careful investigation. Thus, it is true that, for the great majority of the experience-seekers and for the much greater number of the young who try smoking "pot" once or twice, marihuana has little connection with heroin. Still, one small segment of those who begin with marihuana, and who, in addition, are seriously neurotic, finds the nonconformist support they need in such a drug-experimenting, "pot"-smoking group. Because everyone in adolescence seems in turmoil, these neurotics don't look much different from the rest. But after two or three years pass, the regular bunch – even if they are still a little "beat" – have gone ahead and made necessary life decisions. Yes, they take a year off, but they still manage to

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be graduated from college or to acquire an interest that leads somewhere. The neurotic, however, who may have thought he was just like the rest of the bunch, fails to take these steps when they should be taken. Suddenly he is no longer really part of the bunch. What can he do but reach out for another group who will accept him? This group is likely to be closer to the hard-core drug abusers; it may even be a heroin-taking, oblivion-seeking group where big money is needed to stay "in."

While there are not many who follow this path – indeed, most users of this type seek out a psychiatrist rather than a pusher – they deserve attention because they show dramatically what marihuana can mean to troubled youngsters. Marihuana is a disorganizing agent; it offers no help to people who are already more than sufficiently disorganized. Perhaps it is no worse than alcohol – there are 5,000,000 disabled alcoholics in the United States – but that does not mean that we need yet one more relatively potent intoxicant to be made readily available to all. Undoubtedly, many people can handle marihuana, use it, and perhaps enjoy it without ill effects. Allentuck and Bowman, Murphy, and the LaGuardia Report, among others, agree that physiological dependency is not induced by marihuana. But the World Health Organization reports that marihuana-hashish-hemp-bange is the most abused drug in the world. Long-term excessive use results psychologically in a stultifying condition of lethargy, dissociation, and general withdrawal from human contact, a reaction not very different from that of chronic alcoholism. Physiologically, furthermore, marihuana can cause hyperglycemia, hyperthermia, and depression of respiration.

The most pernicious property of marihuana is not its potency but its relative weakness. Many experience-seekers want to extend themselves in inner and outer time and space; they strain against personal boundaries, they want *all* knowledge and feeling to be available to them. It is precisely for this reason that the languid release of the opiate does not interest them. Their intolerance for the strictures of reality, for the limitations imposed by both the outside and the inside worlds, makes the brief and easily terminable "high" of marihuana insufficient. Therefore, a sizable, but currently indeterminable, group of fairly regular "pot" smokers goes on to experiment with the hallucinogens – LSD, mescaline, psylosibin, peyote, dimethyl triptan, or some other variety of the magic mushroom.

The hallucinogens

We may really have opened up a Pandora's box with these drugs. For we understand very little about the action of the hallucinogens. A "high" on a 200 microgram dose of LSD usually lasts from 8 to 12 hours, that is, the time during which there is a high degree of con-

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centration in the cerebral system. As soon as almost any other known drug is excreted from the system, so are its effects. But many experiments indicate that this is not true of LSD. A possible return of effect long after no demonstrable blood level remains has been proven to exist. Is this return physiological or psychological? We do not know.

We do, however, know enough to suggest that, for several months after even a single hallucinogenic experience, no one should make an important life decision. Most young people, of course, wrestle with potential changes in their lives all the time. The nature of that struggle often may be characterized as a pull between a more structured or a less structured way of life: serious music or folk music, attending school or taking a year off, and so on. Clearly, each of these ways of life can have validity; that is not the point at issue here. What does concern us is that under drug influence – which means for months after taking the drug – he invariably chooses the looser or less structured alternative; he seems to be deprived of free choice, to be unduly influenced by his drug experience.

The scientific fascination with hallucinogens is easy to understand; this drug mimics schizophrenia, a disease that is one of the scourges of mankind. By studying the drug effect we may learn about the disease in much the same way as Jenner evoked cow pox to study smallpox. Without great chemical know-how, we have rapidly learned to synthesize the drug. The process is technically so simple that our marvelously facile mass media immediately make it known that any student who knows freshman chemistry can do it in his kitchen. The drug is odorless and tasteless and effective in very high dilutions. Strange rumors are heard, rumors from usually creditable sources. One hears even in academic circles that government agencies have, with great cost, arrived at projections of what would happen to a large city if quantities of LSD were dumped in its water.

It comes as no surprise, considering the nature of LSD's effect, to learn that primitive tribes used it in religious rituals. In no time, modern priests spring up who proselytize for the new faith of "expanded experience." They do collect followers. And, as is usual, many are those very people who are least capable of tolerating "expanded" experience. Adolescents or young adults, whose time of life demands the ability to cope with the diffusion of their aims and the contradictions of their decisions, are most easily persuaded to try LSD. The socially and psychologically disturbed are frequent recruits. *The New England Journal of Medicine* reports that a new, consistent, and discernible fraction (6 to 8 percent) of the admissions to mental hospitals in our large cities come from a trip that failed.

Unfortunately, the hue and cry about the hallucinogens has reduced the amount of valid research being done, and made it unpopular. Few researchers want to take responsibility for having the

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drug around or risk its accidental dissemination. We come full circle back to the beginning of the history of narcotic usage. Again, public alarm strengthens the hand of those who see drugs primarily as a problem of law enforcement and punishment, and has little patience for essential social and psychological considerations.

Are we drug happy?

Our discussion of the little understood, indirect, but potent psychological roots of the experience-seekers' drug abuse must not fail to consider the extent to which this country maintains a drug culture. Our culture's rapidly increasing medical dependency on drugs, both for survival and for longevity, makes drug taking a sacred cow indeed. The extent to which we as a nation have become drug eaters was given shocking, but short-lived, publicity during the Kefauver hearings in 1951 and again during the thalidomide scandal. At the 1966 American Medical Association's convention, a great deal of perhaps belated attention was given to this growing phenomenon. Dr. Don Francke sounded the keynote by saying, "The American public is drug happy. Our culture is flooded with remedies of all kinds." In 1963, American consumers spent 4.2 billion dollars on drugs. This figure does *not* include drugs charged to hospital or clinic bills or money spent on drugs by public or government agencies of any kind. The latter figures are hard to obtain, but would unquestionably swell the total tremendously. When the 4.2 billion figure of 1963 is compared with the 2.5 billions spent in 1965, it becomes clear that the amount spent on drugs is rising faster than either general consumer spending or population growth. As a nation our doctors are prescribing, and we are taking, a rapidly increasing amount of drugs. Measured in doctor visits and hospital days, adverse drug reaction – that is, the noxious side effects – has become one of our largest disease entities.

Along with these alarming effects are the heartening facts of constantly increasing longevity, better national health, and a falling death rate for many diseases. However, the overall efficacy of many of the drugs (e.g., the tranquilizers and energizers) is as yet unproved. Doctors argue that they must prescribe new and unproven drugs because their patients demand them and need them. Not everyone who needs a tranquilizer, they contend, can or should go to a psychiatrist. This argument has considerable validity, but, in many respects, it oddly resembles the rationale of the experience-seekers themselves.

The young drug experimenter is, in fact, imitating his elders when he uses drugs; at the same time, he establishes his independence and rebellion by using those illegal drugs his elders officially decry. To those of his peers whom he wishes to enlist in the drug taking army,

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he points out the hyperbole of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and the hypocrisy of his elders as reasons *for* taking drugs. Untenable as this argument is, a lot of college students in the United States have been persuaded by it.

The oblivion-seekers are a relatively clearcut group: they can be studied as a problem. But, in order to study the experience-seekers, we find ourselves studying our society. All too often, they are only exaggerations or caricatures of so much we see everywhere. Indeed, it is the closeness and at the same time the vastness of the problem presented by the experience-seekers that prevents any study of them. We simply do not know what the extent and quality of experience-seeking drug abuse is, nor what are its implications for the future. For instance, we see many users of LSD becoming patients in mental hospitals. Does their number represent only a small proportion of those who take trips, or is there a high ratio between those who take LSD and eventual psychosis?

The medical profession has now, at long last, taken a stand against the crime-oriented Federal Bureau of Narcotics; it is trying to reassert the right it once abdicated, to diagnose and treat drug abusers as sufferers from a disease. But its well-meant effort may be defeated before it begins. In its call for increased research and treatment, organized medicine has placed first importance on sick individual patients, rather than on the broad social problem which drug dependents present to medical practice. The profession may well find itself in a camp as narrow in its own way as that of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics. The emphasis on individual patients limits interest to the oblivion-seekers who, as I have indicated, may be much less of a problem than the experience-seekers. By putting the greatest priority on the search for a nondependency-producing analgesic, and on local treatment rather than specialized regional public health hospitals far from their patients' homes, the profession is undoubtedly supporting worthy causes. But it is not facing the enormity of the problem and it is not searching for truly fresh approaches. Indeed, all too often, it repeats past mistakes. For example, Vaillant shows that involuntary parole is the most effective means of keeping the drug taker abstinent and employed. The experiments with methadone require the patient to report to someone at the hospital who gives him his drug regularly. Consequently, we do not know as yet whether the methadone itself is essential in the results obtained or whether the effective agent is merely the replication of an involuntary parole situation, stringently enforced by methadone's very severe withdrawal reaction. Yet claims for methadone as a cure-all appear constantly in the press, claims that sound very much like those that were made for heroin as a cure for opium addiction in 1898 when heroin was first synthesized.

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Obviously, there is no one solution to "the" drug problem. Before any research effort can begin, there must be a basic shift in public attitudes. Neither hard-school prejudices nor soft-school sentimentalizing can be allowed to continue to distort the public vision. Many approaches and real social flexibility will be necessary to diagnose, prevent, and treat this multi-faceted, economic, psychological, physiological, and social problem. The known possibilities give some sense of the scope that is needed. Some drugs might be legalized; the British system of a license for certain users of certain drugs might be tried; opiate antagonists might be developed; nondoctrinaire, nonritualized, psychiatric approaches might be effective; Synanon-like, cohesive group-living units show some promise; institutional settings could be made available for those who can find tolerable stability only as institutional workers, attendants, or patients. The study of the peculiar nature of this disease, its incidence in groups more than in individuals, its spread by contagion and subsequent infection of those who want warmth, closeness, and social support for some anti-social or dependent propensities, will teach us about a great deal more than just drug taking. But we must begin by knowing that much of what we think we know about this problem is mistaken.

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Experimenting with humans

BERNARD BARBER

In medicine, in biology, in the social sciences, in pharmacology – many recent advances in these fields have been accomplished largely by experimentation with human beings. In some of these instances, it is claimed, no progress could have been made without such experiments. Yet most of us recoil from such a notion. The biblical idea of the sanctity of life, the Kantian injunction that persons should be treated as ends not means, our horror at the experiments conducted by Nazi doctors all make us shrink from approval of these efforts.

With the exception of some discussion in the professions, this "quiet revolution" has received little public scrutiny. Yet the issues that are implicit in these experiments are matters of public policy, and need to be publicly raised. For purposes of simplicity, let us confine the discussion to four areas: drugs, medical research, social science, and biology. I will give some illustrations of the issues in these fields and then see what standards are available for policy guidance.

Drugs and medical research

The chief source of increased pressure for experimentation on human beings is the sheer increase in the amount of biological and medical scientific discovery. The largest increase is in the kinds of

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drugs now available for use. For example, of the eight leading classes of drugs available in this decade, the majority were unknown until almost twenty years ago. Three whole classes of drugs – antibiotics, antihistamines and tranquillizers – were discovered only within the last two decades. Two kinds of drugs – sulfa and vitamins – were first used between World War I and World War II. Two others were discovered early in this century – barbiturates and hormones. Only narcotics have come down to us from antiquity; but most of the present-day kind that are medically used, with the exception of morphine and codeine, are of recent discovery.

Yet all of this drug development required some experimentation on human beings. Although laboratory work and elaborate animal testing always precede trials on human beings, man, as Dr. Henry Beecher of the Harvard Medical School has put it, is "the final test site" for these drugs – man is "the animal of necessity" here.

Another difficult area to control is that of medical research. The issue was highlighted by the case, a few years ago, of two medical researchers, one a distinguished individual on the staff of the Sloan-Kettering institute, who injected live cancer cells into twenty-two old patients in the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in Brooklyn. The patients were not clearly informed that the experimental procedure was a research project unrelated to the medical treatment of their own condition, and that the substance to be injected was live cancer cells. The researchers claimed that there was probably little risk involved and that providing the subjects with such information would only cause "unnecessary" anxiety.

The two doctors were themselves fully aware of the relevant ethical principles in these matters. Where they went astray was in not knowing how to apply the general principle of "informed and voluntary consent" to that specific research situation. The case came to light only because three young physicians who opposed it carried their opposition to a lawyer on the board of directors of the hospital. A heated controversy followed, which made it clear that no general code of ethics in these matters has yet been formulated.

In the Brooklyn case, the New York State Board of Regents, which has jurisdiction over all licensed professions in the state except law, after a two-year investigation of the facts, held the two doctors involved guilty of "unprofessional conduct" and of "fraud and deceit in the practice of medicine." The Regents put forth two important principles. First, "a patient has the right to know he is being asked to volunteer and to refuse to participate in an experiment for any reason, intelligent or otherwise, well-informed or prejudiced. A physician has no right to withhold from a prospective volunteer any fact which he knows may influence the decision." In short, the patient's right to be "emotional" or "irrational" is his, and not subject to any overriding

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decision by an experimenting physician. And second, the Regents declared that the physician, when he is acting as experimenter, cannot claim those rights of doctor-patient relationships that do permit him, in a therapeutic situation, to to withhold information when he judges it to be in the best interests of his patient.

Social science and biology

When one thinks of experiments with human beings one tends to think of "life and death" situations in which a human being's existence is at stake. More common and more pervasive are those situations—and one finds them increasingly in the social sciences—where one's privacy may be invaded, or one's self-respect and self-regard injured by manipulative experimental devices.

Many experiments by psychologists involving cognitive, perceptual, and emotional processes deliberately involve the deception of subjects. In the famous experiments by Solomon Asch on conformity, nominally independent subjects, but actually confederates of the experimenter, deliberately misled other subjects on the size of signs in order to see whether the individual would submit to the group pressure or trust his independent judgment. (It was reported by the experimenter that most subjects conformed—but, curiously, not what they said or did after being told that they were conformist, if they were so told.) More to the point, however, are some experiments reported by Professor Herbert Kelman of Michigan in the July/August issue of *Transaction*. The subjects were led to believe that they were participating in a learning study. They were instructed to administer increasingly severe electric shocks to another person who, after a while, began to protest vehemently. In fact, the "victim," who only feigned pain, was an accomplice of the psychologist. But in some instances, the subject was instructed to continue to "shock" the "victim" even when the victim "writhed" in pain and pounded his head against the wall. The actual purpose of the experiment was to study, not learning, but obedience, and one can also surmise, given the set-up itself, an intent to study latent sadism or emotional indifference on the part of the subject. As Professor Kelman reported one consequence: "One volunteer was 'smiling and confident' when he entered the laboratory. 'Within twenty minutes,' the experimenter reported, 'he was reduced to a twitching, stuttering wreck who was rapidly approaching a point of nervous collapse.' " Not all subjects, of course, were obedient. A number did violate the rules when they felt that the "victim" was in deep pain. But not surprisingly, as Kelman points out, both obedient and defiant exhibited a great deal of stress, "and there is surely good reason," he continues, "to believe that at least some of the obedient subjects came away from this experience with

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lowered self-esteem, realizing that they had yielded to authority to the point of inflicting extreme pain on a fellow human being."

This and similar experiments in deception were discussed in the spring in a heated debate at the meeting of the Behavioral Sciences division of the National Institutes of Health, at Denver; but no decisions about ethical procedures were reached.

Finally, there are the experimental problems, whose scope we cannot yet envisage, which will be arising out of those advances in biological research that may allow us to control the genetic code. Already it is possible, as biologists have done with frogs, to take a cell from one frog and use it to replace a fertilized cell in the womb of another, so that one can, literally, reproduce *in toto*, the original frog. Thus it is possible—and geneticists claim that there is no reason why it could not be done with human beings—for a mature person, man or woman, to turn out an exact genetic replica of himself, instead of going through the process of fertilizing an egg and taking one's chances on the genetic outcome of the mating procedure. The ethical and legal implications of this are enormous. Yet it is quite possible that, at some point, for eugenic reasons, such exact genetic replication may be proposed. There is already the problem of what to do with foetuses where examination of genetic material reveals a probable defect which would cripple or make an idiot of the child after birth. And geneticists have also raised the question of what is the cost to the human species of allowing individuals who have inheritable congenital defects to reproduce themselves, particularly during a period when medical science is able to save a higher proportion of infants who, under other circumstances, might never have been borne alive with such defects. All these are questions, of how we judge human life and who is to make such judgments, are just on the horizon.

Heightened concern for the individual

Aside from the obvious practical harm that experimentation on human beings can sometimes bring to its subjects, an important source for our interest in this problem is the heightened concern in the modern world for every particular individual, for his rights against the powerful who might harm him, no matter how well-intentioned these powerful men might be or how noble their purposes in the light of the general public interest. Nobody, we have come to feel, has the right to make other men unwilling martyrs for anything, including science or the general public that science serves. Dr. Beecher, for one, has been vehement against the making of unwilling martyrs even in good medical causes. In a recent speech at a symposium on clinical research sponsored by the Upjohn Company, he expressed anew and more urgently his fears about the prevalence of unethical behavior of this kind by those who engage in clinical experimentation.

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He cited twenty examples of clinical experiments made in the recent past that he thought were ethically questionable. His data have recently been published in *The New England Journal of Medicine.*

An old problem too

Nothing is absolutely *de novo*, and despite recent revolutionary transformations in their scope and consequences, experimentation on human beings and the ethical problems involved turn out on closer inspection to have some history of their own. Such experimentation and the associated ethical problems are at least as old as the self-conscious, rational practice of medicine by the Greeks. Then, as in smaller but still considerable measure today, the practice of medicine was on an empirical, trial-and-error, implicitly comparative and experimental basis. The modern methodology of *controlled* experimentation, with its random samples, its "experimental" and "control" groups, its "double-blind" techniques, was lacking, of course. But the Greek physician knew that often, when he gave some medication or treatment to an individual or group of individuals, or when he withheld it, he was making a test on what he assumed to be typical or average cases. He knew that he needed to be as objective as possible in his observations, and the Hippocratic cases include some marvels of objective and precise observation that are of use and pleasure to modern physicians. He knew, finally, that he might do harm to his patients, either through his tests or otherwise. And that is probably why one of the injunctions of the Hippocratic Oath was, and is: Into whatsoever house you shall enter, it shall be for the good of the sick to the utmost of your power.

The Hippocratic Oath and other general statements served for a long time. But in the early modern world, the Hippocratic ethical doctrines were increasingly specified and codified, and by the 19th century, with its great development of biology and scientific medicine, numerous codes of medical ethics were drawn up, which usually included some references to the problem of the exploitation of patients by careless or needless experimentation. The first general codification of medical ethics in the United States was written by the American Medical Association in 1848. This was patterned on an English code, Sir Thomas Percival's *Medical Ethics,* 1803. One of the early, explicit, and classic statements on the ethics of experimentation on human beings is in Claude Bernard's *Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine,* 1865, making this great work an important moral as well as scientific and methodological treatise.

Some recent codes for experiments on humans

The disclosure of the Nazi medical atrocities on involuntary human subjects was the most direct precipitant of the whole set of codes

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of ethics on experimentation on human beings that was written in the period just after World War II. The most important of these, and the one we shall presently take as the focus of our discussion, is the Nuremberg Code, on which many of the other codes have been based. In addition, codes have been formulated by such diverse social and medical bodies as the United Nations; the World Medical Association; the United States Public Health Service (for its Clinical Centers for Medical Research at the National Institutes of Health); the French National Academy of Medicine; the American Medical Association; and various British medical groups. Although these large organizations have been willing to formulate very general codes, individual American medical schools, where much research and experimentation on humans is carried out, have been reluctant to formulate more specific codes for their working researchers. This was revealed in a survey made by one busy clinical investigator who uses human subjects in his experiments and was confused by the ethical problems involved. "Being unable," he confesses, "either to define a code [for himself] or to accept one that was already available," he decided to consult with other American clinical investigators. He wrote to every university medical school to ask if they had a procedural document dealing with human experimentation. He got responses from sixty-six out of the eighty-odd he had written to. *Only eight of these said they had the kind of documentary code he had asked for.* Some of the reasons for this widespread reluctance to draw up a detailed documentary code will become clearer when we discuss the difficulties that arise when the investigator carrying out experiments on human beings tries to apply the very general statements in the existing codes to the very particular situations he faces.

The Nuremberg Code and its generalized rules

The Nuremberg Code for medical research involving human subjects serves well as an example of what a generalized code can and cannot do to solve problems in the ethics of experimentation with human beings. Here, in essence, are its ten principles:

1) The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. (This matter is recurrently defined as absolutely crucial, both for medical and for social-scientific experimentation.)

2) The experiment should be such as to yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other means of study, and not random and unnecessary in nature.

3) The experiment should be designed and based on the results of animal experimentation and a knowledge of the natural history of the disease or other problems under study, so that the anticipated results will justify the performance of the experiment.

4) The experiment should be so constructed as to avoid all un-

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necessary physical and mental suffering and injury. (It is now clear that mental suffering may occur as the result not only of medical research but also of the invasion by social scientists of what Ruebhausen and Brim call "the moral claim to private personality."

5) No experiment should be conducted where there is an *a priori* reason to believe that death or disabling injury may occur; except, perhaps, in those experiments where the experimenting physicians also serve as subjects. (But note that it has been objected that even when researchers willingly expose themselves to danger, they have no right to induce others to do so on that ground.)

6) The degree of risk to be taken should never exceed that determined by the humanitarian importance of the problem to be solved by the experiment.

7) Proper preparations should be made and adequate facilities provided to protect the experimental subject against even remote possibilities of injury, disability, or death.

8) The experiment should be conducted only by scientifically qualified persons.

9) During the course of the experiment, the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experiment to an end if he has reached the physicial or mental state where continuation of the experiment seems to him impossible.

10) During the course of the experiment, the scientist in charge must be prepared to terminate the experiment at any stage if he has probable cause to believe, in the exercise of the good faith, superior skill, and careful judgment required of him, that a continuation of the experiment is likely to result in injury, disability, or death to the experimental subject.

Now, these ten principles of the Nuremberg Code, which are representative of the essential prescriptions contained in other codes formulated during the last twenty-five years, are undoubtly of some assistance to clinical investigators looking for the *beginnings* of guidance on the ethics of experimentation on human beings. But there remain difficult problems in the application of these very general principles to the actual, particular, work-a-day experiences of the clinical investigator. He does get some help from these principles, but often—probably usually—he feels he needs a good deal more. What are some of the problems of application the Nuremberg Code and other general ethical codes leave unresolved?

Specifying "voluntary consent"

One crucial problem that existing codes of ethics for experimentation on humans have difficulty in dealing with effectively arises in connection with the principle of voluntary consent, a principle which is considered so important that it is usually placed first in the list of

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ethical imperatives making up these codes. The essential problem here is to define in meaningfully concrete psychological and social terms what constitutes genuine "voluntary consent"—or, as it is sometimes even more restrictively described, "voluntary and informed consent"—in a particular research situation. The social and psychological distinction between "voluntary" and "coerced" behavior is often hard to make. For example, some doctors assert that charity patients who are asked, even before they are admitted to a hospital, to sign forms giving permission for the use of experimental drugs are, in effect, being coerced into giving that consent because they are afraid that if they do not sign they will not get the care they need. Are the laboratory assistants and medical or other students whom the clinical investigator or social scientist often use in their experiments genuine volunteers or a captive population? Members of religious groups such as the Quakers, Mennonites, Assembly of God believers, Church of the Brethren members, who make a religious principle of letting themselves be used in medical experiments, do seem to be true volunteers. But what about federal prisoners who have traded heavy risk, even of death, for remission of time in jail? How voluntary can be the consent given by those who are at least partly incompetent because of age (young or old) or illness (physical or mental)?

And what of the consent which is voluntary but not "informed" as to the risks involved? Many of the procedures and drugs used in experiments on either ill or well volunteers are too technical for those volunteers to understand, either as to the effects of the treatment or as to the risk involved. In many instances the risks are incompletely understood by the researchers themselves, let alone by the subject. Many clinical investigators, especially when they are in the situation where they are defined as "doctors" treating "patients," know that many patients will assent to what "the doctor" asks or even gently suggests. Who is to guard the patient, or even the doctor himself, against unethical abuse of his authority here? Probably only some panel of expert peers who have the power of review and approval.

Specifying the application of general rules

A second basic, and comprehensive, problem that existing codes have is a difficulty that is inherent in all codes of ethics for all branches of human behavior: how to apply very general norms to very particular cases. Claude Bernard's noble but very general maxim, expressed in 1865, "Christain morals forbid only one thing, doing ill to one's neighbor," fails to take into account the common experience that choice lies, not between simple good and simple ill, but between hard-to-assess evils, or, as Dr. Beecher has said, "among various shades of gray." A summary of the views of many distinguished clinical investi-

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gators attending a recent conference on drug use and drug testing at Johns Hopkins put it this way: "Although codes of ethics for therapeutic trials in man are relatively easy to state, (that is, assuming general principles are sufficient), their translation to practice was regarded as frequently much more difficult." The doctors in the live cancer cell case were fully aware of the relevant general ethical principles; both are men of professional distinction and apparently of high moral integrity. They went astray in not knowing how to apply the general principle of "informed and voluntary consent" properly in their particular research situation.

Part of the reluctance of the clinical investigators in America's medical schools to formulate general procedural documents for the governance of experimentation on humans seems to be due to the widespread feeling that such general documents are not adequate to their purpose. Unfortunately, these clinical investigators seem also to have the misguided view that specific norms cannot be formulated by peers in some systematic way, and that therefore only the individual researcher can ultimately be responsible for his actions. "Documents and codes," said the puzzled clinical investigator who reported this little survey, "cannot substitute for the integrity of the individual investigator. Ultimately the answer to these problems lies in the possession by those in responsible positions of the qualities of integrity, understanding, a respect for the dignity of one's fellow man, accompanied by an intelligent curiosity and the ability to design safe and critical experiments." Many scientists seem to feel that the "responsible, experienced, prudent" scientist can be expected to make the best choices and to achieve the maximum possible ethical behavior on his own. The facts, unfortunately, do not bear them out. The individual needs the counsel and guidance of his "responsible, experienced, prudent" peers.

There is no reason why the public should have any absolute confidence in individual scientists: excessive discretion and responsibility for the lone scientist seems unlikely to safeguard his subjects' welfare, or indeed his own capacity to act ethically in particular situations. Morality here, as elsewhere, is compounded of social as well as individual controls. In practice, to be sure, the phenomenon of the utterly lone scientist does not occur so often as the ideology of the research scientists would have it. The clinical investigator, in actual fact, often consults long and intensively with his peers when he is facing the particulars of a research situation involving experimentation on humans. In some research institutions, but not in enough, the consultation process is already formalized. Under a recent ruling, all grantees of the National Institutes of Health must submit their studies for formal approval by their local peers. Committees have been appointed from which the individual experimenter must seek advice and

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approval for all experiments on human beings. Although only eight of the sixty-six medical schools in the study we have mentioned said that they had a procedural document covering experiments on humans, another twenty-four said they did have, or favored having, a review committee for all experiments on humans. Speaking to this point from his more general experience in the field of law, the late Professor Edmond Cahn said recently at a conference on drugs and drug research: "Since the moral problems attached to experiment on human beings arise in highly specific and variable circumstances, the investigator will rarely find an easy formulary answer. Experience has shown the wisdom of consulting a group or panel of colleagues, who may not only assist in structuring the experiment but also influence its course. None of us can claim impartiality in his own enterprises; we all do well to seek detached, objective, and disinterested judgment. Merely as a matter of self-protection, the investigator ought regularly to seek outside counsel."

Somehow, then, by individual and group processes intermixed, the problem of how general ethical formulas for experimentation on human beings should be specified in particular norms and particular courses of action, is constantly being resolved, though not nearly so well and so often as it should be. It has to be emphasized that these social processes cannot involve the research scientists alone. Here, as in all cases of specialized and professional behavior, the public interest requires that at least certain ultimate decisions be made by the agencies that the public has set up to protect itself against all special perspectives and special interests. That is to say, in some cases, recourse to the established processes of the public administrative and legal systems will have to be taken, as in the live cancer cell case. Though they should act only after full consultation with the interested research specialists, there falls to these administrative and legal agencies the ultimate responsibility for protecting those who are involved in experiments on human beings, either as agent or as subject.

Specifying the consequences

A third important set of problems for general codes of ethics for experimentation on human beings comes out of the difficulty even the conscientious experimenter frequently has in predicting (1) the range of positive and negative consequences the experiment will have for the individual subjects, (2) what benefits will accrue to the public interest in both the short and long runs, and, (3) whether the relationship between private good or harm and the public good will be one in which even a rough functional calculus shows some definite net advantage all around. Many of the effects of experiments on human beings are unintended, sometimes for good, but also sometimes for

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ill, as in the case of thalidomide. Even the most careful and well-intentioned experimenter on human beings is often setting forth into an unknown situation where harm may occur to his subjects. If society wishes to get the benefits of necessary experimentation on human beings, it must support the competent and cautious investigator in assuming this kind of risk, and it must absolve him from blame if the venture turns out badly, as occasionally it will. The public interest requires the public to take upon itself a certain measure of responsibility and burden for the risks which those who seek to benefit it must incur in its behalf. While researchers have no ethical right to make their subjects martyrs for society, society has no right to make martyrs of the experimenters who do harm in spite of their best and most conscientious efforts.

Some suggestions for public policy

These three problems, then—specifying "voluntary consent," specifying the application of general rules, and specifying the consequences—make it difficult to establish satisfactory working codes of ethics and legal rules for the conduct of experimentation on human beings. Yet this continuing task obviously needs to be embraced and carried out satisfactorily. Understandably, the professionals involved are ambivalent about the necessity of detailed ethical codes and legal rules. They would like the guidance and legitimation such norms would provide, but they are also fearful of the intrusion of uninformed and unsympathetic "outsiders" into activities which only they themselves can "really" understand and judge. Yet the public interest calls for something more than now exists. What should that be? As a beginning at least two things.

First, in every research situation where experiments on human beings are conducted, a review and approval committee should immediately be set up. Such committees should consist of prudent, experienced, and active researchers, both "locals" and "outsiders," who are willing to devote whatever time is necessary to this essential function. New committees could consult with those committees already in existence to learn about proper procedures, recurring problems, and satisfactory solutions. All such committees should keep detailed written records of their procedings with a view to codification of procedures and norms, not only in their own particular research situation, but also for sharing with other committees elsewhere. It is desirable that such committees include both a lawyer and a social scientist, since what is involved is not just science but social and legal norms in which expert advice from a social scientist and lawyer is indispensible on both procedure and substance. These other professional experts do not have any total and final answers to the difficult ethical problems involved; they should be prepared to learn from their scientist

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colleagues on the committees. They will be making only part of the essential contribution to a joint process.

Second, in addition to the setting up of review and approval committees, some general and coordinating approach to the problem of ethics of experimentation on human beings is necessary. Such a general and coordinating view could be taken by an expert commission set up for the purpose by the joint efforts of such relevant professional bodies as the Society of Clinical Investigators, the American Medical Association, the American Bar Association, the American Law Institute, the American Sociological Association, the American Psychological Association, and the American Political Science Association. Models for such general and coordinating commissions exist in many areas of medicine, scientific research, legal problems, and social problems. Indeed, after its initial efforts, such a commission might well be established on a permanent basis, for the problem of the ethics of experimentation on human beings is with us to stay and promises only to get larger and more consequential all the time as science advances and affects every area of human activity.

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REVIEW ESSAY

The High Cost of Culture

VIRGINIA HELD

Two economists, in a dispassionate study of the situations of the performing arts in the United States, conclude that the economic pressures besetting them have been growing, that these are likely to increase fairly steadily, and that permanent financial aid, rather than stopgap or one-shot infusions, will be needed to maintain the performing arts at even current levels. William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen's study for the Twentieth Century Fund was recently published under the title: *Performing Arts – The Economic Dilemma: A Study of Problems Common to Theater, Opera, Music and Dance.* Its findings will be of interest to determined or potential performers, eager or grasping or enlightened producers and backers, climbing donors or philanthropic individuals and foundations, politicians and officials with local, state or federal ambitions or responsibilities, students and educators in or out of educational or other institutions, and anyone else with an affection for the performing arts, if the class is not null.

The patient research that has gone into this work is impressive, since the simplest data are unusually difficult to acquire. Consider, for instance, the theater: "Each play," Baumol and Bowen point out, "is a completely new enterprise – as it were, a new business firm organized expressly for the production of that play. Typically, a significant proportion of the openings on Broadway is mounted by new and inexperienced producers. True, there are half a dozen professional producers who earn their living from the theater, but when he has no shows running, even a major producer will pare his staff down to a core of three: a play reader, a production assistant and a general manager. All the other participants in a production – director, actors, designers and the rest – are assembled anew with each new performing enterprise. One result . . . is an almost complete lack of permanent and directly comparable records for the commercial theaters." Thus it is that performers unassembled may hold positions in the conventional statistics as employed waiters instead of unemployed actors.

If these people do act in a play off-Broadway, incidentally, they earn a typical salary of $60 a week, until they move on. The economics

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of the off-Broadway theater, Baumol and Bowen observe, "have alyays been extremely precarious. The number of productions declined significantly during the 1964-65 season [from a peak of 90 productions during 1963-64] and the demise of the off-Broadway movement is now being discussed as actively as was the growth of the movement only a few years ago."

The orchestras constitute the core of Baumol and Bowen's statistical analyses, largely because they are the nation's longest-lived performing organizations and have records that can be studied. The four largest, Boston, Cleveland, New York, and Philadelphia, are in a category by themselves, with seasons of 52 weeks and budgets of $1.5 to $3 million a year. Their continued existence is taken for granted, and they can afford to pay their musicians respectable salaries. But, as a group, the musicians of the 25 major, relatively permanent and established orchestras in America earn from their playing an average of less than $3,000 a year, and must often be partially submerged in, or drift in and out of other occupations.

The situation for the dance is the most amorphous of all. "Most modern dance companies have led an incredibly precarious existence," Baumol and Bowen write. "Typically, a modern dance organization is administered in all its aspects by a single person — the choreographer. He either serves as his own secretary, accountant and business manager or entrusts these tasks to his wife or a friend. Except when the State Department finances a trip abroad, his company usually gives only sporadic and isolated performances. . . . When an engagement is arranged, the choreographer must . . . reassemble his troupe, whose members arrange leaves from the large variety of jobs at which they earn their living." In such circumstances, the bare statistics may be overwhelmed by emotional states of need and discouragement.

THE real world, Baumol and Bowen remind us, "is a hodgepodge of simultaneous occurrences," and their book illustrates the particular difficulties of gaining an accurate picture of it in the realm of the performing arts. *Alors, faites vos théories, Messieurs-dames,* and the facts may be found, for confirmation, satisfaction, or remorse.

Are you inclined to think that art, like endeavor, flourishes on danger, responds to spontaneity, yearns for the taste of fear surmounted, and grows tedious in institutional security? The authors themselves suppose we will dismiss as antediluvian the notion that poverty is good for the arts — and yet the case of the dance does raise a doubt. The most unstable and constantly threatened of all the performing arts considered, it has been perhaps the most creative and distinctive. Ironically, although we barely support it at home, we finance it to tour abroad to convince others of American artistry, and it frequently succeeds. It has been said of Martha Graham that she thrives on anarchy. If art is the imposition of order upon chaos, may it not be that some testing of the capacity of the human person to endure disorder is part of the forging of the artist, and may not some

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high moments of theater, where defiance has crackled through the house as the closing notices were being posted on the doors, give the myth a shadow of corroborability? In any case, no dearth of insecurity appears imminent for most groups of performing artists.

But perhaps you are inclined, rather, to think that art, like thought, requires a measure of leisure, some freedom from the turmoils and terrors of living on the edges of collapse? The high levels of achievement attained by the leading American orchestras may offer support for the claim: These orchestras' incomes have been rising along with expenditures, and though the gap has been increasing, so has the likelihood of some tabs being picked up by a gentleman from a foundation, a corporation, or a government. In the year 1963-64, the five largest orchestras were left with a median deficit of only $4,000 a year — two-tenths of one per cent of their total expenditures. Musicians with the New York Philharmonic earn a minimum of $10,400 a year, and leading musicians are beginning to live like other people, with health insurance and pensions, not having to impose upon their children the cruelties of poverty. The growth of cultural centers — Lincoln Center in New York, the Los Angeles Music Center of the Performing Arts, the John F. Kennedy Center under construction in Washington, and many others — indicates a trend toward the institutionalization of the performing arts, giving practitioners and audiences the benefits of predictability and more regularized arrangements, assuming these are net gains.

For the more reliable theories in which the authors are interested, a more solid set of facts *can* be discerned. Some of their conclusions suggest that the cultural boom may suffer the fate of "the religious revival": evaporation under examination. In his book *The Culture Consumers,* Alvin Toffler had, with others, heralded the enormous rise in consumer spending for culture; in a statement giving some a gleam and others a shudder, Toffler declared that "the arts have been liberated from their prison cell and brought into the sunlight. . . . There they are, as it were, on the supermarket shelf. . . ."

Baumol and Bowen present a different picture. Summing up their investigations of artistic activity itself, they say: "Among art forms and by geographic region, the picture is . . . mixed. There has been real growth in the activity of the dance, the regional theater and off-Broadway theater, though the expansion of the latter may have come to an abrupt end. The major orchestras and the operas have held their own and the commercial theater in New York has been declining, though not as rapidly as is sometimes alleged."

On the question of how lavishly American consumers have been spending for the performing arts, they find that "whereas . . . the annual growth rate of total arts admissions expenditures over the entire period 1932-1963 slightly exceeded that of expenditures on all services, during 1947-1963 outlays on services grew more rapidly, and during 1961-1963 this difference increased further. Even the

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frequently cited comparison between recent growth rates in expenditures on the arts and expenditures on spectator sports has created a false impression. Sports have simply been growing very slowly all along. . . .

"We note that over the 31 year period expenditures on the arts just about held their own with the G.N.P.: their rate of increase of 8.2 percent per year was just exactly 'average' for all goods and services. But during 1961-1963 there was a drop that reduced the growth rate for arts expenditures below the average annual increase in the G.N.P."

The authors find it surprising that many culture-boom-criers have failed to correct their figures for changes in price and population levels, and well they may be surprised. Readers have become so accustomed to expecting these corrections to be built into any figures they are offered that they normally do not think to be on guard against their omission. But, Baumol and Bowen observe, if total outlays by audiences on all forms of the live performing arts are translated into dollars of equal purchasing power, "instead of an increase of 240 percent from 1929 to 1963 (from $127 million to $433 million), the rate of increase in real dollars is found to be no more than 65 percent." If this figure, in turn, is converted into a per capita one to take account of the population increase, it is found that "real per capita expenditures on admissions increased hardly at all over the period: they rose from $2.51 to $2.72 – an increase no greater than 8 percent."

But this is still not the end of the story, because Americans have been growing richer, and the interesting question would seem to be whether they have been willing to spend a higher or lower share of their income on the components of the alleged cultural boom. "We recalculated our figures once again," Baumol and Bowen state, "this time expressing expenditures on arts admissions as a percentage of the consumer's average income (. . . income after taxes). Expressed in these terms, the amount spent on the arts has actually fallen by about one fourth since 1929. Total arts admissions expenditures, we find, have decreased from 15 cents of each $100 of disposable personal income in 1929 to only 11 cents of each $100 in 1963. Thus the adjustments necessary to divest the total admissions figures of the spurious elements that concealed their underlying significance have deflated the alleged 240 percent increase to what now appears to be a 25 percent decline."

1929 happens to be how far back the figures are available. If one chooses, instead, the post-war low of the early 1950's as a starting point, one can say that there has been a modest rise in arts admissions expenditures since, from .08 percent of disposable income to .11 percent, and that the performing arts seem to be holding their own in the competition for the consumer's dollar.

The authors declare calmly that their "analysis of the record entitles us to conclude neither that the nation has entered a great cul-

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tural renaissance nor that it is lost in an artistic wilderness. Rather, as is often the case, one is forced to a comparatively colorless in-between position – that over the course of the last decade and a half, the over-all progress of professional activity in the living arts has amounted to little more than a continuation of past trends."

There is nothing in these trends to lead one to expect a large spontaneous increase in attendance. And how extraordinarily narrow and affluent and well-educated a segment of the public it is which *ever* goes to a play or a concert may surprise many readers.

"Audiences from art form to art form," Baumol and Bowen find, "are *very* similar. They all show a median age in the middle 30's; over 60 percent of the audience for each art form consists of people in the professions (and this finding holds for both sexes); all exhibit an extremely high level of education, with 50 percent of the males having gone to graduate school and 50 percent of the females having at least completed college; and there is a consistently high level of income, in no case involving a median under $11,000." The characteristics of British audiences are found to be remarkably similar.

A breakdown by category, taking into account that the same people may attend one kind of performance a number of times, shows the following:

AVERAGE ESTIMATED ATTENDANCE, BY ART FORM

	Average Estimated Attendance	Average Number of Times Attended in Last 12 Months	Number of Individuals Attending
Broadway	7,000,000	4.5	1,555,556
Off-Broadway	900,000	6.5	138,462
Regional Theatres	1,500,000	4.5	333,333
Major Orchestras	6,600,000	4.8	1,375,000
Opera	1,700,000	2.6	653,846
Dance	750,000	2.3	326,087

But this doesn't indicate the overlap between types, as when, for instance, a regular theater-goer goes to a concert. "An intensive examination of our data," Baumol and Bowen declare, "has led us to estimate that (excluding 'the road' and summer stock) the audience of the live professional performing arts in the United States totaled 2½ to 3 million persons in 1963-64."

INCREASED consumption would not, anyhow, substantially reduce the economic travails of the performing arts, because the nature of their services precludes any significant increase in their productivity, and their costs relative to the costs of manufactured goods are bound to increase steadily. Education has faced the same problem and has, along with getting aid, boldly raised its prices, but the arts

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are not yet in a category of goods such as food, shelter, clothing, medical care – and now education – which most people think they must purchase and pay for, no matter what the cost.

After discounting the magnitude of the featherbedding problem and recommending a selective rise in the prices of those tickets in greatest demand, the authors sketch the gaps between earned income and total expenditures which the arts may expect. "In every organization for which we have data," Baumol and Bowen write, "*the income gap has been growing, and it has been doing so quite steadily.* . . . We . . . found the annual growth rates for the income gaps to be 5.2 percent per year for the New York Philharmonic, 4.7 percent for the Cincinnati Orchestra, 6.9 percent for the basic eleven major orchestras, 8.2 percent for the Metropolitan Opera. . . ." By 1975, if these trends continue as expected, "professional performing arts organizations may well have to raise $60 million . . . if they are to cover the difference between their operating costs and revenues."

Fortunately, contributions have been growing along with the income gaps. But even if private giving to the arts continues to grow at the same rate as the total of charitable contributions – and the authors doubt the likelihood of a significant increase in the share given to the arts – "by 1975 the arts would experience an annual shortfall (net deficit after contributions from private sources) ranging somewhere between $5.6 and $26.3 million."

An extrapolated status quo may not be a very compelling goal, but even to reach this the performing arts are going to need sustained additional support. An obvious possible source of it is government, and Baumol and Bowen patiently make the economist's case: "The provision of public goods," they explain, "cannot be entrusted to market forces alone. . . . National security, which is vital to all citizens, cannot be sold to any one of them. . . . One cannot hope to sell rights to unpolluted air in the city streets. . . ." The performing arts, like education, can be counted a "mixed commodity," which can be expected to cover part, but not all, of its costs by sale to the public.

Government support at any level has in the past been minuscule, as the following table shows:

SOURCES OF DIRECT CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE PERFORMING ARTS, 1964

Source	Approximate Amount (millions)	Percent of Total
Individuals	$50-75	55-61
Corporations	$20	21-16
Foundations	$20-25	21-20
Local Government	$2.5	3-2
State Government	$1	1-1
Federal Government	0	0-0
Total	$93.5-$123.5	100-100

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A DISTINCT break-through was made with the passage in 1965 of a 3-year federal program to aid the arts and humanities. "The act as written certainly represents a major break with tradition," Baumol and Bowen write. "However, the financial commitment involved — a maximum of $10 million per year for the arts — must be viewed in perspective. Ten million dollars is an annual expenditure of roughly 5 cents per capita. This is a very small sum in comparison with governmental outlays in other countries." And small, one may add, in comparison to almost anything. "Twenty-five million dollars," the authors muse, in thinking about the magnitude of the expected gap for all the performing arts, "will not begin to pay for 25 miles of superhighway in a moderately populous area."

Baumol and Bowen assert that because the arts are dependent on contributions of some sort, "one can make a strong case to the effect that interference by private patrons is far more frequent and poses a far more imminent threat than does government control." Furthermore, if the government would assume a larger share of the burden of supporting the major, established, dependable American institutions of the performing arts, such as the leading symphony orchestras, this would free private and foundation funds to fuel the more experimental, unrestrained, high-risk artistic ventures.

The authors may, as economists, underrate the complexities and implications of even so simple an undertaking as giving away the modest sums of money under consideration. Who gives, and who gets, the right to maintenance or hope can be a matter of artistic life or death to the individuals involved. But Baumol and Bowen's findings, though less dramatic than some, may through their very reliability move us beyond the practice of talk into the drama of decision.

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COMMUNICATIONS

Income Grants and "Dirty Work"

HERBERT J. GANS

In his communication (Fall issue), "Against a Negative Income Tax," Alvin Schorr notes: "The notion of providing a decent income to men who might work calls forth passions in Americans that are never fully explained on rational grounds. One might think that we suffer from a buried desire not to work at all, so bitterly do we regard people who we think are bringing it off." Schorr is correct, of course, about the passionate opposition to income guarantees, but it is worth looking more closely at the fear behind this passion.

It is quite true that most of us, at some time or other, desire not to work at all; on days when the job becomes unbearable, we fantasy about how pleasant it would be not to work. The fantasy is, however, short-term; for if one asked people whether they wanted to stop working permanently, most people, or at least those who hold respectable and at least periodically rewarding jobs, would say "no." For men, the job provides a major definition of social role and social status, and is an important underpinning of personal identity; the depression and despair that overcome people who are unemployed for any significant length of time has been documented by a number of studies.

But even aside from such "subjective" factors, there is a rational and objective basis to the passion against income grants. For with guaranteed incomes, at least two types of people — or some among them — might stop working: those who are underpaid for their work and those who perform the dirty work of our society. A man who earns only $50 a week might consider giving up his job if he can earn the same amount from a government income grant; and so might a dishwasher, a lavatory attendant, or a domestic servant — who are usually also the underpaid.

In effect, then, I would argue that underlying the passionate objection to income grants is a real fear by the affluent and respectably employed that the people who do the underpaid and dirty work in our society will walk off their jobs and leave these functions unfilled. Such fears have already been expressed about the "servant problem," particularly when and where factory jobs are open to women. (There is also the fear that if poor people are paid by the government for not working, they will spend their time in sexual activities or alcoholic and drug binges and other disreputable pur-

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suits, which in turn would create both envy and greater fear on the part of the fully-employed. Harold Wilensky, the Berkeley sociologist, once demonstrated that whenever unemployment increased, the number of books and articles about the "leisure problem" also increased – suggesting that middle class writers and readers worry about what the working and lower classes might do with their involuntary "leisure.")

In our society, underpaid and dirty jobs have usually been held by immigrants or migrants to the city, for whom even the dirtiest job was an improvement over conditions "back home," or who really had no choice but to take such a job. When the European immigrants came to America, most jobs were, by present standards, dirty and underpaid, and so there was little social onus or emotional hardship in taking the worst. Moreover, the immigrants were embedded in a strong family system, and the men had to take whatever job they could find because they had to maintain this system and their role in it.

Today, conditions have changed. The majority of the employed are white collar workers; dirty and underpaid jobs are now in a minority. Affluence has created rising standards for job quality and working conditions, and improved communications have made sure that every American, rich or poor, has learned about these standards, and applies them to himself. When he must take a dirty job, social and emotional problems are likely to follow. The most impressive illustration of this consequence can be found in the HARYOU study, *Youth in the Ghetto.* The researchers found that the incidence of social pathology correlated only .07 with unemployment, but .64 with the proportion of unskilled workers in the area. Kenneth Clark concludes: "Apparently the roots of pathology in Central Harlem lie not primarily in unemployment [but] in the low status of the jobs held by the residents of the community."

Moreover, the dirty and underpaid jobs are now relegated almost entirely to nonwhites, and particularly to Negroes, who lack some of the cultural incentives for holding them that impelled the immigrants. Thanks to centuries of slavery and unemployment, Negro men have often been unable to play a central economic role in the family, and are under less cultural pressure to do so than were the immigrants. Faced with the disparity between high job standards and the bitter reality of being eligible only for dirty work, some Negro men find it reasonable now to stop being dishwashers or lavatory attendants and to "hang" on the street corner or "hustle" in the underworld – and to remain single or cut the tie to their families. If an income grant were available, such men might have still less reason to take the dirty jobs. Of course, this applies only to a minority of Negro men – and even less to Negro women. Partly because they play a more central role in the family, Negro women are more resigned to doing the dirty work of our society, and – as a recent study by Helen Safa (*Profiles in Poverty,* Syracuse University Youth Development Center) shows – many unmmarried mothers prefer working to living off Aid to Dependent Children.

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Neverthless, raising the question of income grants should also raise the question of what American society plans to do about its remaining dirty and underpaid jobs. It is true that, as long as there are rural Southern Negroes left who can be persuaded to come to the cities to take these jobs, the status quo can be maintained, and the law of supply and demand can take its course – which means, in reality, that such jobs can be forced on those who have no choice but to take them. Welfare goals demand, however, that we begin to figure out how to make these jobs less dirty and better paid.

POLICIES are not easily come by, because we do not even know what makes a job "dirty." Is it the physical dirtiness of the work, or the lack of advancement, or its insecurity, or the low prestige, or poor working conditions, or substandard wages – or all of these? Many factory workers labor under dirty conditions, but their jobs have some prestige – and they pay a living wage. Many people have clean jobs, but consider them "dirty" because they are low status, dead-end, and underpaid to boot. Some research might provide a better classification of such jobs; but, meanwhile, one sure criterion of the dirty job is: it pays too little.

This of course takes the analysis into the controversial arena of the minimum wage. Clearly, the worst jobs in our society are those that pay below or just above a minimum wage; and equally clearly, one solution would be to raise that minimum wage, perhaps to $2.50 per hour in the big cities, and to an equivalent figure elsewhere. As another short piece in the Fall issue, "The Minimum Wage," suggests, a higher minimum wage will squeeze the marginal workers out of the labor market, and make it harder for the unskilled to compete against the skilled. We ought to know, however, what kinds of jobs are eliminated when the minimum wage is raised. I would suppose that jobs which create a product or a service with inelastic demand will not decrease so sharply; if they cannot be automated, raising wages simply forces a rise in prices. If fruitpickers get higher wages, we pay higher prices for fruit; but we pay them, if grudgingly. And we ought to pay them, for there is no reason why migrant workers ought to subsidize consumers, affluent or not, by working for substandard wages.

There is, however, little doubt that jobs related to an elastic demand situation may be eliminated by a higher minimum wage, either through automation – which would make the remaining jobs cleaner and more prestigious – or through simple erosion; the products and services would no longer be available. This may or may not be desirable. I would argue on general principles that products and services which can exist only through subsidization by low wages should not exist. But that principle might need provisionally to be violated, and some jobs, which would disappear if the minimum wage were raised to $2.50 per hour, should be retained. For example, most hospitals pay their orderlies much less, and would be in difficult circumstances if they had to pay a living wage. In such instances, it

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would become a policy issue whether such jobs should be retained, whether the price increases that follow wage increases should be passed on to the consumer, or whether the federal government – or the state or city – should subsidize the firm or agency so that it can provide the product or service at lower prices. Such a policy, which I think is necessary and desirable, would spread the cost of paying a living wage to the nation rather than to specific consumers. Of course, this is already being done now; many people work at substandard wages and are simultaneously eligible for welfare payments. I suggest that we rationalize this process, and determine more deliberately what kinds of jobs should be subsidized by public funds.

Whatever the solution, however, more attention must be paid to the elimination of dirty, dead-end, and low-paid jobs, even as the society struggles to eliminate unemployment. Since reducing the number of such unattractive jobs might well increase unemployment, there are no easy answers. But enough experience is now available from anti-poverty efforts to show that poor people, and especially younger ones, are often unwilling to exchange unemployment for such jobs. Their attitude is not idiosyncratic or subversive. On the contrary, it simply and powerfully reflects the prevailing culture. "Dirty work" is no solution for unemployment, and public policy must deal with both.

On the Minimum Wage

CHARLES M. LICHENSTEIN*

WE HAVE read your comments in "Current Reading" on our Milton Friedman-Yale Brozen minimum wage pamphlet, with mixed feelings. It's awfully good to know that you think the pamphlet's "basic thesis is probably right". But it's keenly disappointing to discover, along the way toward that conclusion, that you have left the canons of responsible criticism in tatters and have signally failed to serve your own readers. Anyone who's not seen the pamphlet, that is to say, still won't have a notion of what's in it.

He will, to be sure, be properly conditioned not to expect very much even if he should get hold of a copy: the first two sentences of your comment, heavy-handed though they are, will see to that. I must confess that the substantive point involved eludes me, but it really *was* an "interview" and it took place, all unrehearsed, at the recording facility of the University of Chicago's audiovisual center.

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Parts of it, in fact, have been broadcast several times by the University's public affairs forum.

More important by far, does it really get us anywhere – us liberals and us conservatives – to open a debate by impugning the other side as "hardly . . . uncommitted inquiring spirits"? It's not only silly and undignified, it's also a question-begging exercise. Are you "uncommitted" (whatever that may mean)? Am I? Do either of us – or Friedman or Brozen or anyone else engaged in intellectual pursuits – want to be uncommitted? Is it not, rather, a question of knowing what our commitments are, of being prepared to defend them, and of stating them explicitly – while engaged in truth-seeking – so that the reader may discount for them? In these regards, I submit that Friedman and Brozen dealt fairly with their audience.

Getting on to paragraph two, and leaving aside that astonishing first sentence (what a prime example of know-nothingism it is!), you are quite mistaken. You charge that Friedman "does not bother to explain why the gap [between white and non-white unemployment rates] first began to appear in 1954, or why it did not tend to narrow during the period of more than five years that the minimum wage remained at a dollar." As to your point about 1954, you have misread both the chart and the text. First of all, look again at Chart I and you will discover that the gap in unemployment rates did not appear in 1954 but a year later, in 1955. Second, far from not explaining this post-'54 gap and its subsequent widening, Friedman states on page 11:

> You can see from the chart how a small gap opened . . . in 1949-50, *when the minimum wage was being increased from 40* cents to 75 cents. It closed temporarily during the Korean War emergency – so that in 1951-54 unemployment rates were about the same for both groups. But, at the end of the emergency, the small gap opened again. And then a much larger gap emerged.

As to your point about 1959-61: first, both charts I and II show that the larger post-1956 gap was in fact closing in 1959 and 1960 and, second, Friedman explains on page 16 that "when it started to close, the minimum wage was raised again and the gap was pushed apart once more." Maybe the explanation leaves you unconvinced. Well and good. In that case you might better have served the "spirit of inquiry" by taking note of it and then criticizing it on the merits of the factual evidence. I look in vain, amongst all your flat assertions of who is wrong and who is right, for a shred of factual data.

With respect to the rest of that paragraph, if Friedman and Brozen had presented unfounded conclusions, it would indeed have been shoddy argumentation. But you were overhasty in assuming that scholars of their stature would play such a game. The conclusions you object to happen to be taken from studies that consider all relevant factors, including those you mention, and then find the minimum wage rate to be the determining one. (Owing to our own lingering commitment to the spirit of free enquiry, we published a longish

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bibliography into which any reader – you included – might dip to make sure that Friedman and Bozen were not torturing the evidence to support any special pleading.) Academic authorities of no mean reputation, inquiring spirits all, happen to be nearly of a mind on the effects of minimum wage legislation, and on the primacy of these effects. And if anyone's to blame for editing out some of the supporting citations, in the interests of our general readership, blame me and not the authors.

As to your final comment about Friedman: if he can't study the Campbell paper (still unpublished) and conclude that state minimum wage laws are the key factor in differential employment rates, how then can you possibly conclude (without even seeing the paper) that other factors are "far more important"? I return to my earlier point about evidence: it really does cut both ways you know. Should you wish to judge for yourself, I'm sure that Dr. Colin Campbell, of Dartmouth College, would oblige with another copy of his manuscript.

At the last, we take heart from your agreement that high minimum wage rates do more harm than good in the battle against poverty (a point Friedman makes repeatedly). And we're happy to find you agreeing that other ways ought to be found to help the poor. You might *even* have mentioned that Friedman agrees with you, too, and says so:

> The problem of low income is . . . one, incidentally, that I believe we ought to do something about. But are we doing anything to help families with low incomes if we make their situation initially worse? (page 30)
>
> . . . it would be far better to supplement . . . [the marginal worker's] income in some fashion than it is first to make him unemployed and then have to give him the whole sum . . . This is not the place to go into it, but a wide range of alternative proposals have been made for providing supplemental income to the poor on a general basis. I think it's enough to note here that such alternatives exist – and to stress again that the minimum wage only makes the problem worse, not better. (page 33)

I should have thought it unnecessary to remind you that Milton Friedman practically "invented" the negative income tax, so-called, as a technique for supplementing the income of the poor.

And so, where does all this end us up? Unfortunately, and I really mean this, we end up caviling over this or that minor point and fogging up the substantial areas of agreement between us. We end up debating the academic credentials of two highly reputed economists. Pages are wasted and hours misspent – without tackling the important questions. How *do* we reverse the dis-employment effects of minimum wage legislation? And how *do* we help the poor supplement their inadequate income?

We, at any rate, are still open to suggestion and eager for honest debate.

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CURRENT READING

Two Views of New York

It is a rare opportunity to be able to read two important books, published almost simultaneously, about New York City. One – Joseph Lyford's *The Airtight Cage* (Harper & Row) – is highly provocative and already extremely influential. The other – Roger Starr's *The Living End: The City and its Critics* – is merely excellent, and has therefore received much less attention.

Mr. Lyford is an urban expert for the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, an organization headed by Robert M. Hutchins and located at Santa Barbara. The CSDI vehemently deplores just about everything that is status quo in America today, and has served as a watering-place for dissenting pamphleteers. Santa Barbara, as we know, also happens to be a Birchite center. Perhaps an enterprising sociologist should investigate what there is about this superficially lovely spot that encourages such an insatiable appetite for indignation.

The Airtight Cage is a very well-written description of – more precisely, a polemic against – a segment of New York's upper West Side. Mr. Lyford lives there, has studied the area, has participated in its local community activities, and is not without a considerable native shrewdness. Unfortunately, he was raised in a small Illinois town and basically detests city life. His analysis is therefore skewed at many crucial points, and one is a bit alarmed to hear it rumored that he was one of the guiding spirits of the Ribicoff-Kennedy-Javits Senate subcommittee investigation of urban problems.

One gets an idea of what is wrong with *The Airtight Cage* from the very first sentence of the very first chapter:

> "Except for the ghetto of Harlem, its Spanish counterpart on the East side of town called El Barrio, and the inner cities of Bombay, Calcutta, Shanghai, and Chicago, there are not many places on earth which before 1965 were afflicted with as dense a residential population as the upper West Side of Manhattan in New York City. Take, for example, the Area, a 125-block sector running from Eighty-second to 106th Streets and bounded by Central Park on the east and the Hudson River on the west. Before urban renewal began to rip the heart out of the Area, it was inhabited by 152,000 people, or more than 1,000 people per block."

Sounds crowded, doesn't it? But a quick reckoning shows that this density of population is not much above the average for all of Manhattan – including Central Park, Fort Tryon Park, the business

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and theatrical districts, etc.! Without such residential density, Manhattan would not be Manhattan, and New York would not be New York. A metropolis that isn't relatively crowded is a contradiction in terms. But Mr. Lyford takes a dim view of metropolitan living. He wants true, organic neighborhoods and a genuine community. And he concludes his book with a clarion call for the creation of shiny new towns, located far, far away from the city's centre. Naturally, these towns would be wonderful because they would be "planned architectually, socially, administratively and economically." Whatever that means.

Mr. Lyford's priggish small-town bias is beautifully revealed in a passage on page 9:

> "The children who live on these blocks or walk to school through them begin their education before they get to class in the morning. . . . A child will have learned how to identify an alcoholic before he hears him speak and spot any one of a variety of homosexuals. He has seen at close range the transactions that take place between men and women in hallways or on corners between Broadway and Amsterdam Avenue. He may know that a certain grocery store is the local 'drop' for a policy game, and he will have seen policemen accepting money from street peddlers, storekeepers, and contractors."

It's all so very different from the education of Tom Sawyer or Penrod, to say nothing of Henry Adams. But it is in no way different from the kind of education poor city kids have always received on their streets, in their alleys, on their rooftops. That's why city kids have always been so "prematurely" cynical and sophisticated. There is no evidence that this causes them any permanent damage.

There is an intermittent drizzle of such nonsense throughout this book. (Where, for instance, did Mr. Lyford get the idea that private schools in the area actively proselytize among middle-class parents? It is definitely the other way around.) But there are also substantial clearings where Mr. Lyford's candor and common sense get the better of his preconceptions. He reports the findings of opinion polls which reveal that the overwhelming majority of Negroes and Puerto Ricans *like* living in the area, and that their housing conditions – squalid though they are – represent an improvement over their previous situation. He is very good – and refreshingly outspoken – in his discussion of the ambiguous involvement in local politics of the area's upper-middle-class (and curiously ideology-ridden) Jews. He has no illusions that "the culture of poverty" is a vast reservoir of untapped creative energy. And his account of parochial school education is fair and balanced.

Roger Starr is Executive Director of the Citizens' Housing and Planning Council of New York, and *The Living End* is a hard-headed city-wise book. To such as Mr. Lyford, who lament the absence of "community" in our cities, Mr. Starr replies tartly: "The American community which is being talked of so often, and so profoundly, is essentially superficial and highly mobile. Provided only that a certain homogeneity of social class and income can be maintained, American

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communities can be disassembled and reconstituted about as readily as freight trains." And he goes on to point out how particularly inapplicable the idea of community is to a city such as New York, where only a little more than half the people live at the same address as five years previously.

As might be expected, Mr. Starr is especially good on housing. He stresses that much of the pathetic lamentation from middle-class people about the difficulties of obtaining "decent" housing in the city arises from the fact that things have been getting better, not worse, for the majority. Seventy-five years ago, a middle-class family would use up about 4,000 square feet of floor space – and were able to do so because the men who built these houses, and serviced them, lived with *their* families in perhaps 500 square feet of floor space. Over these past decades there has been a massive redistribution of floor space in favor of the working and lower-middle classes, who can now (a) charge much more for their labor, and (b) afford to pay higher rents. Unfortunately, people's ideas about what the fruits of achievement should be are fixed in childhood, through observation of those who lived better than they did. The consequence is the emergence of a large stratum of successful, or moderately successful, city residents who think they are entitled to a spaciousness, and a rental, that their counterparts enjoyed a generation ago. Hence, frustration.

The Living End is full of ripe and crisp judgment. For instance:

> *On architecture:* ". . . Interesting architecture is not arrived at reasonably, and the system of public letting (of contracts) to rigid specifications is calculated to produce honesty rather than beauty. That there are good reasons for preferring moral qualities to esthetic ones, I do not deny. Yet it must be said that the good is often interred with a public servant's bones, while his descendants must live with the buildings he puts up."
>
> *On reformers and bosses:* ". . . The history of [the] contemporary reform movement has greatly affected the formulation of its policies. It did not start in response to a desire to make changes in the policies of municipal government, but rather in response to a desire to make changes [in the direction of honesty and democracy] in the internal organization of the party . . . [But] one cannot test the value of a local government simply by measuring the extent of its use of democratic methods in reaching decisions. Courage in local government consists of defying the opinion of those most intimately affected by a proposed change, when that change is necessary in order to carry out a crucial point in one's own program. The reformers in office have rarely found this kind of courage. . . . The curious view of democracy [held by contemporary reformers] apparently is founded on the belief that the consent of the governed must be practically unanimous, and must be sought, not in general and at election times, but in the case of every issue affecting the lives of the citizens significantly. The old-time politician started with a different premise. Right or wrong, he believed he was uniquely well qualified to run his city because he understood its needs and the conflicting desires of its inhabitants."

Oddly enough, *The Airtight Case,* which sets out to denounce the urban status quo in unmeasured and frequently hysterical terms,

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has quickly won the approval of congressmen, TV commentators, even mayors. *The Living End*, which is probably the best-informed book on New York City in the past seven years, and whose criticisms are relevant and material, has occasioned no such hoopla. This paradox is a noteworthy urban problem in its own right.

The Civil Rights Movement Takes a Turn

The Columbia University School of Social Work has played a very special role in the civil rights movement in recent years. It has, in effect, articulated the ideology for the "militant" wing of this movement, with its emphasis on "community action" in the form of strikes, sit-downs, mass picketings, and other commotions. It has also supplied several of the "grey eminences" for this movement, most notably Professor Richard A. Cloward, the inspirer of Mobilization for Youth in New York City. So when one comes across an article (*New Republic*, December 17, 1966) by Professor Cloward and his colleague Frances Fox Piven, entitled "Desegregated Housing: Who Pays for the Reformers' Ideal?" one's attention is immediately captured.

The article takes as its point of departure the political fact that such recent legislation as the rent supplement bill and the demonstration cities bill received only lukewarm support – and meager appropriations – in Congress. In each case, it was the issue of "enforced integration" that aroused Congressional suspicion and hostility. Now, with the 90th Congress, the small margin of votes that allowed these bills to pass at all has vanished. Professors Piven and Cloward take the occasion to inquire whether there really is any relation between the goal of racial integration and the goal of decent housing for the slum poor. Their answer – which must have come as something of a shock to many of their followers and admirers – is flatly in the negative.

The authors argue that the emphasis upon integration has, in many ways, actually worked to the disadvantage of the ghetto poor:

> "... Since there is, at best, little public support for low-income housing programs, and since this tenuous support has been overwhelmed by fierce opposition to residential integration, the struggle for residential integration has cost the poor, especially the Negro poor, dearly.
>
> "In effect, the desperate need for better housing and facilities in the ghetto has been and continues to be sacrificed to the goal of residential integration – a goal which, given the political realities of racial conflict in urban areas, can only be said to be receding from view."

After pointing out the magnitude of the need for low-cost housing among the poor of our cities – the particular statistics used are challengeable, but their general import is not – the authors go on to argue that "the task of maintaining racial balance in the city seems insuperable." On this point, they quote some fascinating calculations by George Schermer that, if ever published, are certainly not widely known:

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> "Schermer estimated the numbers of people who would have to be moved each year in order to insure a 50-50 population balance in Washington, D.C., in the year 2000. Assuming that migration trends and birth rates remain constant, 12,000 nonwhite families would have to be dispersed to suburban areas and 4,000 white families induced to return to the District *every year until 2000*. . . . To achieve integration neighborhood-by-neighborhood in Philadelphia by the end of the century, 6,000 Negro families would have to go to the suburbs and 3,000 whites settle *exclusively in ghetto areas* each year." (Italics in the original.)

Professors Piven and Cloward then go on to argue, convincingly enough, that anti-discriminatory legislation in the field of housing has done little to change the patterns of segregation, and further that economic progress among Negroes will not permit a truly massive suburban migration for a couple of generations at least. They conclude that liberals and civil rights leaders should concentrate their efforts on obtaining low-cost housing for the ghetto poor, regardless of its bearing upon the issue of integration. They even stress "the importance of the ethnic community as a staging area for groups to build the communal solidarity and power necessary to compel eventual access to the mainstream of urban life."

There would seem to be two conceivable explanations for this radical change of opinion among thinkers whose ardent commitment to the civil rights struggle is beyond question. The first, and least probable, is that they are weary of doctrinaire militancy and wish to settle for a pragmatic and meliorist approach. The second is that the emergence of the doctrine of Black Power among the most militant Negroes is causing the white activists similarly to lose interest in integration per se. The Piven-Cloward argument would have been acceptable to Booker T. Washington; it is doubtless now acceptable to Stokely Carmichael. The irony of this situation is instructive to contemplate.

Paying the Ponies

Horse-racing – or the economics thereof – is in trouble, according to a comprehensive analysis by David Novick in *The Blood-Horse* (July 23, 1966), a weekly magazine devoted to improving thoroughbred racing and breeding. Novick, who is the breeder of stakes winners "Growing Up" and "Pontius Pilate," is also a chief analyst at the Rand Corporation and is generally regarded as the inventor of the Program Budgeting System which has now come into use in Washington.

According to the figures assembled by Novick, although the economy recently went through 66 months of boom, the gains for horse-racing are far short of those for other kinds of business. Over a twenty year period, in fact, while gross national product went up more than 300 percent, the total pari-mutuel play increased only 89 percent. Total purses paid to winners went up one and a half times,

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20-Year Boxscore Of Horse Racing And Economic Indicators

	1946	1955	1965	Est. 1966
Gross national product (billions of dollars)	218	398	676	730
Pari-mutuel betting (billions of dollars)	1.8	2.1	3.1	3.3
Total population of United States (millions)	141	166	195	198
Racing attendance (millions)	27	28	48	49
Personal income (billions of dollars)	179	311	530	585
Total purses (millions of dollars)	49.3	76.6	126.3	134.5
Industrial production index	59.5	96.6	143.3	150.3
Cost of living index	68.0	93.3	109.9	113.2
Foals registered	5.819	9,610	17,189	17,500
Yearling prices (average)	$5,929	$5,456	$6,222	$6,400
Thoroughbred earnings (average)	$2,800	$2,941	$3,280	$3,380

but personal incomes went up twice as fast. Moreover, average annual earnings for each horse raced increased by only 17 percent, and yearling prices show only a very small gain – 5 percent.

Novick points out that the expansion in the total amount bet has been largely the result of more racing days, and of more races per day and that "when the aggregate mutuel play is translated into the amounts wagered per race, the gains are substantially smaller than one would have expected in a growing economy." The average pari-mutuel total per race was $74,953 in 1946 and $72,713 in 1965, *a decline of 3 percent.* And with less money bet, the purses per race are smaller.

The racehorse owner has problems too, with rising costs. In 1946, the average yearling sold for $5,929. Twenty years later this price had increased to only $6,222, a gain of 5 percent. But over this period the cost of producing a market horse increased by a factor of three.

The evidence is quite clear. If you want to make money, don't go into horses. On the other hand, as ancient cost-benefit analysts were fond of pointing out, money isn't everything.

Ownership and Control

"Ownership of wealth without appreciable control and control of wealth without appreciable ownership appear to be the logical outcome of corporate development." This was a central proposition of the Berle and Means classic, *The Modern Corporation and Private Property,* published in 1932 and based on data from 1929. In the September 1966 *American Economic Review,* Robert J. Larner, a graduate student at the University of Wisconsin, brings Berle and Means up to

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date by analyzing the relation between ownership and control in the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations in 1963.

Each of these large corporations (the smallest had book assets of $423 million) was classified into one of five categories: (1) privately owned if an individual, family, or other group of associates holds 80% or more of its voting stock, (2) majority owned if such a group holds 50 to 80% of the voting stock, (3) minority controlled if such a group holds 10 to 50% of its voting stock, (4) controlled by a legal device, for example a voting trust, (5) management controlled otherwise. Berle and Means required at least 20% ownership for minority control, but this is much too stringent.

There are always difficult cases in such a classification scheme, but they are too few to affect the broad tendency shown in the table.

Type of Control	1929 Number of corporations		1963 Number of corporations	
	Total	Industrials	Total	Industrials
Private	12	8	0	0
Majority	10	6	5	3
Minority	46½	34½	18	18
Legal Device	41	14½	8	5
Management	88½	43	169	91
Receivership	2	0	0	0
Total	200	106	200	117

Evidently, the private ownership of giant corporations has disappeared. In 1929, some 45% of the 200 largest nonfinancial corporations were management-controlled, and only a slightly smaller percentage of the industrial corporations (i.e., non-public-ultility, non-transportation) among them. By 1963, almost 85% of the 200 largest were management-controlled, and 78% of the industrial companies among them.

Larner classified as management-controlled in 1963 five companies evidently controlled by a single family. They were IBM (Watson), Inland Steel (Block), Weyerhaeuser (Weyerhaeuser), Federated Department Stores (Lazarus), and J. P. Stevens (Stevens). In each case the dominant family had a strategic and long-standing position in management, and owned only a very small fraction of the voting stock.

The extent of management control has certainly increased in the past 35 years. One important reason is that the absolute size (not the concentration) of the 200 largest corporations has simply become too large to admit substantial ownership interests. In 1929, 27 of the 40 largest firms were classified as management controlled, and the number fell fairly smoothly down to 9½ of the 40 smallest among the 200 giants. In 1963, there was no such relation; the incidence of management control was about the same among the first 40 and the last 40 on the list, and in between.

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If these facts are clear, their meaning is not. It is not at all certain that management controlled firms *behave* very differently from those with a substantial ownership interest. From the economic point of view, one might expect the corporate manager to have an interest in the survival and growth of "his" enterprise, even when the profits of the stockholders might better be served by a shift of their capital elsewhere. But no such bias has been demonstrated. What seems to be the case is that managers and stockholders have a common interest in large, growing, and secure profits, and that this central shared interest is likely to outweigh a divergence of interest at the fringes.

Beyond Capitalism

It is rare to find an economist, like Robert Heilbroner, who is quite disapproving of the capitalist system but still capable of writing intelligently and well about it. *The Limits of American Capitalism* (Harper & Row) is a kind of post-Marxian manifesto, and this slim book – two essays, really – marks a possible turning point in radical criticism. One wishes the "new left" would read it, since it would disabuse them of many of the economic fallacies they are so fond of propounding. It is also a good idea for businessmen to read it, since it will provide them with some chilling intimations of mortality that, as a class, they could doubtless profit from – spiritually, of course.

Mr. Heilbroner's aversion to capitalism derives from an old and honorable and by no means extinct tradition: he doesn't like an acquisitive society and what it does to the people who inhabit it. Though this represents a "radical" view these days, it is worth remembering that most political thinkers and moral philosophers who ever lived subscribed to it. It is indeed easy to think of nicer and/or nobler systems of social organization than capitalism. The trouble is that these other systems do not fit nearly so well with individual liberty and representative democracy, as we understand these terms today. Since Mr. Heilbroner is both a liberal and a democrat, he feels obliged to cope seriously with capitalism instead of merely dismissing it as unworthy of civil comment. In consequence, he has written a book that has to be taken seriously.

Mr. Heilbroner's basic argument can be stated as a triad of thesis antithesis, and synthesis:

1) Ours is a business civilization (that's what capitalism means) in which the structure of privilege, the distribution of incentives and rewards, and the cultural ethos we accept as "natural" all derive their legitimacy from the predominance of business enterprise – especially large-scale business enterprise – as an economic and social institution.

2) The business sector of our society, having mushroomed wildly over these past two centuries, is now being "contained" by the new élites of government, science, and the military establishment. These élites have no new social vision of their own – they propose merely to modify our business civilization in an *ad hoc* fashion, so as to render it more capable of meeting emergent social needs.

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3) What will eventually subvert and transform American capitalism is, not any anti-capitalist mass movement, but the revolutionary impact of the new technology. This impact arises from (a) the creation of social problems that demand non-market controls, (b) the transferral – courtesy of automation – of most new jobs from the private to the public sector, and (c) the raising of the standard of living to a point where the acquisitive life will become existentially unsatisfying.

This cursory sketch does not, of course, pretend to do justice to Mr. Heilbroner's analysis, which is subtle and nuanced. *The Limits of American Capitalism* is a tiny book, but immensely thought-provoking.

Instant Reform

The tribulations of one reformer who sought to initiate changes in a local community is reported in the following "swan song" by Edward Palmer, executive director of the Hyde Park-Kenwood Community Conference – a local action group in the University of Chicago neighborhood in south Chicago – as reported in the *Hyde Park-Kenwood Voices*. Mr. Palmer reconstructs the following "imaginary dialogue":

> "What is the Conference going to do about that group of slum buildings, and to help people that live there – The Conference must form a new, imaginative, creative, innovative, exciting program."
>
> "Well, we could ask for rigid code enforcement, but then half of the families would have to move since the people are now doubled and sometimes tripled up in one-family apartments."
>
> "NO, NO, we can't ask those people to move from their *homes*."
>
> "Well, we hopefully could find them satisfactory temporary quarters, and demolish the buildings and construct public housing."
>
> "NO, NO, we can't ask those people to live in concentrated public housing."
>
> "Well, we can hopefully get an 'Instant Rehabilitation' program going, but the end result will still be many people having to move because of building code requirements and the inevitable increase in rents."
>
> "NO, NO, no one must move or be priced out economically."
>
> "Well, I have run out of ideas on how to 'improve the slum' since there is just no realistic way to improve these buildings without many families being forced to move. One of the major problems of slums is overcrowding."
>
> "NO, NO, one certainly can't ask people to move. What the Conference ought to do is develop some new, imaginative, creative, innovative, exciting programs . . . I must leave."
>
> The gentleman then left with the feeling that he had contributed to the solving of a community problem and that the Conference would somehow be negligent and just possibly immoral if it did not develop a N.I.C.I.E. (New, Imaginative, Creative, Innovative, Exciting) program that would (a) decrease density and (b) leave everyone there.

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The Brain Drain

"Few policy issues have stirred as much emotional reaction and as little empirical work as the alleged large-scale migration of scientists and engineers from the rest of the world to the United States during the last decade." So begins the article by H. G. Grubel and A. D. Scott, in the August, 1966, issue of *The Journal of Political Economy* ("The Immigration of Scientists and Engineers to the United States, 1949-1961"). Theirs is the first attempt to measure the "brain drain" and to indicate both the gains to the United States and the loss to various countries from which these scientists and engineers have come.

For all the agitation about the problem, the data, regretfully, is necessarily inconclusive. Table One provides a quick summary of some of the findings. It gives the numbers who have come each year, this number as a percentage of the comparable U.S. graduates in science and engineering for the year, and the social value of this immigration to the U.S.

Table One

The Brain Drain — What the U.S. Gained

Year	No. of Scientists and Engineers Arriving	Percentage of U.S. Graduates	Social Value of Immigrants (in millions)
1949	1,234	1.3	$ 19,298
1950	1,519	1.3	25,751
1951	1,516	1.7	28,789
1952	2,297	3.2	44,559
1953	2,718	4.5	54,898
1954	3,200	5.5	66,266
1955	2,862	5.0	63,651
1956	3,790	6.1	88,659
1957	5,823	8.1	144,142
1958	5,190	6.5	135,402
1959	5,081	5.9	141,389
1960	4,326	4.8	125,433
1961	3,922	4.2	116,950

Notes: The figures on the numbers of scientists and engineers are derived from the U.S. Immigration Service and published in three pamphlets by the National Science Foundation.

The figure for the "social gain" was computed by the cost of training a scientist and engineer for 17 years (through one year of graduate school), plus the earnings foregone per man during the time spent in school, which is a standard way of computing investment in "human capital."

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The magnitude of this inflow can be seen best in this way. In 1960-1961, a total of 1,311 U.S. institutions conferred four-year Bachelor's degrees. The foreign immigration that year was equivalent to the science and engineering degrees of fifty-three "average" U.S. universities.

If one figures the social gain to the U.S., it comes to as high as $144 million in 1957 and a total of $1,055 million for the thirteen years period. The 1957 figure was equivalent to 13 percent of U.S. merchandise imports and 8 percent of net (non-military) U.S. government foreign aid grants for the same year. Compared to the total stock of U.S. human and material wealth, the gains are small; but for countries losing so many persons, the losses may be enormous.

The fundamental difficulty in measuring the "brain drain" is the high mobility of professionals, many of whom reside in at least one other country before coming to the United States. If one looks at Table Two, Canada is the greatest loser in both the total number who have left there, and the percentage of degrees given in the 1957-1961 period. The emigration of 29.8 percent of first-degree earners is economically significant.

Table Two

The Brain Drain — Who Lost

Country	Average 1957-1961 Immigrants by last Residence	Percentage of Degree Holders in that period
Austria	67	12.7
France	82	0.8
Germany	425	7.9
Greece	64	9.6
Ireland	45	9.3
Italy	71	1.3
Netherlands	136	13.8
Norway	98	20.0
Sweden	106	8.7
Switzerland	134	16.9
United Kingdom	661	7.7
Canada	1,240	29.8

But the figures do not indicate how many of these persons eventually go back to Canada, and what Canada itself gains from other countries. Even though the figures show that Great Britain, during this period, lost 7.7 of its degree holders directly to the U.S., there is no way of knowing how many more it may have lost as a result of individuals first going to other Commonwealth countries and then going on to the U.S.

The data and analysis are necessarily incomplete, for while there are statistics for U.S. gains, there are none for other countries. Further, there is no data on the return migration of skilled persons who gained professional training and working experience in the U.S., and while

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immigration data show the last country from which an individual came, they do not show where he received his education.

In sum, however, the gains to the U.S. from the gross immigration of scientists and engineers is equivalent to about 5 percent of the annual output from colleges and universities in the U. S., and represents an addition to the capital stock of the U.S. of about $1 billion over a twelve-year period. The losses, however, inflicted by the "brain drain" on other countries are equal to 20 and 30 percent of degree holders in science and engineering.

In forthcoming issues:

Housing Problems and Housing Policies
Nathan Glazer

The Catholic Colleges
David Riesman & Christopher Jencks

The Political Economy of Efficiency
Aaron Wildavsky

The End of the Population Explosion
Donald J. Bogue

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